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
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
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
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A C C O U N T
OF THE
W A R
IN
S P A I N, P O R T U G A L,
AND
THE SOUTH OF FRANCE,
FROM 1808 TO 1814 INCLUSIVE.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

BY
JOHN T. JONES,

LIEUT. COLONEL, CORPS OF ROYAL ENGINEERS.

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CONTENTS

OF

VOLUME II.

CHAPTER XII.

MATURITY of the Guerrilla System—Internal Affairs of Spain
—Operations in Catalonia—Surprise of Figueras by Rovira
—Siege and Capture of Tarragona—Figueras recovered by
the French—Activity of the Catalan Leaders—Movements of
Lord Wellington for the reduction of Ciudad Rodrigo—Ge-
neral Hill surprises a French Corps at Arroya de Molinos—
Activity of Balasteros—the French attack and are repulsed
at Tarifa—Operations before Cadiz—Marshal Suchet invades
Valencia—defeats the Army under Blake—captures Mur-
viedro and Valencia Page 1

CHAPTER XIII.

Lord Wellington lays siege to Ciudad Rodrigo—carries the
Breaches by storm—suddenly moves to his right, and be-
sieges Badajos—carries the place by Assault—Marshal Mar-
mont makes an irruption into Portugal—and Marshal Soult
advances to relieve Badajos—the latter retires, on the Fall of
Badajos—Lord Wellington moves rapidly against the former,
who retrogrades on his Approach 60

a 2

950867

CHAPTER XIV.

Military and Political Situation of Spain in May—Lord Wellington decides to act offensively in the North—destroys the Communication between the French Armies across the Tagus—advances to Salamanca—reduces the French posts in that City—manœuvres on the Douro—retires before Marshal Marmont across the Tormes—defeats him in a general Action—pursues him beyond Valladolid—marches against Joseph Buonaparte—enters Madrid—Marshal Soult raises the blockade of Cadiz—is manœuvred out of Seville and concentrates on Granada 84

CHAPTER XV.

Lord Wellington moves from Madrid against the Army lately Marmont's—drives it beyond Burgos—lays siege to the Castle—the Armies of Marshals Soult, Suchet, and Joseph Buonaparte unite in Valencia—advance for its relief—Lord Wellington raises the Siege—retires behind the Douro—Joseph recovers Madrid—marches against Lord Wellington—The hostile Armies manœuvre on the Tormes—The Allies continue their retreat into Portugal 118

CHAPTER XVI.

Lord Wellington advances into Spain—turns the line of the Douro—manœuvres the French back on Vitoria—defeats them in a general Action—drives them beyond the Pyrenees—blockades Pamplona and besieges St. Sebastian—fails in assaulting the breaches at the latter place—The French make a great effort to succour Pamplona—are defeated in a succession of Actions in the Pyrenees—The town of St. Sebastian carried by storm—the French defeated in an attempt to succour the Castle—it surrenders—the left of the Allied Army crosses the Bidassoa—Pamplona surrenders at discretion 143

CONTENTS.

v

CHAPTER XVII.

Operations in the Eastern Provinces—Affair at Castalla—Sir J. Murray disembarks in Catalonia—lays siege to Tarragona—
—Marshal Suchet moves to its relief—the British raise the siege, and re-embark for Alicante—French evacuate Valencia, and retire into Catalonia—the British follow their march—attempt the reduction of Tarragona—the siege raised by Marshal Suchet, who dismantles the works—Affair at Ordal—Secret Treaty between Ferdinand and Buonaparte—Lerida, Mequinenza, and Monzon, recovered from the French by stratagem—Return of Ferdinand VII.—General Peace 193

CHAPTER XVIII.

Military Position of Europe—Lord Wellington forces the passage of the Nivelle—places the right of his Army beyond the Nive—Marshal Soult successively attacks the left and right of the Allies—is repulsed at both points—the Army goes into Winter Cantonments—again moves forward—the Left blockades Bayonne—the Right forces the passage of the Gaves of Mauleon and Oleron—gains a victory over Marshal Soult at Orthes—who subsequently manœuvres to his left—a detachment of the Allies, in consequence, gain possession of Bordeaux—the remainder manœuvre against Soult in the direction of Toulouse—attack and carry his entrenched Position round that city—General Peace 217

APPENDIX.

No. 1.

PROCLAMATION of Don Manuel Godoy Page 290

No. 2.

Secret Treaty between his Catholic Majesty and the Emperor
of the French to partition Portugal 294

No. 3.

Decrees of the King of Spain respecting the Conspiracy at the
Escorial 299

No. 4.

Protest of King Charles against his Act of Abdication . 303

No. 5.

Articles of the Armistice and Convention of Cintra . . 307

No. 6.

Proclamation and statements of the British Commissioners re-
specting the execution of the Convention—Detail of the Ma-
nœuvres practised by the 50th Regiment in the action at
Vimiera 318

No. 7.

Particulars relating to the Death-wound of Sir John Moore 328
Instructions under which Sir J. Moore acted 329

No. 8.

Instructions under which Sir A. Wellesley acted in 1809 . . . 334

No. 9.

Proclamation of Marshal Augereau to the Catalans . . . 336

No. 10.

Proclamation for Maiming the Horses in Upper Spain . . . 339

No. 11.

Return of the number of men carrying muskets, rifles, or carbines, effective with the army in March, 1810 . . . 341

No. 12.

Movements of the 3d division at the Battle of Busaco . . . 343

No. 13.

Calculation of the number of French troops employed against Portugal in the winter of 1810—1811 348

No. 14.

Return of the number of men carrying muskets, rifles, or carbines, effective with the army, in June, 1811 353

No. 14.

Regulations for the protection of Couriers, Convoys, &c. against the Guerrillas 356

No. 15.

Return of the number of men carrying muskets, rifles, or carbines, effective with the army in March, 1813 359

No. 16.

Military considerations on the issue of the contest in the Peninsula of Spain and Portugal	362
--	-----

No. 17.

Observations on the impolitic line of conduct adopted by the Cortes in framing a Constitution for the Spaniards	374
---	-----

No. 18.

Return of the number of troops in Spain and Portugal at different periods as noted in the Adjutant General's Office, London	377
---	-----

No. 19.

Convention for a Suspension of Hostilities and fixing a line of Demarcation between the Armies of Lord Wellington and those of Marshals Soult and Suchet	378
--	-----

No. 20.

Population of Spain at the period Buonaparte attempted to change the Government	383
---	-----

 ERRATA.

Page 6, line 9, *for retian read retain.*

— 269, line 3 from bottom, *for St. Etienne read St. Cyprien.*

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ACCOUNT OF THE WAR

IN

SPAIN AND PORTUGAL.

CHAPTER XII.

Maturity of the Guerrilla System—internal Affairs of Spain—Operations in Catalonia—Surprise of Figueras by Rotira—Siege and Capture of Tarragona—Figueras recovered by the French—Activity of the Catalan Leaders—Movements of Lord Wellington for the Reduction of Ciudad Rodrigo—General Hill surprises a French Corps at Arroya de Molinos—Activity of Balasteros—the French attack and are repulsed at Tarifa—Operations before Cadiz—Marshal Suchet invades Valencia—defeats the Army under Blake—captures Murviedro and Valencia.

THE failure of the mighty effort against Portugal last narrated was a death blow to every hope of a speedy subjugation of the Peninsula, as it proved that the utmost efforts of France were unequal to overcome the British and Portuguese army, and consequently, that whilst England persevered, a rallying point would remain for the patriots of Spain. It had also the

CHAP.
XII.
1811.

CHAP. moral effect of lowering the reputation of the
 XII. French arms, and of giving character to the
 1811. allies and to their chief. Further, it totally destroyed Joseph's hopes of conciliating esteem by an equitable administration; as it threw back into Spain nearly 100,000 French troops, and rendering that country again the theatre of war, revived all the vexations and injustice of military requisitions to irritate the people, and render his sway obnoxious. How fully the consequences of this failure were appreciated by Buonaparte may be gathered from the difference of the language he used in speaking of the British army in his address to the legislative body at the commencement of this session, to his predictions to that assembly in 1809, that "on his appearance the frightened leopard would fly to the ocean to avoid shame, defeat, and death." After a flourishing boast that the peace with Austria had been cemented by his happy alliance with the family of Hapsburg, and his own wishes and those of his people satisfied by the birth of the King of Rome, he proceeded to mention that he had annexed Rome to his empire, and put an end for ever to the schisms about religion: that he had from state necessity united Holland to France, and for the protection of neutrals, the mouths of the Ems and Weser; and for the interests of Switzerland, the Valais: then, after a tirade against the English, im-

CHAP.

XII.

1811.

puting to them every bad and unworthy motive and action, contrasted by a declaration that he would never sacrifice the blood of his people for interests which were not immediately the interests of his empire, and expressing a hope that the peace of the continent would not again be disturbed, he thus described the state of the war in the Peninsula—"Since 1809, the greater part of the strong places in Spain have been taken after memorable sieges, and the insurgents have been beaten in a great number of pitched battles. England felt that this war was approaching its termination, and that intrigues and gold were no longer sufficient to nourish it. She found herself therefore obliged to change the nature of her assistance; and from an auxiliary, she is become a principal. All her troops of the line have been sent into the Peninsula. England, Scotland and Ireland are drained. English blood has at length flowed in torrents, in several actions glorious to the French arms. This conflict with Carthage, which seemed as if it would be decided in fields of battle on the ocean or beyond the seas, will henceforth be decided in the plains of Spain. When England shall be exhausted—when she shall at last have felt the evils which for twenty years she has with so much cruelty poured upon the continent—when half her families shall be in mourning—then shall a peal of thunder put an end to

CHAP. the affairs of the Peninsula, the destinies of her
 XII. armies, and avenge Europe and Asia by finishing
 1811. this second Punic war."

This rhapsody, which, prior to the retreat of Marshal Massena, would have been listened to with respect as an oracular denunciation, was now regarded in its true light, as being merely a string of mysterious and hyperbolical expressions, to cover real weakness and inability to realize his former threats:—the English began to appreciate more justly their own strength and resources, and a popular feeling favourable to a more vigorous prosecution of the war commenced; indeed, it is not too much to date the rise of that martial spirit and military exertion, which so eminently distinguished Great Britain in the latter years of the war, from the success of her efforts to shield Portugal.

Maturity of
 Guerrilla
 system.

Whilst the chief force of the French was occupied in Portugal or Andalusia, and there remained in the interior of Spain a few weak corps only, the guerrilla system took deep root, and in the course of this summer attained its greatest perfection. Left to itself, the boldest and most enterprising of its members rose to command, and the mode of warfare best adapted to its force and habits was pursued. Each province at this period boasted of a hero, in command of a formidable band—Old Castile, Don Julian Sanchez; Aragon, Longa; Navarre, Espoz

y Mina; the Asturias, El Marquisito; the Guadaxara Mountains, Juan Martin, the Empecinado; besides which were El Medico, El Francisquito, El Manco, El Temprano, El Pastor, El Frayle, with innumerable others renowned under some distinguishing appellation, whose deeds spread a lustre over every part of the kingdom. These partizans separated and collected at any assigned rendezvous, at the command of their respective chiefs; and being assured of the inviolable faith of their countrymen, would frequently remain concealed for days together at the very gates of a town occupied by the French, and carry off the object of their search the moment it appeared. Nothing was secure from their activity and address. Joseph Buonaparte feared to sleep out of Madrid, even with the strongest guard; every station, every village occupied by the French, was more or less retrenched; and these precautions did not always ensure safety. Besides various small posts destroyed, the cunning Marquisito surprised, in August, a regular garrison in St. Ander; shortly afterwards the daring Empecinado openly attacked and made prisoners three battalions in Calatayud: and in the same month the resolute Mina forced a commandant with 800 men to capitulate in Ayerba, having previously surprised and nearly annihilated a strong detachment coming to their relief. Even

CHAP.
XII.

1811.

Oct. 4th.

Oct. 18th.

CHAP.
XII.
1811.

Oct. 15th.

the fortified towns were no security beyond their walls. The patient and enterprising Don Julian drove away the cattle from under the guns of Ciudad Rodrigo, and remaining in ambush, made a prisoner of the French governor, who sallied out to retake them. Some of these principal bands mustered five hundred associates, but the majority from thirty to one hundred only; the total number of guerrillas to the south of the Ebro amounting, on a reasonable calculation, to nearly ten thousand. The actions of minor hostility committed by the lesser bands, such as prisoners liberated, dispatches intercepted, patrols cut off, are not to be enumerated; acting independently, in small bodies, but occasionally combining their movements, they were a constant source of inquietude to the French armies, doubling their duty, and giving perpetual employment to whole brigades in fruitless endeavours to annihilate them.

Append. 14.

Though such a desultory mode of warfare could be productive of no great results, yet in the reduced condition of the Spanish regular force, it ought to have been most carefully cherished and encouraged. Unluckily, however, the reputation of some of the guerrilla chiefs raised an unworthy jealousy in the government, which feared their becoming independent; and to retain an authority over them, they artfully rewarded their exertions with military rank,

thereby subjecting them to the generals of the regular army. Gaudy uniforms, a personal staff, and other useless appendages followed: with their titles, their feelings of importance rose, and they increased their force in a corresponding degree; composing their bands of artillery, infantry and cavalry, they exchanged activity for weight, and became a bad species of regular force. The talents of Mina and Longa alone rose with the change: they headed corps of 5 or 6,000 men with distinguished ability, and favoured by the strong country of Aragon and Navarre, displayed manœuvres, sometimes for months together, in baffling the pursuit of more numerous bodies of French, which would have reflected credit on the most celebrated commanders: a volume would scarcely suffice to detail their various stratagems, and the alternate boldness and prudence of their movements. On one occasion, a price being put on Mina's head, the combined operations of armies, and the united efforts of the police of neighbouring provinces were directed against him; but though driven to the verge of destruction by such an overpowering effort, he revived in increased strength and boldness. With these exceptions, the guerrilla force withered under the interference of the government, and would probably have ceased to exist in a few campaigns, had the war been so long protracted.

CHAP.
XII.
1811.

CHAP.
XII.

1811.

Notwithstanding the activity of the guerrillas, the greater part of the population, in the summer of 1811, submissively acquiesced in the rule of the intrusive government. The principal difficulty Joseph's ministers had to contend with, was to raise sufficient money to cover the expenses of the state, after providing for the support of the French armies. The rich possessions of the monastic orders, and the confiscated estates of various patriotic noblemen, were applied to the public service, and an endeavour was made, by partitioning the country into districts, under an equitable system of imposition, to provide for both objects. These attempts were constantly defeated by the insubordination of the French commanders, who arbitrarily seized and appropriated to the use of their respective corps whatsoever came within their immediate grasp. The penury of Joseph's government, and the distress of his party amongst the Spaniards were in consequence extreme: a profuse distribution of honours, and nominations to lucrative employments in every part of the dominions of Spain, for some time supported his interest; but as the war became protracted, and the expectation of speedily receiving any benefit from these appointments vanished, they ceased to attract, and the number of his adherents daily diminished: indeed, at this time, for want of means to pay or feed the few Spaniards he had

been able to organize into battalions previously to the retreat of Marshal Massena, they were permitted to desert with impunity.

CHAP.
XII.

1811.

The ill consequences produced to the royal cause by inattention to the regulations of the government were altogether disregarded by the French generals; and the remonstrances of the Spanish ministers only produced insulting replies: they were reproached with the clemency of their sovereign in releasing prisoners and overlooking repeated opposition to his authority, as being the chief cause of the public distress by paralyzing their system of force and vigour. The Spanish authorities being thus totally disregarded, the subsistence of the French armies continued to be provided by requisition on the country round their cantonments, the inhabitants of which were, as a remuneration, freed from taxation. Their pay was a minor consideration, the troops being usually kept two years in arrears, and as death, desertion, or captivity cancelled every claim, a large proportion never received anything. At first plunder and the sale of confiscated possessions produced considerable sums; but soon the cost of renewing the clothing and equipments of the army, with other indispensable disbursements, far exceeded the amount that exaction could raise, and in the third year of the war, regular remittances from France became indispensable. At the

CHAP.
XII.

1811.

commencement of 1811, one hundred thousand pounds monthly issued from the French treasury was more felt by Napoleon than the annual drain of 70 or 80,000 men, and was made a subject of threatening remonstrance. The French marshals, to avert his displeasure from themselves, imputed the charge to want of vigour in the government: Joseph recriminated on their violence, and Napoleon at length seriously contemplated, as a means of establishing subordination and making Spain bear the expense of the war, to abolish the independent government and place the whole country under a French military administration. Joseph, on the failure of the efforts against Portugal, was called to Paris to confer personally with his brother on this important change; but the danger of confiding to able hands the chief command of so large a force superseded all other considerations, and after a threatening lecture and much unworthy treatment, he was sent back with an injunction to make every interest secondary to that of keeping the imperial armies efficient. From that time almost an open schism prevailed between Joseph's ministers and the French commanders. The latter* set no bounds

* When Joseph Buonaparte passed through Burgos in June, 1811, on his return from Paris, he received the homage of the clergy: after the ceremony, Urquijo, addressing himself to the Reverend Canon ———, said, His Majesty desires to

to their insubordination, in some cases even seizing the produce of the taxes after they had

CHAP.

XII.

1811.

speaking with you in private after dinner! The Canon was accordingly introduced, and Joseph, after complimenting him on his patriotism and on that of his brother, General ———, who held a very important command under the Cortes, said he exceedingly lamented the distresses of Spain, and was desirous of bringing about tranquillity; then turning his discourse to his endeavours to befriend the Spaniards whilst at Paris, he warmed in his feelings, and said Napoleon had treated him with such indignity, had used such abusive language and such violence, even upsetting a table upon him, that he was determined no longer to submit to his arrogance, and that he had come to the resolution of freeing Spain from the presence of the French armies; but previously to such a measure, he must negotiate certain conditions with the Cortes, and that he had selected the Canon to go to Cadiz to open the matter to his brother, General, ——— and to arrange upon what terms the Cortes would treat with him. The Canon arrived in safety at Cadiz; but those to whom he opened the business very properly sent him back to Joseph to say, that previously to treating with him, he must prove his power to make the French armies quit the country. The Canon having had a narrow escape from being put to death as a traitor by the Guerrillas, declined proceeding to Madrid, and came into Portugal in November, 1811, where he communicated every thing, and the negotiation was attempted to be renewed with Joseph, through another channel, but the brilliant events of the campaign of 1812, which immediately followed, caused it to be relinquished.

Whether this was a trick to open a communication with the Cortes, and divide that body, or whether Joseph was sincere, the writer does not pretend to give an opinion, but vouches that the above, in substance, was noted from the words of the Reverend Canon ———.

CHAP.

XII.

1811.

been paid into the royal treasury,* and proclaiming that they had a paramount right to all contributions: so that whilst the government sunk into abject contempt, the intruders lived in abundance, and became more regular in their habits.

The conduct of the French soldiery towards the Spaniards was from the commencement of the struggle very different to their ferocity towards the Portuguese, whom, on every opportunity, they considered themselves authorized to pillage and hunt down as wild beasts—whereas the former, probably from their greater numbers and superior means of revenge, were always treated by them with a degree of consideration. The good effects of this more conciliatory conduct was strongly evinced by the state of the two countries; any part of Portugal occupied by

* “ It appears that the country on both banks of the Tagus, as far up as Aranjuez, has been made over by the Emperor to Marshal Marmont, for the support of the army of Portugal. This arrangement has reduced Joseph Buonaparte to the greatest distress, as the produce of that country was all that he had to depend upon; and he was actually subsisting upon the money produced by the retail sale of the grain forcibly levied from the people.

“ This grain having been thus levied and sold by Joseph, has been seized again by Marmont’s orders, and taken from the people who had purchased it from Joseph’s magazines, who have been informed, that the king had no right to sell it.”—*Extract of a Dispatch from Lord Wellington, dated Freneda, 13th November, 1811.*

the French becoming a desolate waste, whereas the Spanish peasant, feeling personal security, (and aided by the immense sums disbursed by the two belligerents) continued, notwithstanding the heavy exactions to which he was subjected, to renew his crops, and could the consumption of cattle have been replaced with equal facility, agriculture would probably have gone on with little diminution for many years under the burden of the armies. The waste of animal life, however, threatened the most serious consequences; for though the French introduced immense herds of oxen over the Pyrenees, it was found that the quantity of stock annually decreased; and there is reason to think, that had the war been protracted a few campaigns longer, its gradual extinction would have brought desolation on the country, and rendered the subsistence of the foreign armies impracticable. In another respect, the protraction of the war had operated a change highly favourable to the French, for though the great bulk of the Spaniards retained their fidelity to Ferdinand, the horror with which they at first regarded the intruders had insensibly diminished; and in some of the larger towns, where the head quarters of the different French corps long remained stationary, a considerable degree of intimacy had grown up between individuals, and many intermarriages had taken place. A regulation of

CHAP.
XII.
1811.

CHAP. XII. police, introduced this summer by Joseph, was also working a change of sentiment in their favour. In the principal town of every district, Spanish tribunals were established, before which all charges of rebellion or contumacy were summarily tried: by this arrangement the French appeared merely as complainants; the semblance of law and justice was maintained; the odium produced by the frequency of military executions was avoided, and the indignation of the people turned against their own countrymen.*

Government of the
Cortes.

The Cortes, holding their sittings in Cadiz, and cut off from all communication with the interior of the country, were unknown, or an object of little interest, to the nation. That body was principally occupied in discussing abstract questions of right, or legislating for the colonies under the influence of the merchants of Cadiz; not a single regulation for improving their armies, or providing for the public expenditure, had yet emanated from them; and their proceedings scarcely deserve mention, except to observe that they tended to destroy that vigour beyond the law, so necessary in war, and to deprive the country of the funds by which alone armies can be supported.

At this period, the Spanish government with

* After the return of Ferdinand several of the members of these tribunals were tried and executed as traitors.

difficulty paid about 35,000 men, chiefly in gar- CHAP.
rison at Cadiz. The provinces of Galicia, Ca- XII.
talonia and Valencia, each upon its own re-
sources, supported from 10 to 15,000 troops; but 1811.
as, when beyond the limits of their respective
provinces, no funds existed for their pay or sup-
ply, they were not available for general service,
and could scarcely be deemed national forces.

It strongly exemplifies the unyielding character of the Spaniards, that in this enfeebled state, approaching to annihilation, the Cortes, in a secret sitting in the summer of 1811, negatived, by a majority of three to one, a motion for confiding the chief command of their forces to Lord Wellington; and that the people, though feeling an anxious desire for the conclusion of the war, applauded their decision, spurning the idea of shortening their sufferings by an act which they considered derogatory to the national honour.

It was however in Catalonia alone, that a Martial spirit worthy of such firmness shone forth. After the fall of Tortosa, General Sarsfield took post with his corps, about 6000 men, at Vals, and Marshal M'Donald marched from Perillo with the Italian division of General Eugene and a brigade of French dragoons to dislodge him: on the approach of the assailants, Sarsfield retired to the heights of Pla and Fuencaldas, where he formed his men in

Military
events in
Catalonia

CHAP.
XII.

1811.

16th Jan.

line behind the crest of the hill; the Italians, in the eagerness of pursuit, followed without order, and being received with a heavy fire, were checked and thrown into confusion, on which the Spaniards instantly charging, General Eugene and vast numbers fell, and the rest fled in such disorder that the division must have been annihilated but for the opportune arrival of the French dragoons, who, by a spirited charge, checked the pursuit. During the following day, the hostile forces remained in presence of each other, and on the night of the 17th, Marshal M'Donald silently retired on Lerida, where he remained till the end of March, when, being obliged to visit Barcelona, he set out by the circuitous route of Manresa, escorted by the same troops. Sarsfield, gaining intelligence of his intended movement, in order to harass his march, posted the main body of his corps at Monserrat, and placed a brigade with artillery in ambush at Manresa: the advance of the escort fell into the snare, and being completely cut up by close discharges of artillery and musketry, were forced back on the main body:—in revenge for which second affront, the Italians burnt to the ground the same night the flourishing and populous town of Manresa. The flames illumined the country many miles around, and served as the signal for ample retribution; for as soon as the French columns on

the following morning entered the defiles of the Col d'Avi, they found the forces of Sarsfield seconded by all the inhabitants of the neighbouring territory, posted behind the different rocks and precipices, from whence they opened a most destructive fire; and, as the Manresans gave no quarter to such as fell into their power, an endeavour was made by the French to carry off all their wounded, which added so much to the embarrassment of the retiring force, that it was six hours winding up the mountain, and had nearly half its numbers disabled before it reached Barcelona.*

CHAP.
XII.
1811.

Early this spring the Marquis of Campoverde replaced General O'Donnell as Commander-in-Chief, and soon afterwards the French army of Aragon began to act in the principality, when the Catalan forces being no longer equal to contend with the intruders in the field, Campoverde established them in a strong camp under the walls of Tarragona, and turned his endeavours to other modes of annoyance. On the 19th March, he made an attempt with about 6000

* It being the policy of Napoleon to raise the military character of the Italians, the action at Vals was never permitted to be mentioned in any newspaper in France; but he wrote on the occasion in very angry terms to Marshal M'Donald, and to mark his displeasure deprived him of the honour of directing the attack of Tarragona, which, as Commander-in-Chief in Catalonia, belonged to him of right, and confided it to the General of the army of Aragon, Suchet.

CHAP. men to surprise Fort Montjuic at Barcelona; but
XII. those in whom he trusted for assistance having
1811. betrayed his intentions to the governor, the garrison were prepared to receive the assailants, and when the leading Spanish battalion had descended into the ditch, opened such a fire that it was in a moment annihilated: the remainder of the assaulting force instantly withdrew, but various French posts, judiciously placed for the purpose, intercepted their march and caused them a very considerable loss. Two Miquelet leaders, General Martinez and Colonel Rovira, shortly afterwards directed a similar attempt against Figueras, which was attended with the most brilliant success, and filled every Catalan heart with joy. Having established an intelligence with three Spaniards serving in the citadel, they were admitted with a body of men through a sally-port, on the night of the 9th April, and surprised the French garrison in their beds. Rovira then turned the guns against the town, which was occupied by 700 other French troops, and obtained possession of it also. Unfortunately, the arrangements to support this grand blow, by insuring a supply of provisions, had not been fully combined: a strong garrison was thrown in under Martinez, which maintained a communication with the sea for a considerable time; nevertheless, when invested by a corps under General Baraguay d'Hilliers, the

place contained food for little more than three months. At the end of April, the Marquis of Campoverde, after some necessary preparation, marched from his camp near Tarragona with all the force he could collect to escort a convoy for its relief; but on the 3d May, when in the act of endeavouring to force through the blockading lines, his rear being attacked by a French brigade which made a detour from the opposite side, his army dispersed, leaving the convoy and 1,500 prisoners in the hands of the enemy, besides suffering a severe loss in killed and wounded.

CHAP.
XII.
1811.

During the absence of Campoverde's army, General Suchet, with a force of 20,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry, completed the investment of Tarragona without opposition, and immediately ^{4th May,} began to bring up artillery and stores from Tortosa and Lerida to commence the siege: his communication with the former place was protected by Fort Balaguer and a corps entrenched at Perillo; and to secure that with Lerida, he now strongly fortified the large convent on the heights above Montblanch. The Spanish garrison was of nearly equal amount with the besieging force, and being supported by a squadron of English men of war, under Captain Codrington, which kept the port open for the admission of supplies and reinforcements, threatened to make a most obstinate defence.

CHAP.
XII.

1811.

On the other hand, Suchet, who saw the brightest prospects dawn upon him should he speedily capture this last hold of the Catalans, and complete the conquest of the province, determined to second a vigorous attack with the utmost license of military severity. The siege was in consequence obstinately contested; but as the works of Tarragona no longer exist, the details would be of little practical utility, and the leading features only will be mentioned.

Fort Oliva, a detached work, was first attacked, and as soon as a breach was formed, it was assaulted on the night of the 29th May, and being carried, fifteen hundred of the garrison were bayoneted. The attack was then directed against the works of the lower town: on the 21st June, two breaches being practicable, they were stormed, and no quarter given; above 2000 Spaniards were bayoneted. Suchet reported to his government, that in this assault only 160 prisoners were made, saved by a miracle from the fury of the soldiers; and that 1553 bodies of those who fell had been collected to be burnt: and added—"I fear much, should the garrison stand the assault behind their last defences, that I shall be forced to set a terrible example, and intimidate Catalonia and Spain for ever by the destruction of an entire city."

His apprehensions were shortly afterwards

realized. The attack of the works of the upper town, the only remaining defence of the Spaniards, was vigorously pushed forward, and batteries to form a breach were nearly completed, when a British force of 2000 men, under Colonel Skerrett, arrived in the bay from Cadiz. That officer, with his engineers, examined the front attacked, and the latter truly foretold that it would be speedily beaten down after the enemy's fire should commence. On this report, the Governor, Contreras, a brave and sensible man; feeling that to press his allies to land would be to sacrifice them with his garrison, recommended rather that the British should co-operate with the Catalan army under Campoverde, in an attack of the rear of the besieging force, when his garrison should sally out and cut their way through the guard of the trenches, by which means, the regular troops, a fine body of men, 7000 in number, would be preserved for future services. Colonel Skerrett immediately sailed in a man of war to arrange the operation with Campoverde, who, since the severe loss he met with in the attempt to relieve Figueras, had been unable alone to act against the French, and had taken post with his army at Vendrels, about twenty-five miles to the eastward. The two commanders arranged to make a combined attack; but before Campoverde

CHAP.
XII.
1811.

CHAP. could move forward, or Colonel Skerrett rejoin
XII. his troops in the bay, the fate of Tarragona had
1811. been decided. The French batteries opened at
day-light on the 28th June, and by ten o'clock
a practicable breach was formed: the besiegers
then appeared perfectly quiet, firing only an oc-
casional round or two; but when the heat of the
day had a little abated, they suddenly rushed
to the assault. The defenders made but slight
resistance, and in a few minutes the French co-
lumns were in the streets, and immediately gave
loose to every species of licentiousness. Some
thousands of the citizens perished by individual
atrocities; whilst a continued fire from the batte-
ries swept away crowds of trembling fugitives,
who fled to the sea side and sought refuge in
the boats of the squadron. The British seamen
gallantly rescued many within reach of the
very sabres of the enemy's dragoons, who
charged amongst the defenceless mass, cutting
and slashing in every direction. In a word, it
was a French imperial army licensed to pursue
its own inclinations, and scenes such as are read
with distrust in the ancient historians, are at-
tested, by some thousand witnesses still alive, to
have been acted here. General Suchet's own
statement is as follows:—

Moniteur.

“The rage of the soldiers was increased by
the obstinacy of the garrison, who expected to

be relieved, and were prepared to sally out. The fifth assault given yesterday in the middle of the day to the inner works was followed by a frightful massacre, with little loss on our side. The terrible example, which I foresaw with regret in my last report to your Highness, has taken place, and will be long remembered in Spain. 4000 men were killed in the streets: 10 or 12,000 attempted to save themselves by getting over the walls, 1000 of whom were sabred or drowned: we have made 10,000 prisoners, including 500 officers, and in the hospitals remain 1500 wounded, whose lives have been spared."

CHAP.
XII.
1811.

There is something so exceedingly revolting in the picture of these severities, that the mind cannot divest itself of feelings of abhorrence towards the individual who directed them; or otherwise, were the subject coolly and dispassionately considered, the censure would be equally divided between the aggressors and the commander of the suffering party. It is the paramount duty of a general to use every means in his power to bring his operations to a successful termination, and to preserve the lives of his own men; and there seems no other such effectual mode of preventing similarly obstinate defences to those of Gerona and Saragossa, as for the assailants to avail themselves of the

CHAP. power of retaliation which victory furnishes. It
XII. is no more than the custom of war justifies, and
1811. self-preservation demands. In a battle, if a
division stand the charge, the successful party
make no scruple to bayonet all those they over-
take; and no reason can be assigned why troops
fighting behind a wall should be differently
treated, and have the privilege of destroying
their opponents till the last moment, and when
they can no longer do so with impunity be
greeted with friendship. Till a certain point of
the attack, it is perfectly safe to continue the
defence; if the garrison persevere longer, they
do it at their own risk: it is optional with them.
It was so at Tarragona;—and the principle of
putting to the sword after the assault of a breach
all those found with arms in their hands seems
so fully justified by right and policy, that Ge-
neral Suchet, on the abstract consideration of
the subject, cannot be censured for having done
so. The peculiar nature of the contest, however,
ought to have made him hesitate in its applica-
tion to the Spaniards, a people merely defending
their homes against an unprincipled aggression.
The idea of so severely punishing an act of pure
self-defence should have revolted his moral feel-
ings and those of his officers. Such not having
been the case, and the ferocious acts of which
they were guilty towards the unarmed inhabi-

tants, equally with the garrison, having been publicly avowed, give rise to many reflections on the abasement of the moral character under military despotism. In what country, enjoying a sufficient share of freedom for impartial discussion, would a man after such deeds be well received in society?—or what government, having the voice of a free and enlightened public to control their acts, dare to confer rewards upon him? Yet in France, General Suchet was not only elevated to the rank of Marshal for the massacre at Tarragona, but his character, it is believed, rose in the estimation of most of his countrymen.

CHAP.
XII.
1811.

The next operation of this successful commander was to dislodge the Baron de Eroles from Montserrat, which had been strongly fortified, and from whence he made incursions to the very gates of Barcelona. On the 24th July, the French made various attacks on each side of the mountain, and the Spaniards, not being in numbers sufficient to resist at all points, were quickly overcome, and Eroles himself with difficulty avoided being made prisoner.

French take
Montserrat;

This loss was followed by another still more severe. On the 19th August, the brave Miquellets, headed by General Martinez, after having sustained a blockade of four months in Figueras, and consumed all their provisions, attempted to cut their way through the investing corps: but

recover Fi-
gueras.

CHAP. the French having blocked up the roads, cut
 XII. ditches, and made thick abattis, with a variety of other obstacles, the Spaniards were
 1811. checked in their efforts, and after a long conflict forced back with considerable loss. The following day the garrison capitulated, which event completed the conquest of the principality, if the possession of the chief towns and military posts can be so called, whilst the inhabitants universally refuse obedience. Catalonia is extremely mountainous, and only one great road traverses it longitudinally, running parallel to the coast, and at many points skirting the ocean. On this road are nearly all the strong fortresses, the sieges of which have been narrated; and the French were accordingly in full possession of the communication. But the western side of the principality is Pelion upon Ossa; mountain rising above mountain in rapid succession, to the summit of the Pyrenees, and presenting innumerable fastnesses yet uninjured by the labour of man. There the provincial force, under Eroles, Sarsfield, Rovira, Manso, Milans, &c. found places of refuge and retirement, from whence they made constant excursions across the road; and, when the field army of the enemy was on any distant service, frequently for weeks together occupied an intermediate town, preventing the slightest communication between the different garrisons; so that, literally,

Activity of
 the Catalans.

it required a division of troops to escort a messenger from the one to the other. Indeed at no period did the manly spirit of the Catalans, and the enterprise of their chiefs, shine more conspicuously than immediately after the loss of their fortresses; which must, in some measure, be attributed to the firm conduct of General Lacy, who, on succeeding to the command in July, having issued many consolatory and animating proclamations to dissipate the alarm caused by the rapid progress of the intruders, directed various small enterprises against them, Eroles, on the 1st September, convoyed and assisted by a British frigate, retook the islands of Las Medas, considered of some importance as commanding the long-shore navigation, by which Barcelona was chiefly supplied with provisions. Soon afterwards, when the French forces concentrated at Tortosa to prepare for further conquests, leaving a number of scattered posts to keep the principality in subjection, and to maintain the communication with Aragon by the road of Lerida, a regular system was acted upon for their reduction. On the night of the 4th October, the corps of Eroles surprised the town of Igualada, killing or making prisoners 200 men, who had not time to secure safety in the castle to which the remainder fled; and three days afterwards defeated with greater loss, a detachment coming to their relief. The castle

CHAP.
XII.

1811.

CHAP. was soon after evacuated by the French, as also
 XII. Montserrat, and other posts in the vicinity of
 1811. Barcelona. On the 10th, the same active chief
 forced 600 men to capitulate in Cervera, and on
 the 14th, nearly 400 in Belpuig. The French
 made a great effort to intercept Eroles, which he
 evaded by a rapid march into Languedoc: there
 he spread terror and dismay amongst the autho-
 rities; but committing no acts of reprisals against
 the inhabitants, contented himself with levying
 a moderate contribution, with which, and a
 number of cattle, he triumphantly regained his
 native mountains.

Operations
 of the Bri-
 tish and
 Portugeze.

To revert to the operations of the Portugeze
 and English army. Immediately after raising
 the siege of Badajos, Lord Wellington planned
 the recapture of Ciudad Rodrigo, and during
 the time the hostile armies were in presence of
 each other on the Caya, the details of the ope-
 ration were drawn out, and preparations for the
 attack commenced by sending the battering
 train and siege stores from the Tagus to the
 Douro.

The war in the Peninsula was conducted
 on principles peculiar to itself, and reasoning
 founded on the events of other campaigns will
 not apply to it. That a general, with an inferior
 army, at the very moment of a tacit acknow-
 ledgement of his opponent's superiority by re-
 linquishing the pursuit of a valuable prize when

nearly within his grasp, should form the design of wresting from that same enemy a fortress, which from every feeling of honour and interest he was bound to preserve, seems an inconsistency; but tracing the idea to its origin, weighing the reasonings upon it, and combining therewith the successful result of the enterprise, agreeably with the hopes entertained, it will appear far otherwise, and to have been formed on an accurate knowledge of the strong and weak points of each army. Portugal owes much to its poverty. The impossibility of subsisting a large army for a length of time on the resources of any limited portion of it, formed the pivot on which the military operations for its defence invariably turned. The French were at no time sufficiently masters of the country to establish magazines; but subsisted on the daily contributions they levied, and never therefore could remain long united in a large body. The British and Portuguese, on the contrary, had their floating magazines on the Tagus and on the Douro: every thing was drawn from their rear; and provided the line of supply was not materially lengthened, so as to require a great increase to the number of animals that brought up the provisions, they could act as well in one part of the country as in another, and for any length of time. The French, during the whole of 1811, possessed a great numerical superiority over the

CHAP.
XII.

1811.

CHAP. allies, and could alone have been prevented de-
XII. riving some advantage therefrom by every move-
1811. ment of the latter being conducted with a happy
reference to the difference of the commissariat
of the two armies.

The expectation of success in the meditated enterprise was founded on an extension of the same principles. Ciudad Rodrigo, standing sixty miles from the cantonments of the French army, and in a country decidedly hostile, could only be provisioned by convoys escorted from that distance: it was therefore apparent, that should the allies be cantoned in the villages around it, no supplies could be thrown into the place with a less escort than an army sufficiently numerous to overcome them. The enemy must therefore either harass his troops by long and frequent marches, in drawing them from the distant provinces to collect that number, every time it should become necessary to revictual Ciudad Rodrigo, or he must abandon it. It was further arranged, that the battering train and siege stores should be brought forward to Villa de Ponte, only sixteen leagues in the rear, to admit of immediate siege being laid to the place, should the enemy employ any part of his troops on other services. The allies, therefore, whilst remaining quiet in healthy cantonments, would paralyze the whole of the French forces

in the north; and as from their inferiority in numbers they could not possibly make any offensive movement, perhaps no other plan of operations could have been devised, by which Portugal would have been so securely covered, and so much assistance have been rendered to the general cause of the Peninsula. In the execution of this project, so soon as Marmont's army reached Salamanca, the whole of the allied forces were (with the exception of a corps of 14,000 men under Lieutenant General Hill, guarding the Alemtejo frontier,) cantoned in the villages on the banks of the Agueda, near Rodrigo, head-quarters being fixed at Fuente Guinaldo.

CHAP.
XII.
1811.

Allies block-
ade Ciudad
Rodrigo.

In the course of this summer, France, being in amity with all the rest of the world, poured some large reinforcements into Spain:* in July, four divisions of veteran troops passed through Vitoria to join Marshal Marmont, and other considerable bodies about the same period traversed Biscay to strengthen a corps designated the Army of the North, which, under the independent command of Count Dorsenne, was intended more immediately to watch over the northern provinces,

* It has been ascertained that between the 19th July and the end of September, 1811, above 42,000 infantry and 9000 cavalry entered Spain from France.

CHAP. XII.
1811. being in readiness at any moment to unite with Marmont's army in operations against the British. The object of those two commanders, after being thus reinforced, was to induce Lord Wellington to move forward on Salamanca, and bring their united forces into his rear: with that hope, they left a very slight garrison in Salamanca, and Marshal Marmont concentrated his army in the valley of the Tagus, whilst Count Dorsenne evacuated the Asturias and advanced on Astorga with all the force he could assemble, to act against the army of Galicia.*

25th Aug. General Abadia, who commanded that undisciplined body, retired on the approach of the French within the defile of Villa-franca, which Count Dorsenne, after a sharp affair, did not think it prudent to enter, but halted and employed his troops to scour the neighbouring country in every direction. Lord Wellington, on the contrary, notwithstanding the strong temptation held out to him, kept his troops perfectly quiet in their cantonments during the great heats till the middle of September, about which time Ciudad Rodrigo began to be much distressed for provisions, and repeated accounts were received that a very large army was assembling to escort a convoy to its relief: but as it is the constant practice of the French

* See their despatches in the *Moniteur* of the 23d October.

CHAP.

XII.

1811.

commanders to circulate false reports respecting the amount of their forces, it would have been too credulous to rely on their statements of the advance of 60 or 70,000 men, and by a retreat allow them quietly to relieve Rodrigo with an army probably not mustering half that number. Lord Wellington, therefore, caused a position in front of Guinaldo to be retrenched, as a point of support to enable him to keep out his advanced corps till the last moment, and by that means ascertain the real force of the enemy. The troops were concentrated in readiness to occupy the position, General Craufurd's light division remaining on the right of the Agueda, near Martiago, to watch the roads on that flank, and General Picton's division in advance on the heights of El Bodom; but both divisions being intended to fall back on Guinaldo, if threatened in force. At length the French generals, finding their scheme for drawing Lord Wellington from his cantonments fruitless, agreed to unite their forces and make a great effort to oblige him to raise the blockade of Rodrigo. Marshal Marmont arrived at Tomames by the pass of Baños on the 22d September, and the same day, Count Dorsenne, having previously called to his support the independent corps of General Souham from Navarre, joined him there from Salamanca. To render the operation more complete, a division of French troops from Madrid

CHAP. XII. marched at the same time on Zarzamaior and Gata, and a corps from the south manœuvred in Estremadura.
1811.

On the 24th September, several divisions of French infantry and cavalry, to the number of 30 or 40,000 men, took up ground in the plain in front of Ciudad Rodrigo; other large bodies formed on the hills around it, and further reinforcements could be observed approaching from different quarters. Under this formidable escort, an immense convoy, consisting of loaded wagons, carts, cars, horses, mules, intermixed with bullocks, sheep, and other animals, extending along many miles of road, began early to file into the town, and continued to enter throughout the day.

Affair at
El Bodom.

On the morning of the 25th, thirty squadrons of French cavalry, and a body of infantry with twelve pieces of artillery, crossed the Agueda as a reconnoissance. The infantry made a demonstration of forcing the advanced position of El Bodom on its right, whilst the cavalry by a detour ascended the heights on its left, and, advancing rapidly towards Guinaldo, rendered precarious the retreat of the troops opposed to the infantry, but the officer in command judiciously extricated them by crossing to the right of the Agueda, and recrossing the river at a ford higher up. On the left, the only force at first to oppose the enemy's formidable cavalry were two

British and one Portuguese battalion, with three squadrons of dragoons and four Portuguese guns.* Such, however, was the discipline and confidence of this handful of men, that they maintained their ground a considerable time, and when ordered to fall back, on account of the approach of the enemy's infantry, formed into two squares, which, though charged repeatedly on three sides, constantly repulsed the cavalry, and alternately covering each other, effected their retreat in good order on the support ordered up.

The object for which the position of Guinaldo had been retrenched, having been fully attained, the army would immediately have retired, and orders were issued for that purpose; but General Craufurd conceiving, from the movements of the enemy, that the light division might be intercepted in crossing the Agueda by the fords of Robleda, decided, by a march over the mountains, to make a detour into Portugal; and not knowing that the French occupied Perales and Gata with 10,000 men, had filed his baggage in that direction. Under the actual circumstances, it became absolutely necessary to the safety of the light division, that it should countermarch, and cross the river at

* 5th Regiment, Major Ridge; 77th Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Bromhead; 21st Portuguese, Colonel Bacellar; Guns, Major Arentschildts.

CHAP.
XII.

1811.

Robleda, according to the original order, and to cover their junction, the divisions of Generals Picton and Cole, with some cavalry, halted on the position, and the enemy took up ground in their front.

Position of
Guinaldo.

The position of Guinaldo was on a high ridge nearly three miles in width; the right appuying on the Agueda, and the left falling abruptly into a spacious plain, extending to the frontiers of Portugal. It was necessary to post a strong body of troops in the plain to prevent the French penetrating by that flank to the rear of the position; and a division was occupied to counteract any movement they might make to cross the Agueda higher up than Guinaldo, and to make face against the pass of Perales; so that only two divisions could be given for the front. On the morning of the 26th, the enemy were discovered to be approaching Guinaldo in force, and the only alternatives were to abandon as prisoners the finest division in the army, above 5000 men, or risk the chance of being attacked by very superior numbers, in an indifferent position. The latter was preferred; the troops were placed in line of battle, and firmly awaited the shock. In the course of the morning 35,000 infantry, including twenty-two battalions of the Imperial Guard, with a numerous cavalry, assembled a few hundred yards in front of the three divisions, where they formed into line, and were

inspected by an officer of rank. During the time thus lost, the light division passed to the left of the Agueda, and took post on the right of the other divisions, securing that flank of the position. The inequality of force, however, was still too great to give any hope of advantage from an action, and at dusk the head of another very large column appeared in view, which when joined would have augmented the numbers of the French to 60,000 infantry, 6000 cavalry, and 120 pieces of artillery: happily, however, Marshal Marmont was ignorant of the smallness of the force opposed to him, and remained quiet till night, when the army was put in retreat through Alfaiates on Sabugal.

CHAP.
XII.
1811.

On the 27th, two columns of the French followed; and in the afternoon of that day there were some sharp affairs, in which General Cole's division twice lost and twice retook the village of Aldea de Ponte, ultimately retaining possession of it. At night the whole army, according to a preconcerted plan, fell back to a position selected on a chord of the arc formed by the river Coa near Sabugal, the left being at Rendo, and on the 28th offered battle to the enemy; but they having effected their object of revictualling Rodrigo, declined the challenge, and returned to Salamanca. The allies were then put into cantonments rather more retired

Allies go
into winter
canton-
ments.

CHAP. than those they previously occupied, head-quar-
XII. ters being established at Freneda. The casual-
ties of all descriptions attending these move-
1811. ments little exceeded 200.

The French by this great effort having placed Ciudad Rodrigo in a secure state from famine for a considerable time, no hope of speedily reducing it remained, except by a regular siege. To have the power of commencing such an operation at the first favourable moment, it was necessary that the battering train and siege stores should be close to the frontier; with which view, large parties of the troops, immediately on entering their new cantonments, were employed to restore the works of Almeida, and render it a secure place for their reception. Other considerable preparations were likewise to be made before the siege could be undertaken at an advanced season of the year. Rodrigo stands on the Spanish side of the Agueda, a river subject to very rapid rises, ten feet in two days not being an uncommon rise, and the Douro, which receives it, frequently swelling twenty-five feet in the same period. The main ford and the permanent bridge are within musketry of the walls, and all the other passages over the river are either deep or of difficult access, and none of them are to be depended upon in winter; therefore, to insure crossing at the required moment, a bridge of sufficient dimensions to

bear the weight of heavy artillery was to be prepared.)

CHAP.
XII.

1811.

The exhausted state of the country presented a further difficulty. The two armies in their late manœuvres had consumed all the forage near the frontier, and on the approach of winter the little remaining herbage would disappear, and render it necessary to convey greater supplies to a more advanced point, at the moment when all the carriages of the country would be pressed for the service of the siege; the battering train alone requiring five thousand oxen for its removal. To overcome this difficulty Lord Wellington, in opposition to the generally received opinion of its impracticability, undertook to render the upper Douro navigable above the mouth of the Tua, the point where it had hitherto ceased to be navigated. Officers of Engineers were employed on the duty, and in a few months the commissariat boats reached the mouth of the Agueda, forty miles higher than they had previously ascended, which saved a far greater distance of land carriage, and the consequent employment of a multitude of animals.

To divert the enemy's attention from these proceedings, the corps on the Alemtejo frontier, under General Hill, made several movements. That officer, aided by a body of Spaniards, surprised on the 28th October, at Arroya de Molinas, a detachment of 3000 infantry and cavalry

Manœuvres
of General
Hill.

CHAP. of Soult's army, which, under General Girard,
XII. was patrolling the country round Caceres to

1811. levy contributions. General Hill marched from Portalegre on the 23d October by Albuquerque, Aliseda, and Malpartida: at the latter place, on the 27th, ascertaining that the French intended to pass the night in Arroya de Molinas, he made a forced march to Alcuesca, four miles to the south of it, where he halted and passed the early part of the night en bivouac, without permitting a light or fire of any kind to be made that might lead the French patrols to suspect the vicinity of an enemy. The next morning, about 2 A. M. when not likely to be discovered, silently breaking up from his bivouac, he made a flank movement close to the road by which the French intended to march, and where, not apprehending danger, they kept only the ordinary guards. In that position the troops waited the approach of day, when they rapidly moved forward in two columns; the right under Major General Howard, by a wide movement to its right, into the rear of Arroya, and the left column (one brigade) under Lieutenant Colonel Stewart, directly upon the entry of the town from Alcuesca; the cavalry marching between the two, in readiness to support either. The column under Colonel Stewart, favoured by a thick mist and deluge of rain, entered the town so unexpectedly, that the cavalry piquets were rushed upon be-

28th Oct.

fore they had time to mount, and the French main body, though under arms, had so little intimation of danger, that they did not attempt to resist till they had gained the high ground between the Merida and Medellin roads. There they formed into two squares, with the cavalry on their left, to make face against the troops which had dislodged them from the town, and a smart firing took place between the two, during which General Howard's column, having made a sufficiently wide movement, approached the rear of the French, and no alternative remained for them but to surrender prisoners or disperse. There was little hesitation; the squares broke, and the men individually ran up the steepest part of the mountains, followed by the British and Spaniards, till extreme weariness ended the pursuit. Many of the fugitives were killed, 1500 were made prisoners, and three pieces of cannon were taken, with a loss to the allies of only seven killed and sixty-four wounded. General Girard accompanied by a few Dragoons escaped, and crossed the Guadiana at Merida. General Hill's corps after this success resumed its former cantonments till the close of the year, when it advanced to Almandralejo, near which place it gained some advantage over a detachment of the enemy, and afterwards by demonstrations of further movements induced Soult to concentrate his forces in the south.

CHAP.
XII.
1811.

CHAP.

XII.

1811.

Activity of
Balasteros.

In that extremity of the Peninsula, General Balasteros, by adopting a system of warfare similar to that of the guerrillas, manœuvred with much success against various French detachments, till in the autumn, supported by Gibraltar and the strong country of Ronda, the inhabitants of which were ever in arms, he appeared so formidable, that Soult deemed it necessary to send a division of 8 or 10,000 men, under General Godinot, to crush him. Balasteros, having only an equal force, long avoided a general action by rapid marches; at last, on the 14th October, being driven to the very extremity of the Peninsula, he took refuge, and found security and support under the guns of the British fortress. This prudent, yet spirited, conduct, raised such hopes of further success, that detachments of troops were sent from Gibraltar and Cadiz to occupy Tarifa, in furtherance of Balasteros' operations, and landed at the very time he reached Gibraltar. Godinot immediately turned his exertions to dislodge the new comers; but the only road by which he could bring artillery against the town skirting the ocean, the navy, ever on the alert, anticipated his arrival at the pass of La Pena, which they so closely raked with their broadsides, that the French relinquished the attempt and retrograded. Balasteros in his turn became the assailant, and twice gained considerable ad-

vantages over Godinot on his retreat, who, on reaching Seville, fearing to be reproached for want of success, put a period to his existence. General Balasteros shortly afterwards united all the force under his command at Prado del Rey, from whence he made a night march to attack General Semèle, who, with a corps of 2,000 men, was posted at Bornos to guard the right bank of the Guádalete. The surprise of the French was most complete, and after a slight attempt at resistance, which cost them many men, they retired as fast as they could march, abandoning their artillery and baggage. General Balasteros then put his troops into quarters at Bornos, Algesiras and other towns, to refresh, till the beginning of December, when, Marshal Soult having prepared a force to overwhelm him, he embarked his army on board of transports in Gibraltar Bay to seek a more distant field of action.

CHAP. XII.

1811.

26th Oct.

4th Nov.

The French were too well aware how narrowly they had escaped destruction by the Barrosa manœuvre to risk the probability of its recurrence, by leaving Tarifa in possession of the allies, (who had now thrown in a force of 2000 men,) and during this month made a great effort for its reduction. Tarifa could not be considered a fortified post, being merely surrounded by an uncovered wall, imperfectly flanked by small projections; but, as an island

French attack Tarifa;

CHAP. connected with it by a bridge afforded a place
XII. of refuge for the inhabitants, and a secure point
1811. of re-embarkation for the garrison, when driven
from the town, General Copons and Colonel
Skerrett, commanding the troops of the two
nations, decided to undertake its defence, and
whilst the French were bringing up the means
of attack, they, by great and continued exertion,
added much to the strength of the works.
General Laval, with 10,000 men, formed the
investment on the 20th of December; on the
25th broke ground; on the 29th his batteries
opened; and on the 31st a breach became prac-
ticable. The garrison during the attack were
indefatigable; besides maintaining an incessant
fire of artillery on the approaches, they estab-
lished powerful flanks to sweep the face of the
breach, and loop-holed the houses and barri-
caded all the streets in its rear—thus having
completed every necessary precaution, they
firmly waited the assault. At eight A. M. on
the 1st of January, a column of nearly 2,000
men advanced openly to storm the breach from
a distance of 250 yards: during its approach the
defenders kept up a steady and well-directed
fire of musquetry and artillery from the ram-
parts with such effect, that the assailants broke
before they reached the foot of the rubbish: a
small collected body made a spirited but fruit-
less effort to force through the gate-way, and

are re-
pulsed;

the remainder spread along the foot of the wall to seek a less exposed spot; but, after a little while, finding themselves in every direction overwhelmed with showers of hand-grenades, or cut up by a flanking fire of artillery, they deemed success hopeless, and returned into the trenches with the loss of one-fourth of their numbers killed and wounded. Discouraged by the steadiness of the garrison, Laval made no further effort to renew the assault; but resumed the fire from his batteries, which, at the expiration of forty-eight hours, rendered the opening in the wall alarmingly great. Colonel Skerrett made the most skilful arrangements to meet the increased danger, and showed such confidence, that the French, fearing a second repulse, retired on the night of the 4th of January, burying their artillery, of which the bad state of the roads from heavy rain precluded the removal.

CHAP.
XII.
1811.

retire.

At Cadiz nothing worth narrating occurred from the period of the battle of Barrosa to the conclusion of the year. Less cordiality subsisted between the officers of the two nations after the failure of that expedition, and a court of inquiry, held by order of the Cortes, having acquitted General La Pena of any want of energy of conduct on the day of the battle, Sir T. Graham moved to a wider field of action on the staff of the army in Portugal, and the command of the auxiliaries devolved on General Cooke,

Operations
before Ca-
diz.

CHAP. who employed all the force he had disposable
XII. to garrison Tarifa and support the operations of
1811. Balasteros. The French having relinquished the
hope of being able to force the passage of the
San Pedro river, in consequence of the degree
of perfection the works for its defence were
attaining, had apparently adopted the project of
turning the defences of the island of Leon, by
crossing the harbour and making a descent on
the long narrow isthmus at the extremity of
which Cadiz is built; with that view, artillery
was crowded in battery on the point of Troca-
dero to overwhelm that of the opposite fort of
Puntales, and launches and gun-boats were con-
structed for the passage of the troops. At the
same time the strengthening the several works
of the lines went on unceasingly, and above five
hundred pieces of cannon were collected from
different places for their armament. Marshal
Soult, subsequently, to banish the remembrance
of Victor's defeat, and to gloss over his own in-
activity, cast artillery of a peculiar construction,
from which shells filled with lead ranged over
great part of the town. The army in the island
of Leon did not return the compliment, because
the principal sufferers would have been their
countrymen or allies. Nevertheless, by a happy
art the French possess, of giving importance to
their military operations, their defensive position
in front of the island of Leon has been mag-

nified into a strict blockade and vigorous bombardment of the town; and by an undue regard for national fame, is most frequently called by the English the siege of Cadiz.*

CHAB.
XII.
1841.

*-The piece of artillery lately mounted in St. James's Park, considered as a monument of national success, is highly gratifying to every Englishman's feelings; but those who wrote the inscription upon it, either not understanding the force of military terms, or underrating the value of military character, have turned it into a monument of reproach, by making it a public memento that the French besieged Cadiz. Nothing could more disadvantageously contrast the difference of energy of the two nations than the fact, that a French force, seldom exceeding ten or fifteen thousand men, had entered the island of Leon and carried on the siege of Cadiz, at the time when we were exerting our utmost strength to prevent it. As they did no such thing, but, on the contrary, entrenched their cantonments, and held a position, strictly speaking, more defensive than that of the army in the island, which maintained its piquets and advanced posts on the continent during the whole period in question, it surely would have been no more than justice to ourselves, and no disparagement to our enemy, if the inscription had been rather to the following effect. That the French, intending to besiege Cadiz, were, by the powerful aid England gave to the garrison, prevented for two years from even setting a foot in the island of Leon; that, alarmed for their own safety, they erected formidable lines of defence to secure their cantonments; that not daring to approach sufficiently near the town to make use of artillery of the ordinary range, they endeavoured to increase its powers by casting mortars of a different construction to those in general use; that when, by the victory of the Duke of Wellington at Salamanca, the French were forced to abandon their lines, these mortars fell into the hands of the Spaniards who, in

CHAP.

XII.

1811.

Affairs of
Catalonia.Marshal
Suchet
storms Mur-
viedro;

27th Sept.

is repulsed.

28th Sept.

Buónaparte after the events at Tarragona fully appreciated the activity, talents, and (which was more prized by him) inflexible disposition of his newly created Marshal. To give full scope for the display of these qualities, he withdrew Marshal Macdonald from Catalonia, and sent General Decaen, an officer of inferior rank, to command the province, under the orders of Suchet; who, in September, advanced with 25,000 men, to make the conquest of Valencia. Success depending much on celerity of movement, he endeavoured by a circuitous route to avoid the delay of reducing the little castle of Oropesa, which commands the great road; his battering artillery however could not follow by the same track, and appearing before the citadel of Murviedro without other means of attack, he ventured a general escalade, in which he was repulsed with great loss. After this check he remained inactive for a fortnight, till he had brought forward artillery to silence Oropesa. On the 11th of October he established a battery of heavy guns against that castle, which, after eight hours firing, having effected a breach, the governor capitulated. The French battering train then moved by the high road, and on the

gratitude to the British for preserving Cadiz from the dangers and horrors of a siege, presented this to the Prince Regent, &c. &c.

18th of October arrived before Murviedro. As during the time thus lost, the Spaniards had assembled a force to relieve the garrison, the besiegers hastily threw up some distant batteries, from which they formed a breach, and; without further preparation, gave the assault. The approach proved narrow and difficult, and the columns, after a great display of gallantry and boldness, were driven back with the loss of 2 or 300 men killed and wounded. Suchet after these failures went regularly to work, and on the 24th had brought his operations nearly to a close, when the advance of General Blake, with a considerable army, caused the attack to be suspended, and the besieging force to be concentrated to oppose him. That officer, after separating from the allies on the Guadiana in June, having been repulsed in an attempt to assault the castle of Niebla, returned to Cadiz, from whence at the end of July, he sailed with a body of troops to Almería, and uniting with the army of Murcia, mustered 20,000 men under his command.—Soult immediately moved all his disposable force in that direction, and on the 9th of August, in a general action near Lorca, so completely dispersed the Spaniards, that not more than 8 or 9,000 men united at Lebrilla, to which place Blake retired his head-quarters. The fugitives, however, by degrees collected, and various reinforcements were sent to their support from

CHAP.
XII.

1811.

opens
trenches ;Movements
of General
Blake.

CHAP. XII. Cadiz, and on the invasion of Valencia the command of the army of that province was likewise

1811.

conferred on General Blake, increasing his force to 30 or 35,000 men, being nearly all the veteran troops in Spain, including the corps which so gallantly fought at Albuera. The different corps and divisions were commanded by Zayas, Lardizabal, C. O'Donnel, Villa-campa, Juan Caro, Mahy, officers of distinguished merit, and the cavalry and horse artillery, were of superior quality. Thus supported, Blake boldly advanced on the 25th October to relieve Murviedro: on his approach, Marshal Suchet, leaving six battalions to continue the blockade, took a position with his left resting on the sea in rear of Puzol, and his right extending to the mountains beyond the village of Val de Jesus: two brigades were allotted to observe the defile which leads from Betara to Gilet, with a brigade a little distant on their right to watch the road from Segorbe, and a third in reserve in rear of Murviedro to support either the blockading corps or the left of the French line.

Is defeated
near Mur-
viedro;
25th Oct.

The Spanish troops commenced the action with great spirit, rapidly driving back the French piquets, and making themselves masters of Puzol, with scarcely any loss; on their left, also, after some hard fighting, they carried an important height and captured two brigades of artillery: the battle then became general along

the whole front, and being in view from the battlements of Murviedro every advance of the Spaniards drew forth the most extravagant demonstrations of joy from the garrison: already had some Spanish dragoons arrived within a mile and a half of the place, and its relief seemed probable, when Blake, elated with the prospect of a victory, ordered a wide movement on both flanks to prevent the retreat of the French, of which Suchet took advantage to draw together all his reserves and attack with a compact body the weakened centre of the Spaniards. He easily overpowered it, and drove it beyond Albalate; after which the circumventing wings, being attacked with vigour on the heights of Peuch, and in the defile of Betara, with difficulty escaped the fate they were preparing for their enemies; by force of marching, however, they effected their retreat with the fugitives from the centre, and the army recrossed the Guadalaviar with the loss of 2000 in killed and wounded, and about 4000 made prisoners; the French loss being only 128 killed, and 596 wounded.

CHAP.
XII.
1811.

Murviedro, thus deprived of all hope of relief, capitulated on the following morning. Suchet, a few days afterwards, pushed his advanced posts into the suburbs of Valencia, on the left of the river; but finding the bridges destroyed or covered with strong *têtes-de-pont*, and the Spanish army posted in a formidable po-

Murviedro
surrenders,
26 Oct.
2 Nov.

CHAP.

XII.

1811.

sition on the right bank, with the villages of Quarte and Mislata in their front retrenched; those of St. Onofre and Manises on their left flank converted into strong posts, and their right protected by inundations, and appuyed to the city, he did not feel himself strong enough to attempt the passage, but halted with his left at the Grao, his right at Liria, and his centre in the suburb Serrano; he then covered his front with strong redoubts, and sent urgent solicitations to Joseph and Napoleon for reinforcements. To capture Valencia was a measure of paramount importance, it being the richest city in Spain, and its fall almost ensuring that of Alicante and Carthagena, when the French Eagles would hover triumphant over every battlement on the eastern coast, and the intrusive government be established without a point of interruption from north to south: both brothers, therefore, without hesitation, issued orders for troops to march to Suchet's aid from the other armies, in numbers more than sufficient to ensure his triumph: but as if success were ever to be a prelude with Napoleon to further exertions and further conquests, the completion of these arrangements which seemed to ensure the submission of Spain, was attended with a call on his people for 120,000 additional conscripts.

20th Dec.

Marshal Suchet did not wait for the arrival of all the reinforcements marching to his camp, but

on the 25th December, having been joined by about 10,000 men, chiefly from Catalonia; having brought up 120 pieces of battering cannon and mortars, and completed his bridge apparatus, he decided to attack the Spanish position. During the night he threw two bridges across the Guadalaviar, about three miles above Manises, at which point the inundations cease to be an obstacle; and at the same time made the division of General Harispe cross near Ribarroja, and by a wide movement march upon Torrente, some miles in rear of the point of attack.

CHAP.
XII.

1811.

25th Dec.
French pass
the Guada-
laviar.

Early on the 26th the main body of the French army passed over the bridges with slight opposition; the Murcian division under General Mahy, charged with guarding that part of the river, keeping within the entrenchments of Manises and St. Onofre, and even abandoning those posts before they were seriously attacked, and flying in disorder beyond the Xucar: the Spanish cavalry posted on the extreme left, behaved no better, and after a slight affair at Torrente, fled also far to the rear. Other secondary bodies of French crossed about the same time between Quarte and Mislata, six miles lower down the stream, and also near the mouth of the river: these were successfully opposed in their attempts to advance over the numerous canals and ditches parallel to the Guadalaviar, till the Commander in Chief, seeing the flight

26th Dec.

CHAP.
XII.

1811.

Valencia in-
vested.

of his left wing, and being informed that the division of Harispe had penetrated to Cataroja on the road to Murcia, considered his situation to be desperate—when, instead of leaving a small corps to continue to dispute the intersected country round Valencia, and marching with an overwhelming force against the division in his rear, he took the fatal resolution to retire within the defences of the city, without a further struggle. The French immediately closed on all points, and by means of inundations and some large buildings of which they took possession, were able before evening to establish a defensive line in support of the investment.

Valencia is a very considerable place, containing 80,000 inhabitants, and covered on the northern side by the Guadalaviar; but being fortified with merely an elevated wall flanked by towers, it is not capable of opposing much resistance to a regular siege on the southern side, where it has no natural defence. The government aware of this, had for two or three years previous to this period, spared neither labour nor expense to cover the city, and include the suburbs on that side within a line of temporary works, and had collected artillery, ammunition and arms for a numerous garrison. General Blake upon entering the lines perceived that, from the nature of the new defences and their great extent, they were little calculated for

a protracted resistance, and further learnt that the population of the city augmented by 60,000 fugitives from the country, and cut off from all communication with the sea, had not wherewith to subsist on for more than a few days; in consequence, on the 28th he made an attempt to sally out and liberate his army, but the effort being feeble and the French advantageously posted for resistance, he was instantly repulsed with the loss of 2 or 300 men: indeed Marshal Suchet felt so confident in the strength of his line of circumvallation, that he ventured to send detachments in pursuit of the routed Spaniards beyond the Xucar, one of which entered St. Felipe de Xativa on the 29th, and made a very important capture of stores, ammunition and provisions.

CHAP.
XII.
1811.

From the moment that the abortive attempt to escape from the lines deprived the Spanish army of confidence in their situation, desertion rose to a great height, and during the three following days not fewer than 1500 men passed into the French camp creating the utmost distrust and apprehension in Valencia. The French, on the contrary, encouraged by these circumstances, broke ground with great boldness on night of the 1st January, within 180 yards of the advanced line, directing their attack against the posts of Olivete and St. Vicente, and on the 4th, when the approaches were still at some dis-

1812.

CHAP.

XII.

1812.

General
Blake ca-
pitulates.
9th Jan.

tance, the Spanish army abandoned the defence of the lines, and retired into the town. A bombardment followed, and after three days' continuance, during which the trenches were regularly pushed forward, till the miner had penetrated under the main battlements, General Blake, wishing to spare the citizens the horrors of a storm, entered into a capitulation, and, on condition that religion should be respected, the inhabitants and their property protected, and no inquiry made into the past conduct of those who had taken an active part in the war or revolution, delivered up prisoners, 22 General and 900 regimental officers; 16,000 effective troops of the line, 2,000 sick, 1,700 artillery-men and sappers; and further engaged for the release, by exchange, of 2,000 French troops, prisoners of war in Majorca and Alicante. The victors took possession of 370 pieces of artillery, 2,000 barrels of powder, 3 millions of ball cartridges, and an immense quantity of arms, ammunition, and clothing, supplied by England; and further levied a contribution on the inhabitants, of two hundred millions of reals.

General Blake, and the principal Spanish officers, were immediately marched into France, and the troops followed in successive divisions of 6 or 7,000 each, swelling the number of prisoners made on the eastern coast in this campaign, to more than 40,000.

These rapid triumphs of Marshal Suchet, formed such a brilliant contrast with the desultory operations of the other French armies in the Peninsula; and the conquest of Valencia so much surpassed all his other deeds, and seemed so surely to fix the ascendancy of the French in Spain, that Napoleon, altogether overlooking the nominal sovereign of the country, conferred on his successful Marshal, by an imperial decree, the title of Duke of Albufera, and annexed to the dignity the royal domain of the same name, situated a few miles south of the city, to be held as an unalienable fief of the empire: he also decreed that property to the value of two hundred millions of reals should be selected in Valencia, and considered part of the extraordinary domains of the empire, and in other grants and regulations, acted as if Spain were a dependency of France. Indeed, such accumulated losses and misfortunes might have been expected to have sunk the nation into despair, and have produced distrust, anarchy, and submission; but, luckily, a few days before intelligence of the fall of Valencia became public at Cadiz, a change had been effected in the regency, and the Duke of Infantado had replaced General Blake as President: after that event, the people, far from feeling indisposed towards the government for the evident deficiency of their military arrangements, threw the whole blame of the late disasters

CHAP.
XII.

1812:

24th Jan.

23d Jan.

CHAP.

XII.

1812.

on the few individuals removed from power, and with that peculiar and accommodating confidence, which so frequently supported the nation under misfortune, but which always excused personal exertion, every man felt and expressed a conviction, that the superior energy of the regency newly installed, would serve to repair the errors of the past, and command success for the future.

The unskilful manœuvres of General Blake in shutting his army up in Valencia, and his surrender after such a short resistance, have left great suspicions of his integrity. It is, however, unjust to impute actions to base motives, because they are otherwise incomprehensible, and instances are not rare of a life of heroism and boldness being shaded over by a last act of weakness or imbecility ; besides, confidence is not always accompanied by resource.

Blake served in 1793 and 1794 with distinction at the head of a battalion, in which situation his regular habits and personal courage qualified him to shine. At the battle of Rio-Seco, he commanded a brigade which preserved the most order, and covered the retreat ; and at Albuera, gave further proof of bravery and good arrangement in the charge of a division. Placed, however, repeatedly in the command of armies, he afforded an impressive lesson, that courage and enterprize are of little value, unless blended with

prudence and judgment; a too presumptuous confidence having rendered his career almost invariably disastrous. The events which closed his military life, show how little experience had diminished that failing; as he voluntarily sought the unequal combat in which his army was defeated, and unnecessarily sacrificed the remnant of his force in an attempt to hold a town ill-provided for defence, and without the means of retreat.

CHAP.
XII.
1812.

Thus, through over-confidence and want of skill in their chief, ingloriously fell the flower of the Spanish military. Spain, left without a regular army, sunk for a season into a mere auxiliary, and the contest in the field devolved entirely on the Portuguese and British. How it was supported by them, the succeeding chapter will show.

CHAPTER XIII.

Lord Wellington lays siege to Ciudad-Rodrigo—carries the Breaches by Storm—suddenly moves to his right, and besieges Badajos—carries the Place by Assault—Marshal Marmont makes an irruption into Portugal—and Marshal Soult advances to relieve Badajos—the latter retires on the Fall of Badajos—Lord Wellington moves rapidly against the former, who retires on his Approach.

CHAP.
XIII.

1811.

5th Nov.

MARSHAL MARMONT, after his successful movement to re-victual Ciudad-Rodrigo, learning that part of the allied army had retired into distant cantonments, became persuaded that Lord Wellington had relinquished the hope of obtaining possession of that fortress; and at the close of the year ventured to detach three divisions of infantry, with a body of cavalry, to the assistance of Marshal Suchet before Valencia, and to put the main body of his forces into cantonments on the Tagus. Count Dorsenne had a little previously detached General Bonnet's division to re-occupy the Asturias, and General Du Breton with a division, to scour the province of Las Montañas. These arrangements seeming to offer the opportunity so long sought for, of carrying through a bold and rapid attack before the French troops could be assembled in sufficient

numbers to fight a battle, it was eagerly seized. CHAP.
XIII.
 The different divisions prepared fascines and gabions in their respective villages, and on the 1812.
 6th January, every thing being in readiness to Siege of
Ciudad-
Rodrigo.
 commence the siege, the bridge was fixed at Salices; but a heavy fall of snow having covered the ground, and the weather continuing extremely inclement, it was not till the 8th, that the army moved. The light division under General Craufurd, singly crossed the Agueda, and formed the investment; the other divisions remaining under the nearest cover on the left bank, in readiness to move to the support of the attacking force, and to take their turn of duty in the trenches. The same evening, a detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Colborne, stormed and carried an advanced redoubt, situated on the great Teson, at the precise spot selected for the commencement of the attack, 500 yards from the walls. Ground
broken.
8th Jan.
 The following day, the first parallel was 9th Jan.
 established, and the batteries traced out. On the night of the 13th, the convent of Santa Cruz, on the right of the attack, was carried by assault, a lodgment formed in it, and a communication established by the flying sap. 14th.
 On the 14th, the garrison made a vigorous sortie, and succeeded in filling in a part of the sap before they were repulsed. The same afternoon, the batteries opened, and at night, the fortified convent of S. Francisco, which flanked the left of the approaches, was

CHAP. successfully escalated, and a lodgment formed
 XIII. in the suburbs. The second parallel was then
 1812. completed, and some returns of the sap opened
 to blow in the counter-scarp ; but strong indications of an immediate advance of the enemy to relieve the place, induced Lord Wellington to decide upon giving the assault as soon as the breaches could be made practicable, without the delay of that operation. In consequence, such were the exertions made by the artillery and other officers, that two good breaches were completed in the fausse-braié and body of the place on the
 19th Jan. eleventh day, notwithstanding that the garrison fired above 11,000 large shells, and nearly an equal number of shot, without a single round being fired against the defences in return. General Picton's division was directed to assault the larger, and General Craufurd's division the lesser breach, whilst the demonstration of an escalade, to divert the attention of the garrison, was directed to be made on the opposite side of the place, by a body of Portuguese under General Pack. At 9 p. m. on the 19th, the leading brigade of each division most cheerfully moved forward, preceded by parties of sappers, carrying some hundred bags filled with hay, which they threw into the ditch, to lessen its depth. Major General M'Kinnon's brigade first descended opposite the great breach ; at which moment, hundreds of shells, and various combustibles arranged

Assault of
 the breach-
 es.

along the foot of the rubbish, prematurely exploded, and exhausted themselves before the troops arrived within the sphere of their action. The men gallantly ascended the breach against an equally gallant resistance, and it was not till after a sharp struggle, that the bayonets of the assailants prevailed, and gained them a footing on the summit of the rampart. There, behind an interior retrenchment, the garrison redoubled their defensive efforts, but nothing could long resist the ardour of the attacking columns, and the French gave way at the very moment that the lesser breach was forced; then, being attacked on both flanks, they took refuge in the town, where they were pursued from house to house, till all the survivors were made prisoners. The besiegers suffered less in numbers than might have been expected from such a bold enterprise; having only 6 officers and 140 men killed, and 60 officers and 500 men wounded; but they sustained an irreparable loss in two highly-distinguished general officers, Craufurd and M'Kimmon. The former early fell on the glacis, whilst bringing up his division; the latter, with many brave men, at the moment of success, by an explosion in the ditch of the retrenchment of the breach. Seventy-eight officers and 1,700 men, prisoners, 109 pieces of mounted ordnance, a battering train complete of 44 pieces, an immense quantity of shot, shells, and musquet-ball cartridges,

CHAP.
XII.

1812.

CHAP. with a well-filled armoury, and an amply-supplied arsenal, were the fruits of this success.
XIII.

1812. The capture of Ciudad-Rodrigo, deserves to rank with the proudest deeds of the British and Portugueze armies, it being, probably, the only well-authenticated instance of a retrenched breach, fully manned and prepared for defence; being carried by an effort of cool and deliberate courage, against a brave and skilful enemy. There were no auxiliary attacks to detract from the splendour of the assault, nor to cloak over the humiliation of defeat; a second inclosure of a height, beyond the powers of escalade, leaving the garrison at full liberty to employ their utmost efforts in defence of the breaches.* The combat was therefore a fair trial of courage between the contending parties, and the result is too gratifying to admit of a sentence of exultation. Indeed, throughout all the details of the siege, every branch of the army gave proofs of zeal and devotion. The infantry, in addition to the valour displayed in the assault, were patient and indefatigable in the works of the attack, which were pushed forward by the Engineers,

* The main-scarp at Rodrigo, every where on the eastern side of the place, exceeds twenty-eight feet in height, and no ladder of that length was issued, on the evening of the assault, from the Engineers' park. The Portugueze, under General Pack, spiritedly escaladed a lunette, situated in front of the *fausse-braie*, and overpowered and bayoneted the defenders.

with activity and judgment, and the breaches were most ably formed by the accurate fire of the artillery.

CHAP.
XIII.

1812.

The fact of the reduction of a fortress in face of a superior army, the chief object of which was its preservation, sufficiently marks the brilliancy of the enterprize: but it will appear more striking, when the season of the year is considered (the depth of winter,) with the obstacle to secrecy and dispatch, which the passage of the Agueda formed. The construction of a bridge, and fixing it over that river, gave such strong intimation of an offensive movement being in contemplation, as should have induced the enemy to prepare to succour the place. Notwithstanding this advantage, the celerity of the movements to form the siege so outstripped Marshal Marmont's expectations, that he had not collected his army till some days after its conclusion, and was advancing to the relief of the place with 60,000 men,* in the full confidence of success, when he ascertained, not only its fall, but that the trenches had been filled in, and the breaches rendered nearly defensible; on which he counter-marched, and concentrated his forces round Salamanca. Soon afterwards, he was rejoined by General Montbrun, who, on his arrival at

23d Jan.

* Four divisions of his own army; two divisions of the army of the North, and the division of General Bonnet from the Asturias.—See his letter to Berthier, dated 16th January.

CHAP. Almanza on the 11th, being made acquainted
XIII. with the capitulation of Valencia, marched, con-
1812. trary to the opinion of Marshal Suchet, against
Alicante, hoping, by his sudden appearance and
a threatening summons, to intimidate the go-
vernor into a surrender ; but General Cruz,
knowing the strength of the place, refused to
listen to any terms, and Montbrun, after throw-
ing a few howitzer-shells into the town, retraced
his steps.*

Intelligence of this unlooked-for success, was
received with enthusiastic joy at Cadiz, and
seemed to banish all remembrance of the disas-
ters on the eastern coast : Te Deum was sung
with the grandest ceremonies, splendid illumina-
tions followed, and the Cortes immediately con-
ferred on Lord Wellington, by acclamation, the
rank of a Grandee of Spain of the first class, with
the title of Duke of Ciudad Rodrigo, to himself
and descendants in perpetuity. In England, also,
it was hailed with proud and grateful satisfaction,
and the Parliament, besides a vote of thanks to the
army, settled an annuity of 2,000*l.* a year on the

* It has been attempted to impute the loss of Rodrigo to this
unauthorized march of General Montbrun on Alicante ; but,
it would appear, without sufficient reason, for had that officer
set out on his return from Almanza on the 12th, ignorant as he
was at the time of the necessity for pressing the march of his
troops, it would not have been possible for him to have
reached Rodrigo on the 19th ; as it was, he only arrived at
Toledo on the 25th.

Earldom of Wellington, with which rise in the Peerage, the Regent marked his sense of his lordship's services in the two last campaigns.

CHAP.

XIII.

1812.

The successful attack of Rodrigo was followed by the still more daring attempt to play a similar game in the south, and reduce Badajos. The alarm created amongst the French marshals by the unexpected blow so recently fallen on one of them, added extremely to the difficulty of the meditated enterprise; Marshal Soult having it in his power readily to assemble 35,000 men, and Marshal Marmont being able to join him with a still greater number. All, therefore, depended on secrecy and activity. Accordingly, the battering train, and engineers' stores were embarked in large vessels at Lisbon for a fictitious destination, and being transhipped at sea into small craft, were conveyed up the river Caldao to Alcacer do Sal; where carriages of the country could, without creating suspicion, be collected to transport them to the banks of the Guadiana. Fascines and gabions for the attack were prepared at Elvas, as if intended for the works of that fortress; and every other provision was made under similar precautions of secrecy.

Attempt
to reduce
Badajos.

These, however, were but secondary arrangements in comparison with those of the commissariat, which were not only of far greater magnitude, but also exceedingly complex. The

Commissariat
arrangements.

CHAP. frontier of Beira would not at this time yield
 XIII. subsistence for a single squadron of dragoons, and
 1812. besides providing food for the army whilst on its
 march through that exhausted tract, it was necessary to change the line of supply from the Douro to the Tagus; as, during the meditated operation, the north-eastern provinces would be open to the incursions of the enemy. Further to enable the army speedily to return at any required moment, a quantity of provisions must be left in the north; the recently captured fortress was also to be in some degree provisioned. For the former object, a depôt as a temporary supply was directed to be formed at Celorico, the point deemed least removed from the frontier for safety; and a grand magazine to be established beyond the Douro. So soon as these arrangements were completed, and the breaches at Rodrigo rendered thoroughly defensible, that fortress was delivered
 5th March. over to the Spaniards, and the army was put in movement. One division of infantry, covered by a few cavalry posts, remained on the Agueda, to create an alarm in that quarter; whilst, by a
 9th & 10th. rapid movement, the main body crossed the Tagus on a bridge of boats laid down at Villa Velha, and directed its march on Elvas.

On the 16th March, all the preparations for the siege of Badajos being complete, a pontoon bridge was thrown over the Guadiana, and the light, 3d and 4th divisions, under Lieutenant-
 Badajos invested.

CHAP.
XIII.

1812.

Colonel Barnard, Generals Picton and Colville crossed and invested the town; the remainder of the army, under Generals Graham and Hill, being pushed forward to Llerena, Merida and Almandralejo, to oppose Marshal Soult, who, instructed by the fate of Rodrigo, had begun to concentrate his forces the moment he heard of Lord Wellington's approach. On reconnoitring, it was found that the place had been materially strengthened since the attack of the preceding summer; many of the scarps having been heightened, the detached works secured by good enclosures at their gorges, and a considerable portion of the enceinte having been covered by an inundation of the Rivillas. The garrison was ample and select, and commanded by General Philippon, whose two recent successful defences had inspired all around him with confidence. To reduce such a fortress by a regular attack, had the necessary means existed, would have required more time than sufficient to bring an army to its relief: Lord Wellington, therefore, decided by a bold effort to make himself master of a detached fort, called the Picurina, from the site of which the scarp-wall of one front could be sufficiently seen across the inundation to be beaten down; and having from thence effected a breach, to trust to the obscurity of evening to cover the march of the assaulting columns along the interior edge of the water.

CHAP.

XIII.

1812.

Ground
broken.
17th March.

22d Mar.

The evening of the 17th proved very stormy, and ground was broken within 160 yards of Fort Picurina, undiscovered by the enemy. On the 19th, the garrison made a bold sortie, killing and wounding about 150 of the besiegers, before they were repulsed, and their cavalry in a particularly daring style galloping round the flanks of the trenches, and into the depôts far in the rear. This sortie, however, was more brilliant than useful to the besieged, as the trenches were not sufficiently advanced to be materially injured, and it expended above 300 of their numbers. The defence had a far more powerful auxiliary in the weather, which was so exceedingly tempestuous, and the rain fell in such torrents, as to threaten the failure of the operation. The pontoon bridge over the Guadiana, was carried away by the rise of the river: the current became too rapid for the flying bridges to be worked, and the passage of the supplies of every description, was suspended. The works of the siege were also much impeded by it; the trenches on the low ground being constantly full of water, and the earth becoming so saturated with wet, as to lose its consistency, and not retain any shape. Happily, on the 24th, the weather settled fine, and the besiegers completed their first batteries, which the following day opened on the Picurina fort, to beat down the palisades, and injure the defences. The same evening, Major-General

Kempt commanding in the trenches, that work was assaulted : two parties advanced from the flanks of the parallel to the rear of the fort ; and whilst the attention of the garrison was directed to repulse their efforts to force in at the gorge, a third party successfully escalated the front. The defenders shewed much firmness, continuing to resist even when mixed with the assailants ; many of them were in consequence bayoneted, the remainder, above 200, were made prisoners. About the time the fort was carried, the alarm-bell rang in the town, many rockets were thrown up, and a random fire of musketry and canon was opened from every part of the ramparts, the garrison evidently apprehending a general assault. At the same time, the beating of drums created the alarm of a sortie in the trenches, and the guard commenced a heavy firing ; this caused a still heavier firing from the town, which increased that from the besiegers, and it was past midnight before quiet was restored. The second parallel was then formed, in advance of the fort ; enfilading and breaching batteries were erected in it, and after seven days firing, three extensive breaches having become practicable, the assault was ordered on the evening of the 6th of April. To aid this measure, the counterscarp being yet entire, and the garrison appearing to have made every preparation for an obstinate defence, Major-General Picton,

CHAP.
XIII.

1812.

Assault of
Fort Picu-
rina.
25th Mar.

CHAP. with his division, was directed by a simultaneous
XIII. movement, to escalate the exposed wall of the
1812. castle, described in the account of the former
siege; and Major-General Leith, with his division, the rampart at the other extremity of the town.

Assault of
the breach-
es.

Two divisions, nearly 10,000 men, headed by Colonel Barnard and General Colville, marched to the assault of the breaches about ten o'clock, accompanied by parties of sappers carrying ladders, crow-bars, bags filled with grass, and other useful auxiliaries. They were discovered on reaching the glacis, and instantly a heavy fire opened; nevertheless the men leaped into the covered way at the points where the palisades had been purposely destroyed by the batteries; the ladders were quickly fixed down the counterscarp, and the two divisions descended into the ditch. These operations broke their formation, which could not be restored in the confined space wherein they found themselves encaged. The enemy had the whole front doubly manned, and the summit of the breaches crowned with chevaux-de-frize: confident in their situation, and well provided with every means of annoyance, they poured an unremitting and destructive fire on the assailants, who made many gallant but unconnected efforts to force the breaches; various officers even leading parties of their men to grapple with the

spears fixed on the crest, but never in sufficient strength to remove them. Such and other equally praiseworthy attempts were persevered in for two hours, when the majority of the officers having been disabled, and success appearing hopeless, the two divisions were withdrawn, to be re-organised for fresh efforts as soon as the day should dawn.

CHAP.
XIII.
1812.

General Picton met with a similarly determined resistance from the garrison of the castle, and lost many men; but persevering with firmness and decision in bringing forward fresh assailants, as fast as the preceding fell, he at length succeeded in raising one ladder, and established a footing on the top of the wall: other ladders were then with less difficulty reared at other points—the troops mounted them with great spirit, and after a short struggle in the interior, became masters of the post. The division then formed in readiness to descend into the town as soon as day-light should appear.

Escalade of
the castle.

A little later, General Leith's division in like manner, by perseverance and gallantry, forced in under similar circumstances at the point allotted to them. General Walker's brigade immediately swept round the ramparts, and falling unexpectedly on the troops posted for the defence of the breaches, readily dispersed them. Other battalions were then introduced up the breaches, and the garrison, being overpowered,

Escalade of
the town.

CHAP.
XIII.

1812.

were made prisoners. The Governor and Staff, with a few men, took refuge in Fort Christoval on the opposite side of the river, till the tumult had subsided, when they sent their submission, augmenting the number of captives to nearly 4000. A considerable quantity of ammunition and combustibles, 5000 musquets, 172 pieces of artillery, with more than 80,000 shot, were found in the place: the fortifications were in the very best order, and such skilful defensive arrangements appeared to have been made both by retrenchments and the disposition of the troops and artillery, as merited for General Philippon and his brave garrison a happier fate.—The assailants lost, during the assault, 59 officers and 744 men killed, and had 258 officers and 2600 men wounded, making the total number of killed and wounded during the siege, as nearly as possible, 5000. The only officers of rank that fell were Lt. Col. Macleod, commanding the 43d regiment, and Major O'Hara, of the 95th regiment: the number wounded was too considerable to admit of individual mention: Generals Picton, Colville, Kempt, Walker and Bowes, were among them.

This attack of Badajos was, upon the whole, a most daring enterprise.—The exertions of British troops are, however, sometimes quite extraordinary, and when a few years shall have swept away the eye-witnesses, their achievements in

these memorable assaults, will scarcely obtain credit. Even their very failures on this evening, when fully considered, will be found to add lustre to their character. Probably never since the discovery of gunpowder were men more seriously exposed to its action than those assembled in the ditch to assault the breaches. Many thousand shells and hand-grenades, numerous bags filled with powder, every kind of burning composition and destructive missile had been prepared, and placed along the parapet of the whole front. These, under an incessant roll of musquetry, were hurled into the ditch without intermission for upwards of two hours, giving to its surface an appearance of vomiting fire, and producing sudden flashes of light more vivid than the day. Description, however, conveys but a faint idea of the imposing nature of such mode of defence. The doors of success were certainly thrown open ; but they were so vigilantly guarded, the approach to them was so strewn with difficulties, and the scene altogether so appalling, that instead of its being a disparagement to the troops to have failed in forcing through them, is it not rather a subject for pride and exultation that they had firmness to persevere in the attempt till recalled?—Nor did the great loss they sustained from the well prepared efforts of their antagonists render them vindictive : on gaining the ascendancy, not a Frenchman im-

CHAP.
XIII.

1812.

CHAP. XIII. 1812. ploréd mercy in vain. Scenes of plunder and drunkenness, such as are inseparable from an assault, prevailed to a great extent; but strong measures being immediately adopted, order was restored the succeeding day. In touching thus lightly on the excesses of the British, in comparison with the stronger mention made of the conduct of the French on similar occasions, be it remembered, that whilst the latter sports with life, and indulges every base passion, the former is seldom cruel; his chief object is the discovery of liquor, and generally speaking, his utmost personal outrage, a blow.

Movements
of Marshal
Sout.

Marshal Sout having completed his arrangements for uniting a force of about 25,000 men, broke up from Seville on the 1st April, and advanced to raise the siege of Badajos: but when at Villa-franca on the 8th, only two marches distant, he was made acquainted with the fall of the place by some cavalry which escaped from Christoval, and had the mortification to find that even his natural activity, increased by the misfortunes of his coadjutor, had been unequal to match that of the British commander. The day previous to the assault, the covering army had fallen back on the besieging force, and arrangements had been made to fight a general action; but the capture of the place rendering such a sacrifice of men unnecessary, the whole of the troops beyond the numbers required for

the defence of the town, were passed over the Guadiana. This measure depriving Soult of all chance of covering his loss by a brilliant affair, he retrograded on Seville; which place a Spanish force under the Condé de Penne Villamur, sent to take advantage of his absence, held in a state of blockade. The allied cavalry under Sir Stapleton Cotton closely followed his march, and gained some advantage over his rear-guard at Llerena, and before he could reach Seville, the Spanish troops had withdrawn, and, by taking a circuitous route, returned to the Guadiana without molestation.

CHAP.

XIII.

1812.

11th April.

Soon after the fall of Badajos, Lord Wellington received intelligence that Marshal Marmont was committing great depredations within the frontier of Beira, and immediately on ascertaining the retreat of Marshal Soult, marched with the bulk of his army to oppose him. That commander, expecting to recover Rodrigo and Almeida in the absence of his antagonist, and calculating that of the great force which Soult had under his command, sufficient numbers might be assembled successfully to engage the covering army, and cause the siege of Badajos to be raised, had judged it better to act in the north, than to cross the Tagus, as at the last attack. So soon, therefore, as Lord Wellington was completely engaged in the operation, he advanced from Salamanca with a considerable force, and

Movements
of Marshal
Marmont.

13th.

CHAP. leaving one division to blockade Rodrigo, known
XIII.
to be indifferently supplied with provisions,

1812. invested Almeida with the remainder. After a
3d April. reconnoissance, he pushed his riflemen to the

glacis, making a demonstration of an immediate
assault of the works as yet imperfectly repaired,
and only garrisoned by militia; but the good ar-
rangements and firm conduct of Colonel Le Me-
surier, the governor, induced him to desist, and
leaving that fortress in his rear, he crossed the

12th April. Coa at Sabugal, and penetrated into Portugal.

The allied cavalry which had been left to ob-
serve Marshal Marmont's movements, retired
towards the Tagus, when he crossed the fron-
tier: a strong body of militia, under Generals
Trant and Wilson, placed in position at Guarda
to cover Beira, also retrograded towards Celo-
rico; but unluckily the rear-guard attempting
to repel the French advance, something like an

14th. action took place, which threw the whole body
of militia into the greatest disorder, and they

15th. were pursued with loss as far as Lagiosa. After
this affair, Marshal Marmont pushed on to Cas-
tello-branco, threatening to destroy the bridge

of boats at Villa-Velha; but on intelligence of
the fall of Badajos and the approach of Lord
Wellington, he hastily retired into Spain, and

23d. raised the blockade of Rodrigo, having, by at-
tempting too much, failed in obtaining those
solid advantages which would probably have

attended a more limited and decided line of conduct.

CHAP.
XIII.

1812.

Allies go in-
to canton-
ments.

Head-Quarters were then established at Fuente Guinaldo, and the army was put into cantonments between the Agueda and the Coa. The officer in charge of the depôt at Celorico had precipitately set it on fire, on hearing of the French army being in movement, and that supply was unnecessarily lost; but from the prudent precaution of having placed the principal magazines beyond the Douro, the army was enabled to subsist in plenty in these exhausted cantonments, and recover its discipline and vigour, after such severe fatigues and losses. In the meanwhile, under protection of a corps commanded by Sir Thomas Graham, the works of Badajos were repaired, and the place put into a state of defence.

This further triumph was received by the Cortes of Spain in the same enthusiastic manner as the reduction of Rodrigo. In England, both Houses of Parliament expressed their thanks to the army and its leader; and though the great loss which attended the assault carried deep affliction into the bosom of numerous families, the success of so dashing an enterprize created throughout the nation a general feeling of pride and exultation. Indeed, it is truly gratifying to be able to state that, at the period of the re-capture of Ciudad-Rodrigo and Bada-

CHAP. jos, Buonaparte, stood on the pinnacle of fame
XIII. and power: his empire stretched from the Elbe to
1812. the Pyrenées, and from the shores of the Northern
to those of the Adriatic Sea; whilst throughout
all continental Europe his military supremacy
was admitted and feared. As proof of the latter
assertion, it need only be recalled to memory
that the various arbitrary decrees which, in the
arrogance of uncontrolled authority, he, from
time to time, issued, to cramp and confine the
industry of the world, were obeyed without an
hostile movement. The powerful and the weak
equally yielded them a full though reluctant
compliance. Even Russia, doubly secured
against his interference by her immense extent
and distant situation, deemed it prudent to submit,
till the prosperity of her empire was threatened
by a longer adhesion, when she endeavoured,
by friendly representations, to obtain an exemption.
These failing in effect, the discussion had,
at this time, assumed the character of angry
remonstrance, the usual precursor of war; but
as a long series of overbearing conduct and insulting
replies had failed to drive her into open
resistance, it cannot be doubted that it depended
on Buonaparte, by conciliatory and friendly attention,
to preserve her as an ally. No external
interference, or the apprehension of it, therefore,
existed, to divert his attention from the affairs
of Spain; and the impartial historian, of what-

ever country he may be, is bound to record, that those brilliant triumphs over the French armies, were obtained by the Portuguese and British, when Buonaparte was in amity with all the rest of the world, and his military empire in the zenith of its strength and glory.

CHAP.
XIII.
1812.

The unfavourable turn which the struggle with the English for the possession of Portugal had taken, could no longer be concealed by Napoleon, and it was becoming absolutely necessary to his reputation and safety, founded on military predominancy, that he should overwhelm the Portuguese and British army, or cloak his inability to do so by some action of superior éclat. The first was nearly impracticable, for should he make a great exertion, and considerably augment his forces, Lord Wellington was prepared to retire to his lines in front of Lisbon; which having been incessantly strengthening till the period of the operations against Rodrigo, ought, when defended with such an army as his Lordship now commanded, to be found perfectly inattackable. The consequences of a second failure could scarcely be calculated: Napoleon therefore left the war in the Peninsula to be decided by perseverance, and the chance of events; and resolved to astonish and dazzle the world by carrying his arms beyond the confines of Europe in the north. Previously, however, he endeavoured, with his accustomed art, to

CHAP. scatter the seeds of discord and arrest the exer-
XIII. tions of England by an offer of negotiating peace
1812. on the basis " that the integrity of Spain shall
be guaranteed. France shall renounce all idea of
extending her dominions beyond the Pyrenees.
The present dynasty shall be declared indepen-
dent, and Spain shall be governed by a national
constitution of her Cortes.

"The independence and integrity of Portugal
shall be also guaranteed, and the House of Bra-
ganza shall have the sovereign authority.

"The Kingdom of Naples shall remain in
possession of the present monarch, and the King-
dom of Sicily shall be guaranteed to the present
family of Sicily.

"As a consequence of these stipulations,
Spain, Portugal, and Sicily shall be evacuated by
the French and English land and naval forces."

23d April.

To these propositions an immediate answer
was returned, requiring the precise meaning at-
tached to the expressions, "The actual dynasty
shall be declared independent, and Spain go-
vernment by the national constitution of the
Cortes."

"If, as his Royal Highness fears, the meaning
of this proposition is, that the royal authority of
Spain, and the government established by the
Cortes, shall be recognized as residing in the
brother of the head of the French government,
and the Cortes formed under his authority, and

not in the legitimate sovereign, Ferdinand the Seventh, and his heirs, and the extraordinary assembly of the Cortes, now invested with the power of the government in that kingdom, in his name, and by his authority, I am commanded frankly and explicitly to declare to your Excellency, that the obligations of good faith do not permit his Royal Highness to receive a proposition for peace founded on such a basis."

CHAP.
XIII.
1812.

The above full and explicit declaration admitting of neither equivocation nor subterfuge, no reply was attempted, and Buonaparte redoubled his exertions to complete his preparations against Russia. French troops to the number of three hundred thousands poured into Germany and Poland. Contingents from Austria, Prussia, Italy, Naples and all the lesser German States joined their standard. Napoleon himself quitted Paris for Dresden on the 9th May; the Kings and Princes of Continental Europe there waited his commands, and after some preliminary arrangements, the signal was given for a march affecting the destinies of the whole world: but before we follow the raging of this mighty torrent to its re-action in the north, let us revert to the more steady but not less destructive stream, which unceasingly undermined Napoleon's power, and absorbed his resources in the south.

CHAPTER XIV.

Military and Political Situation of Spain in May—Lord Wellington decides to act offensively in the North—destroys the Communication between the French Armies across the Tagus—advances to Salamanca—reduces the French Posts in that City—manœuvres on the Douro—retires before Marshal Marmont across the Tormes—defeats him in a general Action—pursues him beyond Valladolid—marches against Joseph Buonaparte—enters Madrid—Marshal Soult raises the Blockade of Cadiz—is manœuvred out of Seville, and concentrates on Granada.

CHAP.
XIV.

1812.

Strength of
the French
Armies.

THE French forces within the Pyrenees in May, 1812, exceeded 170,000, chiefly veteran troops, under distinguished officers. Marshal Soult commanded 58,000 (the army of the south) in Andalusia: Marshal Marmont 55,000 (the army of Portugal) in León: General Souham 10,000 (the army of the north) in Old Castile: Marshal Suchet 40,000 in Aragon and the eastern provinces; and Marshal Jourdan could dispose of 15,000 men, called the army of the centre, for the security of the intrusive king, and the quiet of the capital.* These might be

* The Imperial Guard with some select regiments of cavalry were withdrawn from Spain to accompany Napoleon into Russia. Marshals Victor, Mortier, and other principal officers having also quitted the Peninsula, the organization of the

reinforced to any extent. On the other hand, the capitulation of Valencia had deprived Spain of nearly all the experienced troops formed in her numerous unsuccessful efforts; and the government, embroiled with its American subjects, and without a revenue at home, wanted money to equip other armies, had the Spanish people been forward to second them; whereas, fatigued with the burthen and little success of a war which seemed interminable, they were fast sinking into a state of sullen quiet.

CHAP.
XIV.

1812.

Reduced
state of
Spain.

The extraordinary general Cortes having completed their labours, and definitively arranged the articles of a new constitution, they were sworn to by the members and by the regency, in a solemn sitting on the 19th March; and now being at leisure, it was expected that the military arrangements would come under consideration:—various reports were spread of an intention of attaching a certain number of Spaniards to each British battalion, and of raising corps under British officers, but nothing was effected: it seemed as if they considered the triumphs of the allies to have changed the nature of the contest, and so far from being stimulated by them to greater exertions, they were in secret

French forces into corps d'armée was annulled, and the several armies were composed of divisions of about 10,000 men each. Marshal Jourdan, in the name of Joseph, regulated the general conduct of the war.

CHAP.
XIV.

1812.

Decline of
Guerrilla
system.

exhibiting sad symptoms of declining firmness. The members of the government blockaded in Cadiz trembled at the danger to which they were exposed, and having the opinion of those similarly circumstanced only to consult, had so relaxed in their patriotism, as to commence a negotiation with Marshal Soult for the restoration of all the prisoners in their custody, on condition that the bombardment of the city should cease: thus, to avert a slight personal inconvenience, meditating to let loose some thousand additional oppressors on their more resolute subjects. The fatal consequences to be apprehended from this measure could not be contemplated without alarm. In a contest with an invading force, there can be no middle course: the struggle can terminate only in victory or submission. Concession but places the invaders in a situation to demand further sacrifices, and rare indeed are the examples of forbearance short of unconditional submission. Even the Guerrillas were declining in their general influence: at this period, united into corps of sufficient strength to attack entire brigades of the French, they had ceased to be the insidious enemy every where to be apprehended, and further had thrown off their shield of intangibility; such unmanageable bodies hourly incurring the risk of being forced to regular combat with superior numbers, for which they were altogether un-

fitted by organization or discipline. This increased strength of the bands was also attended with a more serious evil. Guerrillas, equally with other troops, require to be fed and clothed, and their chiefs had no funds to purchase supplies beyond the occasional booty taken from the French. Whilst acting in small bodies, that was usually found ample, or if otherwise, the deficiency was voluntarily made up by the towns and villages. The captures of the permanently large bodies, however, not augmenting proportionably to their increased numbers, the liberality of the population could no longer meet their demands, and supplies could only be obtained by forced requisitions. These, even when bona fide required, caused a sentiment of irritation which was raised to exasperation by the conduct of some of the bands, whose rapacity was so unbounded as to excite distrust of the motives of their union. Thus, perpetual and uncertain demands falling on the citizens from all quarters for the maintenance of the Guerrillas, were fast generating a total separation of feeling and interest between those warriors and their countrymen. So far was this carried, that in all the towns of the southern provinces, the inhabitants had enrolled themselves as civic guards for the preservation of internal tranquillity, and the protection of private property; and it cannot be computed that fewer

CHAP.
XIV.

1812.

CHAP. than 25,000 Spaniards thus aided the intruders
 XIV. against the Guerrillas in Granada and Estramadura alone.*
 1812.

Affairs of
 Catalonia.

In Catalonia, General Lascy, during the operations against Valencia, assembled together the principal force of the province, and after obtaining some considerable success over various French detachments, made the Baron Eroles blockade Tarragona; but on the 24th January, before the investing corps had effected anything against the place, General Decaen from Barcelona attacked it on the heights of Altafalla, and completely dispersed it, killing, wounding, and making prisoners great numbers, and capturing its artillery, stores and baggage.

Affairs of
 Valencia.

In Valencia all was tranquil. Denia, though well provided for a siege, surrendered to Marshal Suchet on the 19th January, without making

* The writer was the first English Officer who, on the occupation of Madrid in August 1812, communicated between Lord Wellington's army and the force at Alicante. The inhabitants of the district through which he passed, never having seen an English uniform, crowded round him by hundreds wherever he stopped to refresh, and supposing him a person of importance, charged him with petitions of every nature to Lord Wellington. He, however, remarked that the most pointed request of the authorities and respectable people of many of the principal towns and villages was, that parties of English cavalry should be sent to scour the country, and put down the Guerrillas, whose demands they represented as being more vexatious than those of the French.

any defence, and shortly afterwards treachery put him in possession of Peniscola. The commandant afforded a solitary example of want of honour in a Castilian : he not only betrayed the confidence reposed in him by his countrymen, but publicly claiming credit for his baseness, endeavoured to augment his guilt by vaunting to the utmost the powers of resistance of his garrison.

CHAP.
XIV.
1812.
4th Feb.

After these captures Marshal Suchet, seeing the turn affairs were taking on the side of Portugal, and learning that a British force had been disembarked to garrison Carthagena, prudently suspended his operations against Murcia, and established his advanced posts on the commanding banks of the Xucar, which gave him a secure front towards Alicante, and left his army at liberty to repress and punish the slightest movement made to oppose his authority ; and thenceforth seconding an equitable administration by a system of unjustifiable severity,* he had

* In direct violation of the capitulation made with Blake, which guaranteed pardon and oblivion for the previous political and military conduct of every individual in Valencia, Marshal Suchet officially reported to his government only sixteen days subsequently, "that 1500 outrageous monks had been arrested and sent to France, and that the chiefs of the insurrection, inmates of the house of the English Consul, as well as the sicars of that wretch, had been executed on the public place." Suchet, the more quickly to establish obedience

CHAP.

XIV.

1812.

Lord Wel-
lington de-
cides to act
offensively,

been able to establish perfect submission and outward tranquillity throughout Valencia. Little therefore remained to Spain beyond strong hatred of the intruders; a half organized army in Galicia, and a few seasoned troops trained by Balasteros in irregular warfare.

The allied Portuguese and British army from long service had attained great perfection, and their commander, unwilling to allow the quiet of the Spaniards to sink into apathy, decided to take advantage of the war in which Napoleon was about to engage with Russia, further to pursue the offensive. The brilliant operations narrated in the last chapter had opened a road into Spain either to the north or to the south, and had deprived the French of all facility of annoyance to Portugal in the absence of her protectors. The numbers of the allied forces in Spain, and even the military means of England, if exerted to the utmost, were far too limited to admit the hope of expelling from the Peninsula so formidable an enemy as the French by any immediate effort; but to lay the foundation of ultimate freedom, by liberating the southern

to his authority, gave up to pillage several towns or villages, which were, for a short period after the fall of Valencia, the seat of declared resistance, and subsequently ordered to be treated as banditti and disturbers of the public peace, all Spaniards taken in acts of hostility against the French troops.

provinces, where the best spirit prevailed, and which would offer a rich and extensive country wherein the Spaniards might renew their exertions, seemed practicable. With that view, Lord Wellington decided to act on the Douro, as the most likely means of speedily attaining his object; for should he gain any decisive success in that quarter, the enemy's troops from the extremities must concentrate to preserve Madrid and the centre of the kingdom; whereas, the consequences to be expected from a victory in the south, would be to draw the enemy's chief force to, and fix the war on the very point to be liberated.

CHAP.
XIV.
1812.

in the north.

Marshal Marmont, who commanded in the kingdom of Leon, could bring into the field, including the division of General Bonnet, detached on a plundering excursion into the Asturias, 50,000 men. Lord Wellington, after leaving a corps of 10,000 infantry and 1200 cavalry, to observe the movements of Marshal Soult, could muster for offensive operations, only 39,000 infantry and 3000 cavalry; but as the Spanish army of Galicia, by threatening the northern parts of the province, would occupy a portion of the enemy to observe it, the force of the contending parties might be considered nearly matched. To prevent any check to a successful career by the junction of troops from the distant French armies, it was arranged that

Scheme of
operation.

CHAP. 10,000 British from Sicily, and 6000 Spaniards
 XIV. organized in Majorca at the expense of England,
 1812. should be disembarked on the eastern coast of
 Spain, and there uniting with a force which the
 Spaniards, with their usual perseverance and fortitude, were assembling under O'Donnell from the wreck of Blake's army, should raise Catalonia and Valencia in arms. This measure, it was presumed, would prevent Suchet from detaching any portion of his forces, and keep stationary the army of the centre, by the sensation it would create in the capital and throughout La Mancha.

Bridge at
 Almaraz

As a preliminary step it was expedient to render the communication between the French armies on the north and south of the Tagus as difficult and tedious as possible, by the destruction of the bridge of boats at Almaraz, their shortest and best line of communication; all the permanent bridges from Toledo downwards, having been destroyed by one or other of the belligerents in the course of the war, and the roads leading from them being scarcely practicable for carriages. The French commanders, feeling the importance of this bridge to their mutual strength and security, had surrounded it on both sides of the river with formidable enclosed works, having in the interior of them casemated and loop-holed towers. In the interval of preparation for the meditated offensive

destroyed
 by Sir R.
 Hill.

movement, Sir Rowland Hill was employed on this service. His corps broke up from Almandralejo on the 12th May, and marching by Jaraicejo, reached, on the 18th, the range of mountains between four and five miles from Almaraz, on which the castle of Miravete stands: The French had put that post into a state of defence, and having connected it by a line of works with a fortified house on the opposite side of the main road, had raised a formidable barrier across the only communication by which artillery could be brought from the south against the works of the bridge, considered inattackable with less powerful weapons. Sir Rowland, however, judged otherwise, and finding that infantry might cross the mountain by a tract leading through the village of Romangorda, he left his artillery on the summit, and at dark began to descend with a column of 2,000 men under Major-General Howard. The leading company arrived at dawn of day close to the principal fort, built upon a height a few hundred yards in advance of the tête-de-pont; but such were the difficulties of the road, that several hours passed away before the rear closed, during which time fortunately a deep ravine concealed the troops from the view of those within the work, and the first discovery they made of their danger, was on a desperate rush being made to the assault. The garrison, however, knowing, from a feint

CHAP.
XIV.

1812.

19th May.

CHAP.
XIV.

1812.

which had been made on the works of Miravete early in the morning, that an enemy was in the neighbourhood, were on the alert, immediately opened a heavy fire, and resisted, with vigour, the efforts made to push up the scarp; but the troops placed round the work to keep down the fire of the defenders being very successful, a dozen ladders were at length raised, and the assailants gained a footing on the parapet; from that moment the firmness of the garrison forsook them, they took to flight, abandoning the tower, and endeavouring to escape over the bridge through the tête-de-pont, which was entered with them. The French officer commanding in the fort on the opposite bank, immediately cut the bridge, and upwards of 250 of the fugitives were, in consequence, made prisoners. He even, under the influence of panic, abandoned his post, and retired with his garrison to Talavera, for which conduct he was tried and most deservedly shot. The whole of these formidable works on both sides of the river thus fell to infantry alone, with the small loss of 33 killed and 147 wounded. The entire establishment, with the great dépôt of stores it contained, was the same day destroyed, and the troops immediately retired.

Marshals Marmont and Soult, so soon as they became acquainted with the march of Sir R. Hill, put their respective forces in movement

towards the Tagus ; the former had the mortification, on reaching the banks of the river, to find his superb establishment in ruins, without being able to command means of crossing to draw off the garrison of Miravete, which remained completely isolated till relieved by a detachment from Toledo. Soult, after marching for some days, learning that Sir R. Hill had passed Truxillo, relinquished the attempt to intercept his return, and the allies regained, without molestation, their position in front of Badajos. General Balasteros took advantage of these movements to attack, with his whole force, (6,000 men,) a division of French posted at Bornos : that point covering the principal communication from Seville to Cadiz against any troops which might be landed at St. Roque or Algesiras, was occupied by the invaders with great jealousy, and had been strengthened by redoubts and intrenchments ; General Corroux received the attack with a destructive fire of musquetry and artillery, and immediately afterwards, sallying out and charging the assailants, the whole Spanish army dispersed and fled, in the utmost disorder, to the camps of Los Barrios and St. Roque, with the loss of two generals, and 150 men killed, 950 wounded, and 700 made prisoners.

CHAP.
XIV.
1812.

General Balasteros defeated.
1st June.

1st June.

During this time, the utmost quiet prevailed in the cantonments of the main body in the

CHAP.
XIV.

1812.

Arrangements for moving forward.

Lord Wellington advances on Salamanca : 13th June.

attacks the French forts.

north, and every thing seemed to indicate an intention of allowing the troops to repose during the approaching heats, as in the former season ; but the moment Badajos was fully supplied, five hundred cars, which had been employed for that purpose from the Caldao river, suddenly turned along the frontier, each bringing a load of provisions to Rodrigo, and then working on the same service from the boats on the Douro, speedily stored the place with a month's consumption for the whole army. The heavy howitzers on the capture of Almaraz also marched northward, and three 18-pounders, with a supply of battering ammunition were secretly fitted out on travelling carriages at Almeida. The bridge over the Tagus at Alcantara was, at the same time, repaired for a more ready communication with the corps in the south than that of Villa-Velha.— These primary objects effected, Lord Wellington broke up from his cantonments on the Agueda, and crossed the Tormes on the 17th June, by the fords above and below Salamanca. In that city, the French had collected a considerable depôt of stores and ammunition ; for the protection of which, and to command the passage of the river, they had constructed formidable works. On reconnoitring, they were found to consist of three well-covered forts of masonry, forming altogether a post of importance, only to be reduced by a regular attack. The division of Major-

General Clinton was allotted for that service, and the remainder of the army took post on the heights of St. Christoval, three miles in advance of the town, with its right on the Tormes, near Cabrerizos, and its left near Villares de la Reyna. On the second day, after breaking ground, the artillery battered in breach, and the ammunition became exhausted before a practicable opening was formed ; but as the parapet of one of the principal forts was much damaged, the palisades beaten down, and the defences otherwise injured, an attempt was made to carry it by escalade, which failed, with the loss of Major General Bowes, and 120 men. On the 20th, Marmont, with a part of his army, approached the position of Christoval, and took up ground in its immediate front, where he remained till the evening of the 23d ; when judging that the allies were in too great strength to be attacked with success, he decamped, and took a position with his right at Cabeza Velosa, and his left on the Tormes, and made many demonstrations of passing the river, under the expectation that the apprehension of losing their line of supply would induce the allies to recross the Tormes, and give an opportunity for drawing off the garrison. In that hope he was disappointed ; for Lord Wellington only passed over one brigade of cavalry to watch his movements, and immediately changing the front of his army, placed it in such a manner

CHAP.
XIV.

1812.

19th June.

23d June.

Marshal
Marmont
manœuvres
for their re-
lief.

CHAP. with its right at the ford of Santa Martha, and
 XIV. its advance at Aldea Lengua; that it could ma-
 ~~~~~  
 1812. nœuvre with equal facility on either bank.

25th June.

During the night of the 24th, Marshal Marmont crossed at Huerta with the principal part of his army, which being known at day-light, two divisions of infantry and a second brigade of cavalry under Sir T. Graham forded the river at Santa Martha, and the remainder of the allied army concentrated between Morisco and Cábrerizos, the advance remaining at Aldea Lengua. In the course of the day the French pushed on to Calvarrasa de Abaxo on the road to Salamanca; but finding the force under Sir T. Graham in order of battle, between them and the town, and other divisions in readiness to cross, they halted, and in the evening repassed the river at Huerta, and re-occupied their position in front of Villares. During these movements a supply of ammunition for the battering guns having been brought up, the attack recommenced on the afternoon of the 26th, and by ten o'clock next morning the larger work was in flames, and the lesser breached. The troops were formed for the assault of the latter, when a white flag announced the intended submission of the garrison: at the same moment the flames in the other work increased rapidly, and the Commandant likewise demanded to capitulate. Each, however, requiring three hours preliminary delay,

27th.

their offers were treated as stratagems to gain time to extinguish the flames, and Lord Wellington limited them to five minutes to march out, promising them their baggage and effects.

CHAP.  
XIV.  
1812.

This message not being complied with, the batteries resumed their fire, under cover of which the storming parties advanced, and carried the lesser fort at the gorge: the enemy offering little resistance, the Portuguese light troops even penetrated into the principal fort, making above 700 prisoners. The works were immediately blown up, and the artillery and ammunition, with a great variety of stores and supplies, given to the Spaniards. The army of Galicia which, under General Santocildes, advanced simultaneously with that of the allies, had, during these operations, blockaded Astorga; and now feeling secure by the fall of Salamanca, commenced serious preparations for its reduction.

French forts  
carried by  
assault.  
27th June.

On ascertaining the capture of the forts, Marshal Marmont withdrew the French garrison from Alba, and retired from his position at Cabeza Velosa towards the Douro; the allies closely followed his march, and, on the 2d of July, the cavalry, under Sir Stapleton Cotton, drove the French rear-guard across the river at Tordesillas. Lord Wellington then took up ground on the left bank, from La Seca to Pollos, whilst making preparations to cross; and Marmont concentrated his forces on the opposite

Marshal  
Marmont  
retires.  
29th.

Lord Wel-  
lington fol-  
lows.

CHAP.

XIV.

1812.

side, between Pollos and Tordesillas, to dispute the passage, which was an exceedingly difficult undertaking, the French having strongly fortified posts at Zamora and Toro, and having, in some degree, secured all the other bridges.

Upper  
Douro.

Between Valladolid and Portugal, the Douro runs through a flat extensive valley, varying in its width between the heights, which is, however, always considerable. The course of the river, in its windings nearly throughout, skirts the heights with its right bank; so much so, that from the Puente del Duero, near Valladolid, to Zamora, the only point favourable for passing in presence of an enemy, from the left to the right bank, is at Castro Nuño, twelve miles above Toro, where there is a good ford, a favourable bend in the river, and advantage of ground. The position of the French was therefore so exceedingly strong, that little hope could be entertained of any successful operation against them whilst they remained concentrated behind the river.

It has been observed that the subsistence of the French armies in Portugal, where they had only temporary possession, depended upon their commanding a sufficient tract of country to supply their wants. In Spain, the active hostility of the people produced the same consequences; as the French never formed any system of depôts or magazines, conceiving that they

would cramp their movements, and prevent their flying from point to point to enforce obedience to their dominion. Marmont, therefore, behind the Douro depended for support upon daily contributions; and to oblige him to separate his forces, or make a decisive movement that should admit of bringing him to action under favourable circumstances, the Guerrillas were let loose upon his flanks and rear, to cut off his supplies, or render necessary large detachments for their collection.

CHAP.  
XIV.  
1812.

Pending the effects of this measure, the French cavalry was considerably augmented, and the division of General Bonnet from the Asturias effected its junction, increasing the French force to 47,000 men; after which, considerable detachments were observed daily to move to their right, and counter-movements were made by the allies; at length, on the 15th, a very large corps having moved down the river, head-quarters were transferred from Rueda to La Nava del Rey, and a general movement of the allied army to its left took place. On the 16th, two divisions of the French crossed the bridge at Toro; in consequence the allies were moved that night to Fuente la Peña and Canizal on the Guarena; General Cole's and the light division occupying Castrejon on the Trabancos, two leagues to the right. The next day it was ascertained that the enemy had re-crossed the Douro at Toro in the

Marshal  
Marmont is  
re-inforced:

7th July.

CHAP. night, destroying the bridge after them, and  
 XIV. had, by forced marches, retraced their steps to

1812. Tordesillas, twenty-five miles above Toro.—At  
 that place the whole French army passed the  
 river without opposition, and by the extraordinary  
 exertion of a march of forty miles, were  
 early on the morning of the 18th on the Tra-  
 bancos. Marmont, by this manœuvre, opened  
 his communications with the army of the centre,  
 which was in movement from Madrid to his  
 support, and endangered the safety of the two  
 divisions on the right; but the cavalry being  
 quickly moved up to cover their retreat, it was  
 effected with trifling loss, notwithstanding the

re-crosses  
 the Douro.  
 18th July.

Allies retire. utmost efforts of the enemy. So close was the  
 pursuit, that the troops halting for a few mi-  
 nutes only, to refresh, on passing the Guareña,  
 their pursuers were enabled to open upon them  
 forty guns, under the fire of which they joined  
 the army on the heights on the left bank. The  
 main body of the French soon afterwards came  
 up, and the hostile armies being collected in  
 front of each other, Marshal Marmont assumed  
 the offensive, and pushed a column across the  
 valley to gain possession of an important ridge  
 above Castrillo, at the junction of the Guareña  
 and the little stream from Canizal, bearing the  
 same name; it was, however, in a moment re-  
 pulsed by Lieut. General Cole's division, and  
 the cavalry judiciously charging, captured a

French act  
 offensively.

general officer, one gun, and between 300 and 400 men. The loss of the allies, during the day, was 100 killed, 400 wounded, and 50 made prisoners.

CHAP.  
XIV.  
1812.

After this severe check, Marshal Marmont <sup>19th July.</sup> became more circumspect, and on the 19th commenced a series of manœuvres, threatening to interrupt the retreat of the allies and throw them into confusion: in the afternoon several divisions marched to their left through Tarazona to out-flank the army and cross the river higher up, but their intentions were parried by counter-movements, and the whole of the allied forces collected behind the Guareña at Vallesa and El Olmo. During the night, dispositions were made in the plain of Vallesa to meet a general attack, but at day-light on the 20th, the whole French army was observed in full march to its <sup>20th.</sup> left, and the allies were immediately put in motion to their right; the hostile force, however, was too far advanced to be thus counteracted, and crossing the Guareña higher up at Cantalapiedra, was enabled to form on a range of heights which extended on the left flank of the army nearly to Salamanca; this, instead of producing a hurried retreat, or deviation from the line of march, was met by the slight change of throwing back that flank, and marching in column along the bottom in a parallel direction to the enemy to the heights of Cabeça Velosa,

CHAP. where the army remained in position for the  
XIV. night, having one division and a brigade of  
1812. cavalry detached to Aldea Lengua, on the  
Tormes, more closely to watch the movements  
of the enemy, who occupied, in great force,  
Babilafuente and Villaruela. The movements  
of this day were highly impressive; the hostile  
armies marching in parallel lines, frequently  
within half-cannon shot of each other, through  
a country open, and with no impediment to  
meeting; every moment it might have been ex-  
pected that some circumstance of ground or  
other accident would have brought on a general  
shock; a few occasional cannon-shot, however,  
alone interrupted the remarkable stillness of the  
scene.

21st July. The next morning the army retired to the  
position of St. Christoval, which it occupied  
during the attack of the forts. The same day  
the enemy crossed the Tormes by the fords near  
Alba and Huerta, marching by their left, to gain  
the road to Rodrigo. To counteract this inten-  
tion, the allies in the evening made a cor-  
responding flank movement by the bridge and  
fords near Salamanca, and halted for the night  
on some heights on the left bank which secured  
their communications; General Packenham's  
division, (the 3d) with some cavalry, remaining  
at Cabrerizos.

22d.

Early in the morning of the 22d July, the

army took up the ground in position, extending nearly from the remarkably bold rocky heights, called the Arapiles, to the Tormes, below the ford of Santa Martha; the enemy being immediately in front, covered by a thick wood, and occupying La Pena and Calvarrasa de Abaxo. About 8 A. M. a French column rapidly advanced from the wood, and seized the outer and most extensive of those strong points; upon which the allies as quickly as possible took possession of the other. This movement proving the determination of the enemy to press the army back, General Packenham's division, with the cavalry, were immediately brought across the Tormes, and posted near Aldea Tejada, in support of the right flank. Until this moment neither commander had obtained any particular advantage over his opponent; each covered his communications, and was free to manœuvre in any manner or direction he might judge best; but as the French army of the centre was within three days' march of uniting with Marmont's force, and a considerable body of cavalry and horse artillery from the army of the north was still nearer, it is probable that the Allies would, in the evening, have continued their retreat. Luckily, however, Marshal Marmont endeavoured to hasten their march by a series of threatening manœuvres on a range of easy heights, not more than a thousand yards in

CHAP.  
XIV.

1812.

Battle of  
Salamanca.  
22d July.



CHAP. XIV.  
1812. their front. About two P. M. he extended rapidly to his left, with great show, much fire from his artillery, and from numerous tirailleurs thrown out in his front and on his flank. This was an attempt to turn the right flank of his opponent, and interpose on the road of Portugal, whereby, with a force little superior to their's, he acted on the circumference of an arc of one-third greater extent than their line, an error instantly appreciated by Lord Wellington, who eagerly seized the favourable opportunity to become the assailant, and made the following disposition of his army :—The 1st and light divisions, under Generals Campbell and Alten, to the left of the Arapiles heights, as the extreme left of the line—the divisions of Generals Cole and Leith, in two lines on the right of that point, with the divisions of Generals Clinton and Hope, and a body of Spaniards, under Don Carlos de España, in column to support them. Major General Packenham's division, with a considerable body of cavalry, formed the extreme right. Whilst these arrangements were in progress, the French made many strenuous but unsuccessful endeavours to possess themselves of the village of Arapiles, situated between the two armies, and occupied by a detachment of the guards; but made no change in their general dispositions, probably deeming the movements of the allies

merely precautionary efforts against their threatened flank manœuvres.

CHAP.  
XIV.

1812.

The moment the formation of the army was effected, the attack commenced from the right. Major General Packenham, with his division, supported by two brigades of artillery and several squadrons of cavalry, under Major General D'Urban, moved along a valley at a very quick rate, and crossed the extended left of the enemy, almost before they were aware of the attempt. Generals Cole's and Leith's divisions, supported by Generals Clinton's and Hope's, moved forward nearly at the same time, and attacked them in front, whilst a Portuguese brigade, under Brigadier General Pack, advanced against the rocky height of the Arapiles. General Packenham's division, with the cavalry, quickly overthrew the left of the French, and constantly bringing up their right, so as to outflank the points on which they attempted to stand, drove them for a considerable distance from one height to another, and made above 8,000 prisoners. Generals Cole and Leith likewise carried every thing before them, and were rapidly pursuing their success along the crest of the enemy's position, when they were momentarily checked by a body of troops advancing on their left flank, from the Arapiles height, which, from its great strength, the Portuguese failed to carry. General Clinton's division, which was marching in second

CHAP. line, in columns of battalions, with intervals for  
XIV. formation, was, at the same time, vigorously at-  
1812. tacked by a body of cavalry, which had been  
concealed behind the Arapiles, and for some  
minutes a fierce struggle of doubtful issue raged.  
Marshal Beresford, who was near the spot,  
changed the front of a brigade in reserve, which  
held in check the troops advancing from behind  
the Arapiles, till General Clinton was enabled  
to form his two right battalions into line, with  
which he advanced to the charge, and being  
completely successful, the French abandoned the  
important point of the Arapiles, when the battle  
again became a series of triumphs. A charge of  
cavalry made by Sir Stapleton Cotton, in which  
General Le Marchant fell, was eminently suc-  
cessful, and each successive height on which the  
enemy endeavoured to check the pursuit was  
immediately carried. The only appearance of  
equal resistance was, for a short time, on the  
French right, where the fugitives, forced back  
from their left by the advance of General Packen-  
ham, attempted to re-form, under protection of  
the troops which had arrived to their support, in  
good order, from the Arapiles. They took up the  
ground with great judgment, forming on what  
might be designated a second position, almost at  
right angles to their original front; the infantry  
were ranged in line along the crest of the hill,  
supported by heavy close columns in reserve; the

cavalry were assembled in masses on their flanks, and the artillery posted on the advanced knolls so as to sweep the whole face of the height, which was steep and rocky. General Clinton's division was ordered to attack them in front, whilst General Cole should make a flank movement on their left; the former advanced up the rocky and steep height in line, suffering most severely from a heavy fire of musquetry and artillery without firing a shot, and charging with the bayonet, drove the enemy from a commanding conical height, and captured two guns. General Cole, about the same time, engaging their flank, they hastily retired from every part of their second position, and the allied troops pursued them till dark as quickly as they could march.

Besides the numbers dead and wounded, 7000 prisoners, eleven pieces of artillery, and two eagles, remained on the field. Generals Ferey, Thomieres, and Desgraviers were killed; Marshal Marmont, Generals Bonnet, Clausel, and Menne were wounded. The allies had nearly 5000 killed and wounded; amongst the latter, five general officers, Beresford, Stapleton Cotton, Cole, Leith, and Alten.

Marshal Marmont and his second being disabled, the command of the French army devolved on General Clausel, who, as soon as it became dark, made a most rapid march towards Alba de Tormes. The 1st and light divisions

CHAP.  
XIV.

1812.

Retreat of  
the French  
army.

CHAP.  
XIV.

1812.

were ordered to the ford of Huerta, under the belief that the Spaniards continued to hold the castle of Alba, and that consequently the retreat of the defeated force must be by Huerta; but the Spaniards had abandoned the castle on the advance of the French, without making any report of it to Lord Wellington, and in consequence the retiring force recrossed the Tormes at that spot in the night, without delay or resistance, and saved themselves from the further considerable loss which must inevitably have attended a rencontre with the first and light divisions, whilst fording the river in their disorganized state. The next morning, the main body of the allies advanced to Alba, where the cavalry crossed, and shortly afterwards came up with the rear-guard of the retiring force near La Serna. A brilliant charge was directed against them by General Bock, with a brigade of heavy dragoons of the German Legion, in which numbers were sabred, and nine hundred made prisoners; many others owing their safety to throwing away their arms, and scrambling over the enclosures.—After this dispersion of their rear-guard, the enemy fell into the greatest disorder; but making exceedingly long marches, and being covered by a strong body of cavalry and horse-artillery from the army of the North, which joined them two days subsequently to the action, and the pursuit being much retarded by the increased

Brilliant  
charge of  
cavalry.  
23d July.

distance to bring up the supplies, they passed the Douro without further serious loss. Lord Wellington directed the Galician army to blockade the French posts on that river, and with his own forces followed the fugitives to Valladolid, which he entered on the 30th; but finding that they continued in full retreat on Burgos, and that he had no chance of overtaking them, he recrossed the Douro the next day, and established his head-quarters at Cuellar, to organize preparations against the Army of the Centre, which, since the battle, had been manœuvring at no great distance from the allies, to favour the escape of the defeated force. On the 6th of August, the army moved on Madrid by Segovia and St. Ildefonso, leaving General Clinton's division and some weak battalions at Cuellar, to observe the line of the Douro.

CHAP.  
XIV.

1812.


French re-  
pass the  
Douro.

Allies move  
on Madrid.  
7th August.  
8th.

Intelligence of the approach of the allies produced a scene of consternation and dismay amongst the French party in the capital not to be described: it would appear that such a fatal event had been totally out of the contemplation of Joseph and his ministers, as no arrangements had been made to meet it; every one began at the same moment to pack up their private effects, to dispose of their immoveable property, and to send off their families; the government seized indiscriminately the animals and carriages belonging to individuals till the square of the

State of  
Madrid.

10th.

CHAP. XIV.  1812. palace and the Puerto del Sol were crowded to excess; various attempts to resist or escape made by the drivers gave rise to violent altercations and affrays; numerous arrests took place, some for open violence, others on suspicion, till at length the city was filled with tumult and confusion.

Joseph makes a reconnaissance;

11th Aug.

puts the Portuguese cavalry to flight.

On the 10th, Joseph, with about 2,000 cavalry, proceeded to Naval Carnero, to watch the movements of the allies, who, the following day, crossed the mountains of Naval Serrada and Guadarama, preceded by a small corps of heavy German and Portuguese cavalry, under General D'Urban: a reconnaissance made by Joseph in the evening, brought on a shock, near Majalahonda, with the advance, in which a charge ordered by the Portuguese cavalry was not executed with spirit; they turned before they reached the enemy, and in their flight upset three guns of the horse-artillery, which, in consequence, fell into the hands of their pursuers. The Germans, however, behaved with their accustomed gallantry, and by a spirited charge prevented any further bad effects from the failure of the Portuguese. The supporting division shortly afterwards making its appearance, the French burnt the captured gun-carriages and retired, followed by the cavalry, whose advanced piquets took post the same evening on the mountains overlooking Madrid.

This, when known, completed the confusion in the city: the night was spent by the French and their adherents in agitation and alarm, in consultations, in the concealment or destruction of public and private documents, in preparations for flight: by the patriotic citizens in mutual congratulation, in joyous hope and expectancy, in pride and exultation: no one attempted to repose, and the streets exhibited the bustle of day. The French troops were kept under arms, and orders were repeatedly given and countermanded, as the feeling of the moment dictated, for the evacuation of the city, till at length, at 6 A. M. on the first movements of the English piquets, Joseph retired in great haste by the gate of Toledo, leaving a body of 1,700 good troops shut up in the entrenchment of the Retiro to bridle the inhabitants, and cover the march of his valuable convoys.

CHAP.

XIV.

1812.

11th Aug.

12th.

About 2 P. M. Lord Wellington, with the advance of the allies, entered the town, and immediately reconnoitred the defences of the Retiro, which being found to consist of two enclosures, one requiring a small army for its defence, and the other so confined as not to afford space to endure a cannonade, his lordship ordered the garrison to be driven by an assault into the lesser work, and guns to be placed in battery to annihilate them when so confined. The preparations for commencing

Allies enter Madrid.

12th.



CHAP.  
XIV.

1812.

Capture the  
post of the  
Retiro.

these operations being completed, the commandant, knowing the defects of his post, hastened to make his submission, and gave up, on the 13th, 180 pieces of artillery, 20,000 stand of arms, a great quantity of ammunition, artillery carriages, clothing, and stores of all kinds.

13th Aug.

Joy of the  
citizens.

Don Carlos de España was immediately nominated Governor, and on the same day the new constitution was proclaimed amidst the *vivas* of thousands, and sworn to with cheerfulness by the municipal authorities and principal householders. Indeed, the good-will of the inhabitants of Madrid, and their detestation of the intruders were most strongly manifested from the first moment that they were free to express it. Men, women, and children poured out of the town in incredible numbers to meet the columns of the allied army, hailing them as deliverers, bringing them refreshments, and embracing the officers and soldiers with fervour: within the city, garlands of flowers and festoons of drapery were suspended from every door and window: in the evening an illumination prolonged the light of day, and all distinction of rank and sex being disregarded in a delirium of joy, the streets presented throughout the night a scene of unrestrained hilarity and mutual congratulation. Even after these first transports of exultation had subsided, their offerings of gratitude and attachment continued unbounded: public

fêtes were brought in aid of individual kindness, and if intensity of feeling be a test of sincerity, it may safely be pronounced that the inhabitants of Madrid were truly rejoiced at being liberated from the yoke of the intrusive government.

CHAP.  
XIV.  
1812.

During these brilliant operations of the allies in the north, the other French armies appeared to be paralysed by astonishment. Marshal Soult in the middle of June, advanced with nearly 25,000 men to Santa Martha, with the intention of attacking Sir R. Hill's corps; but that officer having strengthened the position where the battle of Albuera had been fought, with redoubts and batteries, and made a judicious disposition of his own force, and of a body of Spaniards for their support, Marshal Soult did not chuse to risk another repulse, and retrograded on the 23d June. After this, a variety of trifling affairs took place between the cavalry out-posts, in one of which General Slade's brigade drove before them a body of French from Llera to Maguilla, where a reserve unexpectedly fell on the pursuing force, and threw them into the greatest disorder, killing and wounding above 50, and making prisoners 120 others.

Affairs of  
the south.

June.

The battle of Salamanca produced a strong sensation amongst the French commanders in Andalusia. In the middle of August they blew up the castle of Niebla, and evacuated the whole of the Condado; at Seville they packed up all

CHAP. XIV. their public documents and valuables, and employed strong working parties to add to the defences of the Cartuxa, occupied as a citadel.

French  
raise the  
blockade of  
Cadiz.

24th Aug.

They also made many precautionary arrangements before Cadiz; but no decisive movement took place till intelligence arrived of the fall of Madrid; the day subsequently an unusual activity amongst the French created a suspicion in the city that the blockaders were preparing to abandon their lines, and in the night many tremendous explosions and fierce conflagrations announced to the garrison their immediate deliverance. At 9 A. M. the Spanish troops made a sortie, and took possession of an enormous quantity of shot, stores, and implements, of which their quick approach prevented the destruction, and of five hundred pieces of cannon, many in a serviceable state, and of thirty gun-boats.

25th.

Marshal Soult's first intention, on hearing of the capture of Madrid, was, to concentrate his army in Granada, in readiness to move to the aid of Joseph, if necessary, but continuing to hold Seville in order to oppose Lord Wellington in front, should he march towards the south.—The latter object, however, was defeated by the success of a detachment sent from Cadiz against Seville, under General Cruzmorgeon and Colonel Skerrett. The troops landed in the Guadalquivir, and taking the route of St. Lucar, unex-

Spaniards  
recover Se-  
ville.

27th.

pectedly appeared in the suburb Triana, on the right of the river, on the morning of the 27th August. The French garrison, which consisted of eight battalions, attempted to destroy the bridge, and gain time to effect their retreat; the injury however proving trivial, the inhabitants, under the fire of the rear-guard, threw planks across the opening, and the allies crossed in time to make 200 prisoners in the town. The same evening the French troops from the vicinity of Cadiz, about 7,000 in number, approached Seville to take up their quarters; but believing the force in possession to be that of Sir R. Hill, they made a hasty movement to their right on Carmona, followed by General Balasteros, who from Ronda hung upon their flank, and greatly annoyed them till they halted at Granada. Sir R. Hill's corps was then ordered to move to the Tagus, and connect its operations with the main body, whilst it should watch the roads from the south, and nearly all the British troops at Cadiz were embarked for Lisbon. The Spaniards were entreated to press the reduction of the posts on the Douro, and unite all their efficient troops to aid the tide of success, and strong applications were repeated to the British Government to forward reinforcements of every arm.

CHAP.  
XIV.  
1812.

Marshal  
Soult concentrates  
his army at  
Granada.

## CHAPTER XV.

*Lord Wellington moves from Madrid against the Army lately Marmont's—drives it beyond Burgos—lays siege to the Castle—The Armies of Marshal Soult, Suchet, and Joseph Buonaparte, unite in Valencia—advance for its Relief—Lord Wellington raises the Siege—retires behind the Douro—Joseph recovers Madrid—marches against Lord Wellington—The hostile Armies manœuvre on the Tormes—The Allies continue their Retreat into Portugal.*

CHAP. **LORD WELLINGTON** at Madrid was in a proud,  
 XV. but not an enviable situation : he had defeated a  
 1812. powerful army, and had driven the intrusive  
 king from the capital ; but the object of his advance was still unattained, as Marshal Soult remained in Granada, and independent of his corps, nearly 100,000 French troops might be brought to act against the 40,000 Portuguese and British under his Lordship's command in the centre of the Peninsula : further, Marshal Massena had been sent into Alava with an army of observation of 10,000 men, and although Napoleon, engaged with the mass of his forces in the heart of Russia, could not as heretofore send reinforcements to an unlimited extent, still there was reason to apprehend that other more considerable bodies would speedily cross the

Pyrenees. The Cortes, far from directing all their energies to support and follow up the advantage gained over the intruders, seemed to be chiefly occupied in promulgating their new constitution, and to appreciate the success of the Allies by the opportunity gained for its more extensive circulation: the regency decreed 50,000 men to be added to the Spanish armies; but tied up by respect for their new laws, they ordered them to be raised in fixed proportions throughout the country, and by voluntary enlistment, so that no immediate benefit was obtained. The different Spanish commanders exerted themselves to the extent of their means. General Santocildes with the Galician forces obliged two hundred and fifty men to surrender prisoners in Tordesillas, and after a siege, 1200 in Astorga, on condition of being exchanged; and the Empecinado captured 700 in Guadalaxara. Many of the principal Guerrilla chiefs hastened with their bands to Madrid, and those on the northern coast, encouraged and assisted by a squadron of men of war, under Sir Home Popham, recovered Bilboa, and displayed more than their wonted activity. These efforts, so highly creditable to the individuals concerned, and to the national character, were however of little weight in the balance of strength.

Further, the promised co-operation on the eastern coast had entirely failed; the corps sent

CHAP.  
XV.  
1812.

19th Aug.

CHAP. from Sicily not having exceeded 6,000 infantry  
 XV. of various nations, without cavalry. The time  
 1812. had passed for the employment of so small a  
 force, the activity of Marshal Suchet having dis-  
 possessed the Spaniards of all means of imme-  
 diate co-operation. After the dispersion of the  
 Catalan regular forces on the heights of Alta-  
 falla, the French commanders commenced a  
 similar system of severity to that which had pa-  
 cified Valencia; but the retaliatory measures of  
 the Catalan chiefs saved their brave countrymen  
 from being reduced to similar quiet;\* never-  
 theless, by entrenching various interior posts,  
 and fortifying Blanes, Mataro, Mongat, with  
 other places on the coast favourable for maritime

\* The Governor of Lerida having put to death, as robbers, some soldiers of Eroles' corps who fell into his power, that resolute chief, on verifying the fact, kept parties on the watch till he made prisoners a small detachment of the garrison, from which he selected one individual by lot, and instantly executed the remainder in his presence. The fortunate prize drawer was then escorted to the gates of Lerida, and accorded life and liberty on condition of making known to his comrades the scene he had witnessed, and of delivering a letter to the Governor which contained the positive determination of Eroles to treat in a similar manner every Frenchman, of whatever rank, he might capture, should a single Catalan be punished for opposing the French dominion. The sincerity of the threat was too clearly evinced by the action that accompanied it, ever to be put to the test:—*Fact learnt in conversation with Eroles soon after its occurrence.*

communication, the French had, in great measure, bridled the inhabitants, and checked the descent of the organized troops from the mountains.

CHAP.

XV.

1812.

General Maitland on arriving with the forces from Sicily had consequently a fortress to reduce before he could act, and the Catalan leaders were prepared to assist him with only 8,000 men, whilst they stated the enemy's disposable army in the province at 13,000; beyond which Suchet held concentrated, near Valencia, 14,000 infantry, with an excellent cavalry, having nothing to oppose his marching into Catalonia, but the Spanish army under General O'Donnel, unequal to contend with half his numbers. To land and raise the province, under these circumstances, would have been to commit the population without a rational prospect of success; therefore, on intelligence that O'Donnel had been defeated with loss, at Castalla, on the 21st July, and had retired to Murcia, leaving Alicante open, General Maitland threw his corps into that fortress. Marshal Suchet was consequently at full liberty to co-operate with Joseph Buonaparte, and their forces united near Valencia at the end of August.

It was naturally expected that the resources of Madrid would have given fresh vigour and means to the allied army: it was found, however, that the pressure of the war, and the insecurity of property had so lessened both the general and indi-



CHAP. XV.  
 1812. vidual wealth, that little beyond the efforts of good-will could be obtained. The citizens fed the troops in garrison, and those in charge of the sequestered and royal lands, zealously gave the produce of the harvest on promise of future payment; but though the military chest was absolutely penniless,\* all the money that could be raised on the most unexceptionable security was limited to a few thousand dollars, and much of that sum in adulterated coin at a fictitious value.

No effort was made by the liberated districts to arm or to organize a military system; repeated failure having discouraged exertion, and created a general impression that deliverance could only arise from the efforts of the Allies; and the fact of the only three fortresses which had not been reduced by the French, Cadiz, Carthagena and Alicante, being garrisoned by British and Portuguese troops, shows how nearly the contest had devolved altogether on the

\* A very serious drain had unexpectedly occurred a little previous to this period, to aggravate the distress of the army for money. The troops in Portugal, and the inhabitants round Lisbon, depending in great measure for their subsistence on corn imported from the United States of America, the declaration of war by that power, which was received immediately after the battle of Salamanca, threatened to embarrass exceedingly the supply of the troops; and to avert its effects, Lord Wellington, at a great expenditure of ready cash, purchased at the moment, at Lisbon, corn for a twelvemonth's consumption.

18th June.

auxiliaries. Lord Wellington had therefore little more than his own forces to oppose the united efforts of the strong armies which menaced Madrid from every quarter. Should he march into the south, they would close upon him without the liberation of any portion of the country, and should he march into Valencia, he must relinquish his communications with Portugal. The most efficient force of the Spaniards was the army of Galicia, officially represented as consisting of 25 or 30,000 men, then in the north, and only capable of acting whilst in communication with its own province. Considerable exertion was making in England to select a force to support his further movements: a brigade of foot-guards embarked early in September, and a brigade of horse and life-guards, and several battalions of the line were put under orders to follow. It was, however, only in the north that these re-inforcements could effect their junction in time for the final struggle: all these considerations united in favour of operations in that quarter, and his Lordship decided to march in person with four divisions, against General Clausel, who, with the army lately Marmont's, had advanced to the Douro, and having driven back with some loss the Galician forces under General Santocildes, had liberated the French garrisons left in Zamora and Toro. The two divisions of the allied army most in need of repose

CHAP.  
XV.

1812.

15th Aug.

29th.

CHAP.

XV.



1812.

were left in garrison at Madrid: Sir R. Hill was ordered to move up to the Iarama to cover the city on that side, and General Balasteros, under whom all the Spanish armies of the south were united, was requested to join Sir R. Hill in the event of Marshal Soult moving on Madrid, or under the circumstance of the latter marching into Valencia, to take post at Alcazar, in readiness to act on his line of march from that city to the capital: further, it was arranged that the Galician army should take part in the operation against Clausel, and form the left of the advancing force: a reinforcement of 3000 British, expected to land at Lisbon at the commencement of September, was ordered to press its march into Spain, and arrangements were made for the disembarkation at Corunna of the Guards about to be sent from England.

Lord Wellington quitted Madrid on the 1st September; passed the Douro on the 6th, at the fords of Herrera and El Abroja, and on the 7th drove the French from Valladolid, and followed them closely through Duenas beyond Palencia. At that town, the Spanish army of Galicia effected its junction, but instead of proving an efficient force of 20 or 30,000 men, it mustered only 12,000 very indifferent troops, scarcely better organized than at the commencement of the war, and totally incapable of opposing a single division of French. During the pursuit,

no endeavour could provoke an action: the French rapidly retired on every approach of the Allies, destroying all the bridges, and never making a show of resistance till the 17th, when favourable ground, and the immediate vicinity of Burgos induced Clausel to remain in position till the allied army was nearly formed for the attack. All his battalions could be distinctly numbered, and the force drawn out was calculated at 22,000: they did not, however, risk the shock, but quickly retired on the approach of the Allies, forming a sad contrast to the imposing appearance and bold conduct they maintained prior to their defeat. They were the same day manœuvred out of the town of Burgos, where 9000 infantry of the army of the north under General Souham, effected their junction. That officer, who assumed the chief command, leaving a garrison in the castle, retired to Briviesca, where he halted in a strong position. The main body of the Allies advanced to the villages round Quintanapalla to hold him in check, whilst 7000 men invested the castle, head-quarters being fixed at Villatoro.

CHAP.  
XV.  
1812.

19 Sept.

The castle of Burgos occupies an oblong conical hill, the lower part of which is surrounded by an uncovered scarp-wall of difficult access, and on the summit stands the ancient keep, converted into a modern casemated battery. Between these defences, the French had

CHAP.

XV.

1812.

19th Sept.

22d.

constructed two lines of field works thickly planted with cannon, encircling the hill, and they threw in nearly 3000 men for their defence: thus forming of Burgos a strong post to cover their only remaining depôt of ammunition and stores. It was an object of primary importance to deprive them of these supplies, and the castle garrisoned by Spaniards would prove a great support to the army in its manœuvres against the superior force with which it must ultimately contend. Accordingly, though there were only three heavy guns at command, five howitzers and a few hundred rounds of shot, the siege was decided and instantly commenced with vigour. The first evening a hornwork which covered the lower wall was assaulted: whilst two parties attacked it in front; Major the Hon. W. Cocks forced in at the rear; the garrison, which consisted of a strong battalion, made a spirited resistance, and being well seconded by the fire of the place, success cost the assailants 400 in killed and wounded. Batteries were then erected, under the fire of which the besiegers made an attempt by escalade to establish themselves on the space between the top of the outer wall, and the first line of field works. The storming-party gallantly forced up the wall, but the immediate vicinity of the interior defences enabling the defenders to obtain constant reinforcements, the assailants, after many fruit-

less endeavours to establish themselves, were beaten down with considerable loss. An attempt followed to breach the wall with the three heavy guns, in which two of them were disabled by the more powerful artillery of the castle: the sap and the mine were then brought into play, and when the first had been pushed so near to the place, that the garrison from the superior height of their defences plunged into it all sorts of missiles thrown with the hand, rendering the work too destructive to be continued, a gallery was struck out and driven under the outer wall, where a mine was exploded on the night of the 29th September, which formed a breach. The opening was not at the moment deemed sufficiently large to be assaulted, and before daylight the garrison had placed such obstacles on its summit as rendered it impracticable. Another gallery was in consequence run under the wall, and in the afternoon of the 4th October exploded: its effects produced an excellent breach, and the 24th Regiment were in a few minutes lodged on its summit. The next afternoon the garrison sallied out, and gained possession of the lodgment, which they destroyed before they could be repulsed. The two following days were spent in increasing the front of the lodgment, which by great perseverance was pushed within ten yards of the enemy's line: the work, however, was very murderous, as only

CHAP.

XV.

1812.

23d Sept.

25th.

5th Oct.

CHAP. one piece of siege artillery remained serviceable,  
XV. and the garrison, from their extensive front,

1812. overpowered the fire from the sap; besides having great depôts of ammunition at their command, they rolled down a constant succession of shells, which lodging against the gabions destroyed them with those they were intended to protect, and the heavy rain which fell retarded every exertion to repair the casualties.—

8th Oct.

Under these circumstances, on the night of the 8th, the garrison made a desperate rush, overpowered the guard, and held possession of the trench long enough to destroy all the work on the level between the second line and the outer wall. It then became apparent that to push the sap on so restricted a front, without the assistance of artillery, was hopeless, and some ammunition having been received from St. Ander, the howitzers were put in battery to injure the defences and make an opening in an exposed part of the second line. That effected,

18th.

the assault was given on the 18th October; the assailants, after a severe struggle, carried the second line, and some of the German Legion even escalated the third line, and complete success seemed to have crowned their efforts, when the garrison, seeing only small bodies opposed to them, rallied, charged the different parties, and drove them out, with the loss of 80 killed and 170 wounded, making the casualties from the

commencement above two thousand. This was the last vigorous effort of a siege of 30 days, wherein it is difficult to say which party deserved most praise; the assailants, for their bold and courageous efforts, or the defenders, for their perseverance and skilful arrangements. Each at the same moment had the good fortune to have their exertions duly appreciated: General du Breton and his garrison, as might be expected, found, in the applauses of their grateful countrymen, the reward justly due to their gallant defence; and the unsuccessful party, by a rare magnanimity in their chief, had the consolation of hearing their conduct praised, and their failure imputed to causes beyond their controul.\*


During the attack, the hostile force at Bre-  
viesca had been joined by the remainder of the

CHAP.  
XV.  
1812.

Movements  
of General  
Clausel.

\* This siege failed entirely from want of the necessary means of attack with the besieging force. The same deficiency at the previous sieges, partly arising from a too limited means of transport, and partly from the non-existence of the requisite establishments in the British service, rendered them so costly in men. It is, however, but justice to the officers employed, to state that the attacks of the different fortresses in Spain, though irregular from the above causes, were pushed forward with a boldness, intrepidity, and dispatch, beyond precedent, as admitted by friend and foe. The plan of the attack of Burgos, had considerable professional merit as well as boldness, and, notwithstanding its failure, added much, in the opinion of the army, to the previously high reputation of Lieutenant Colonel Burgoyne, the Engineer in command.



CHAP. XV.  1812. army of the north, and by the army of observation from Alava, and on the day of the assault, manœuvred under General Clausel as if with the intention of fighting a general action; in consequence of which most of the besieging corps joined the covering army. On the 20th, the French advanced with considerable force, and driving in the piquets, obtained possession of Quintana-palla: but Sir Edward Paget, being detached with two divisions against their left, drove them back without difficulty, and recovered Quintana, on which they desisted from their offensive movements, and it was expected that the allied troops would have resumed their labours; a convoy of heavy artillery and ammunition being on the road from St. Ander, which would have ensured the fall of the castle in a few days, with little or no further loss to the besiegers. The period, however, had arrived when to provide for the security of the conquests to be retained, was of far greater importance than the honour of a success, of which time had lessened the value. The object of the campaign had already been fully attained; as Marshal Soult, finding the allies steadily pursuing the war in the north, had reluctantly evacuated the whole of the south of Spain, and joined his troops to the other armies to check their career. He marched from Granada on the 15th September, by the road of Caravaca, and effected his

Marshal  
Soult joins  
Joseph Buonaparte.

junction with Joseph's forces at Albacete, on the 29th September, without molestation, as General Balasteros, who had acquired such considerable reputation for himself and for the corps under his command, by unceasing activity for some years, and who had hung upon the flank of the retiring force and harassed them with much effect as far as Granada, upon receiving instructions to act as one of the general mass and obey the orders of Lord Wellington, not only remonstrated, but, sacrificing the interests of his country to his personal feelings, ceased to act offensively. Had Balasteros confined himself to a protestation, however forcible, it might have passed as the impulse of a high-spirited soldier and patriot; but his inactivity at the most critical period of the campaign proved the contrary, and he deservedly forfeited by his conduct on this occasion, the fruits of a most meritorious career: being deprived of his command, he was imprisoned at Ceuta, with scarcely a voice raised in his behalf.

CHAP.  
XV.  
1812.

Balasteros  
refuses to  
act.

In consequence of this refusal of co-operation on the part of the Spanish commander, there being in Valencia only the weak British corps under General Maitland, it remained on the defensive in and round Alicante, and the French completed without interruption all their arrangements. Almost the only military event of any interest in that quarter was the debarkation of a

Operations  
on the east-  
ern coast.

4th Oct.

CHAP. detachment of 600 infantry and some artillery,  
 XV. under General Donkin, near Denia, to endeavour

1812. to obtain possession of that post, but the com-  
 mandant rejecting the offer of terms, and making  
 a sally with his garrison at the moment that a  
 French detachment advanced against the left of  
 the investing corps, the troops were hastily with-  
 drawn, and found safety in the boats of the men  
 of war. Marshal Soult, on intelligence of this  
 disembarkation, moved forward a strong corps  
 from the Xucar, which on the 8th reconnoitred  
 the English posts in front of Alicante: a smart  
 skirmish ensued for about two hours, near St.  
 Vicente, when the French retired, carrying off a  
 piquet of Calabrese, which they surrounded.

8th Oct.

Joseph ad-  
 vances on  
 Madrid.

On the 9th, the little castle of Chinchilla, situ-  
 ated at the point of separation of the high road  
 from Madrid to Valencia and Alicante, capitula-  
 ted after an attack of several days; and on  
 the 16th, every preparation being complete,  
 Joseph set out from Valencia at the head of  
 60,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry, composed  
 of his own and Marshal Soult's forces, to recover  
 his capital.

16th Oct.

Siege of  
 Burgos  
 raised.

Lord Wellington received intelligence of Jo-  
 seph's being in movement on the 21st October, on  
 which he instantly raised the siege of Burgos, and,  
 by the unprecedented boldness of filing the whole  
 army in the night under the walls of the castle,  
 and over the bridge of the Arlanzon, closely en-

Allies retire.

CHAP.

XV.

1812.

filaded by its artillery,\* (which he accomplished with scarcely any loss,) gained a march on General Souham, who did not overtake him in force till noon, on the 23d. The French cavalry then vigorously pressed that of the allies, and several sharp affairs took place. At the passage of the Hormaza General Anson's brigade twice charged the head of their pursuers as they forded, and checked their advance for three hours. At length, some guerrilla cavalry posted on their left flank being menaced, instantaneously gave way, and the allied cavalry were obliged hastily to fall back to avoid being surrounded; they, however, took an opportunity, after passing a broad deep ditch by a narrow bridge, to charge their pursuers when only part had filed over, but being repulsed in the effort, the retreat of the whole body became very hurried, till forced back upon

\* The complete success of this bold manœuvre offers many reflections on the futility of attempting to stop the march of troops by the fire of artillery in the night. In this instance the good order and silence with which the allied army filed under the walls of the castle were rendered of no avail to them by the conduct of a party of guerrilla cavalry, who, unused to such coolness, put their horses to their speed, and made such a clatter, that the garrison took the alarm, and opened a fire from the artillery directed on the bridge; the first discharge was, as might have been expected, very effectual; but the gunners immediately afterwards lost the range and direction, and their fire only served to make the carriages file over the bridge with more speed than usual.

CHAP. the infantry rear-guard, composed of German  
 XV. light-troops, under the command of Colonel  
 1812. Halkett, which, formed in two squares in rear  
 of Venta del Pozo, received the enemy's ca-  
 valry with a volley, and checked the pursuit.  
 The right of the army during the afternoon  
 crossed the Pisuerga at Torquemada, and the left  
 at Cordovilla, where head-quarters were fixed  
 for the night.

24th Oct.

The retiring force being under 20,000 men, and the French displaying above 30,000, after this proof of the superiority of the latter in cavalry, an orderly retreat could only be hoped by the most constant vigilance and obedience: but unluckily, an irresistible temptation lay in the way of the soldier, which instantly shook both. It is the custom throughout the north of Castile to preserve the produce of the vintage in subterraneous caves, and the sides of the hills in the environs of all the villages on the line of march, were studded with them: during the night the soldiers could not be restrained from breaking open those round their camps and indulging to excess, the effects of which were but too visible the following morning nearly throughout the army, and it required the utmost exertion of the officers to put their battalions in march. In the course of the day, however, the enemy not pressing the rear very forcibly, they accomplished twenty miles, and on the evening of the 24th the whole

army was in position behind the Carrion, with its left at Villa-muriel, and its right at Duenas, at which point, the brigade of Guards, disembarked at Corunna, effected their junction.

CHAP.  
XV.  
1812.

No retrograde movements beyond those of 25th Oct. detail were made this day, but a variety of precautionary measures were carried into effect to check the pursuit. The two bridges over the Carrion at Palencia, those at Villa-muriel and Duenas, and the bridge over the Pisuerga at Tariejo, were ordered to be prepared for destruction, and exploded on the approach of the French. The bridges at Duenas and Villa-muriel were mined, and successfully exploded; the latter under a fire of grape-shot from the enemy. At Palencia, the party posted to cover the operation was attacked, and being overpowered, the bridges in a perfect state were gained by the enemy. At Tariejo, a report that the French had already crossed at that point, delayed the commencement of the service, and they gained time to arrive before the mine was fully prepared; it was, in consequence, prematurely exploded, failed, and the cavalry immediately galloping over, made the party prisoners.

In consequence of the failure of the mine at Tariejo, the enemy pushed a corps on the right into contact with the posts on the Carrion, rendering the further retreat of the army difficult and even precarious; arrangements were there-

CHAP. fore made for an attack on that point; but on the  
 XV. approach of the columns, the French recrossed

1812. the Pisuerga. On the left also, they made a bold attempt to establish themselves across the Carrion by means of some fords near Villa-muriel, by which they passed over a strong body of men, sending a detachment to occupy a village at some distance from the bank. The Spaniards were employed to dislodge them from thence, but faltering in the execution, General Alava put himself at their head and fell, badly wounded, in the act of encouraging and leading them on; still they did not attack with spirit, and the Brunswick Oels' corps was ordered to take the lead: these men gallantly ran into the village without firing a shot, when the Spaniards, encouraged by their example, closely followed, and the defenders withdrew. Shortly after this, the 5th division, under General Oswald, advanced against the French main body, and obliged it also to recross the river.

26th Oct. The army retired without molestation sixteen miles, and crossed the Pisuerga at Cabezon. The ground at and above Cabezon, on the left of the Pisuerga, is particularly bold and strong, steep heights in many parts abruptly terminating at the river: all the roads leading along its left bank are consequently very difficult and bad; and the high road from the north, from that

cause, runs through the country to its right. CHAP.  
At Cabezon it crosses the river by a stone bridge; that bridge was barricadoed and mined for destruction, and the army halted in its rear. XV.  
1812.

General Souham, having been detained by the ruined bridges of Duenas and Villa-muriel, did not approach till the evening, when he halted his whole army on the right of the Pisuerga, sending, however, frequent patrols during the night, to the barricado on the bridge, to ascertain that the piquets had not been withdrawn. The next morning, to try the determination of the allies to maintain their ground, he brought up two brigades of artillery, and cannonaded the town: these being opposed by a superior fire, he instantly desisted from further efforts in front, but made considerable detachments to his right through Cigales. 27th Oct.

In the morning, a party of French attempted to pass the river at Simancas, but the bridge had been too effectually destroyed; in the evening they entered Tordesillas, where their arrival had been equally anticipated in the destruction of the bridge. During these movements, to turn the flanks of the allies, a large force remained in a threatening attitude on the heights above Valladolid, on the right of the river, from whence they occasionally cannonaded those passing along the high road. 28th Oct.

The army retired early from Cabezon, destroy- 29th Oct.



CHAP.  
XV.

1812.

The Allies  
re-cross the  
Douro.

30th Oct.

Allies re-oc-  
cupy the po-  
sition of  
Christoval,

ing the bridge and that at Valladolid, and in the course of the day crossed the Douro at Tudela, and at the Puente del Duero, the bridges at which places were blown up, as also that at Quintanilla, and subsequently those of Toro and Zamora. In the evening, the French passed over a body of men by swimming the river near Tordesillas, and unexpectedly attacking the guard left in a tower on the south end of the bridge, overcame it, and immediately began to restore the communication. In consequence, the allied forces, the next morning, moved to their left and took up ground in front of the bridge, which they strengthened with batteries; in that position they remained till the 6th November, when the bridge at Toro, as well as that at Tordesillas, having been rendered passable, they fell back four leagues to Torrecilla de la Orden. The following day they continued their march, and on the 8th took up the position of St. Christoval, in front of Salamanca, which they had twice before occupied. Thus concluded a retreat exceeding one hundred and fifty miles, made in face of a superior enemy, with the deliberation of an ordinary march, in which, consequently, the troops suffered nothing from fatigue, and the casualties from the sword and prisoners were under eight hundred and fifty.

General Souham did not follow the retiring

force beyond the Douro, but waited the approach of the armies of Joseph and Soult, which had some days previously passed through Madrid; Sir Rowland Hill's corps, having broken up from the Jarama on the 30th of August, and with the British garrison having leisurely retired, by the pass of Guadarrama and Fontiveras. The same day that the left of the allies re-occupied Christoval, Sir R. Hill re-crossed the Tormes, leaving a strong force in the town and castle to command the passage of the river.

CHAP.  
XV.

1812.

between 1st  
and 4th  
Nov.

8th Nov.

On the 10th November the armies of Marshal Soult and General Souham, with Joseph Buonaparte's guard, composing a force of 80,000 infantry and 13,000 cavalry, united on the right of the Tormes; the allied army opposed to them not exceeding 48,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry.

Manceuvres  
on the  
Tormes.

The French directed their main efforts against the right of the allies, and made preparations to force the passage at Alba; but finding the town barricadoed, and the troops under General Hamilton not to be shaken by a heavy cannonade and the demonstration of an assault, they relinquished the attempt, and on the 14th commenced the passage of the river, by the fords of Galisancho, higher up the stream. In the course of the following day the whole French army passed over to the left bank, and took post in a strong position near Mozarbes, from whence detachments of cavalry intercepted the commu-

CHAP.  
XV.

1812.

Lord Wel-  
lington re-  
tires into  
Portugal.

nication of the allies with Ciudad Rodrigo, leaving them only the alternatives, to attack, to starve, or to retire. The troops were nearly exhausted with the fatigues of so long and active a campaign, their discipline and their organisation had been considerably affected by the relaxation invariably attendant on a retreat, and the superiority of the enemy left no hope of obtaining more than a negative triumph: Lord Wellington therefore preferred the restoration of his army in quiet, to contesting a point of honour, and, on the 15th November, broke up from Christoval, and commenced his retreat into Portugal. The French, probably checked by the recollection of the fatal consequences of Marmont's offensive movements on a similar occasion, on this very spot, were far from acting with their accustomed vigour and reaping full advantage from their superior numbers and favourable position. Instead of making a great effort to overwhelm the army on its retreat, they confined the pursuit to a body of cavalry with light artillery, which closely followed for the first two days, but with so little success, that the allies lost only 50 killed, 150 wounded, and 170 missing, after leaving the Tormes; but at one moment, having penetrated the line of march between two divisions, they made prisoner Lieutenant General Sir Edward Paget, the second in command. The distress in the army was never-

theless very great; during the whole of the retreat from Christoval, the weather was extremely inclement, the roads excessively deep, and the supply of provisions irregular.—Sir R. Hill's corps more particularly suffered from the latter cause; whilst at Madrid their line of supply was along the valley of the Tagus, and the arrangements for changing its direction having miscarried, the soldiers, left without extraneous resources or money, were in great measure indebted for sustenance to the sweet acorn, with which the country abounds.

CHAP.  
XV.  
1812.

On the 18th, head-quarters entered Ciudad Rodrigo, and so soon afterwards as it could be ascertained that the French armies had retired from the Tormes, the troops were put into extended winter cantonments, the left being retired to Lamego, and the right thrown sufficiently forward to hold the pass of Bejar.

This was the most important campaign of the war, as it decidedly changed the relative feelings and strength of the contending parties. Duly to appreciate its merit, it must be recollected that the military means of Spain were never before or subsequently at so low an ebb. The French forces, including those which entered during the summer, exceeded 190,000, and were formidable beyond their actual numbers from the confidence and skill acquired in twenty years of general success. They were moreover

CHAP. in possession of all the fortresses on the line of  
XV. operations, and commanded by officers of the  
highest reputation. The amount of the British  
1812. and Portuguese, including every reinforcement,  
fell short of 75,000 : a portion of which, acting  
against the general mass, and in actual collision,  
at various periods, with 130,000 of the French,  
captured and retained possession of two of the  
fortresses, and liberated all the southern pro-  
vinces of Spain ; being incontrovertible proof of  
superiority of tactic and combination, as well as  
of prowess.

Difficulties nearly amounting to physical im-  
possibilities were to be overcome before sub-  
sistence could be obtained for a greater supe-  
riority of numbers to oppose to the allies ; while  
the assistance of the Spaniards could not but  
increase in value from their more extended ter-  
ritory. It has, therefore, only to be granted  
that man and nature should remain unchanged,  
to feel assured that whatever might have been  
the fate of the rest of continental Europe, the  
subjugation of the Peninsula was no longer to  
be apprehended after the operations of 1812.

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## CHAPTER XVI.

*Lord Wellington advances into Spain—turns the line of the Douro—manœuvres the French back on Vitoria—defeats them in a general Action—drives them beyond the Pyrenees—blockades Pamplona and besieges St. Sebastian—fails in assaulting the breaches made in the latter place.—The French make a great effort to succour Pamplona—are defeated in a succession of Actions in the Pyrenees.—The town of St. Sebastian carried by storm—the French defeated in an attempt to succour the castle—it surrenders—the left of the Allied Army crosses the Bidassoa—Pamplona surrenders at discretion.*

**DURING** the winter cantonments the most unremitting attention was paid to restore the discipline and organization of the army, preparatory to renewed exertion. Various changes were made in its equipments and accompaniments, tending equally to convenience and efficiency. Tents were provided to shelter the men in their bivouacs, and a pontoon train was fitted out for the passage of the rivers, and to enable the columns to act off the great road.

CHAP.  
XVI.  
1813.

It was now felt by England that the moment was arrived for putting forth her full strength: reinforcements of every description, but more particularly of cavalry, were promptly sent out;

CHAP. the artillery carriages were all replaced, and  
 XVI. 1,300 fresh horses added to their establishment.

1813. The Portuguese battalions were also completed.

No hostile movement took place on either side during the winter, except an attempt made by the French to surprise the post at Bejar, the garrison of which having timely notice of their approach, were on the alert, and in a moment repelled the assailants. The progress of these arrangements was therefore uninterrupted, and in the spring of 1813 the army formed a superb body of 65,000 infantry, and 6,500 cavalry.

App. 15.

The Cortes of Spain, enlightened by the events of the last campaign, and become sensible of the weakness of ranking national pride above the real interests of their country, conferred, in the month of December, the rank and authority of Generalissimo of the Spanish forces on Lord Wellington, who, in a personal conference with the administration at Cadiz, arranged that he should in the next campaign have the active co-operation of 50,000 Spanish troops. The principal divisions to be the army of Galicia under General Giron; a corps under General Freyre; the troops of Morillo, and a force to be organized in Andalusia, as an army of reserve, under the Condé de Bispal.\*

\* So scanty, however, were the resources of the Spanish government, that Lord Wellington found himself under the ne-

Thus the united strength of the Peninsula was placed in hands capable of wielding it, at the moment when the resources of France were greatly diminished, and her powerful empire shaken to its very centre. Buonaparte, soon after the opening of the last campaign, carried 400,000 men into the heart of Russia to enforce compliance with his system for regulating the commerce of the world: he pushed on with presumptuous confidence to Moscow, 300 leagues beyond the Vistula, without magazines, without an army of support, or even retaining possession of the country through which he passed, expecting to dictate peace as soon as lodged in the palace of the Czars; but the Russian generals delivering up their ancient capital a prey to the flames, and refusing to enter into any communication with him, he found his expectations thwarted. Unable to carry the war farther forward, and unwilling to confess his disappointment, he lingered so long in a state of inaction, that winter broke in upon his retreat, and the majority of his troops miserably perished by its inclemency, or threw themselves upon the humanity of their pursuers to escape its effects; Napoleon, himself, with only a single attendant, flying into Poland.

CHAP.  
XVI.  
1813.

cessity of supporting the corps under Morillo during the whole campaign, and the army under General Giron for a considerable period of it.



CHAP.

XVI.

1813.

The hardy Russians, braving the rigour of the season, did not relax in the pursuit on the liberation of their country ; but crossing the frontier, and urging forward the force of the different nations through which they passed, gathered strength in their advance, and threatened France herself with invasion.

The line of the Elbe first served as a rallying point for the fugitives, who, on reserves drawn from every quarter of the empire, there checked the pursuit. The force thus collected, however, little exceeded 100,000 men, as Buonaparte, by an impolitic retention of various fortresses in the north of Germany, of little value in his plan of operations, deprived himself of the services of a body of veterans of nearly equal amount. The absolute authority, however, which he exercised over the persons of the French, enabled him to give a colour of judgment to this imprudent measure : by calling out the aged and the young, by anticipating the resources of the future, and disregarding all claims of exemption for the past, he made a convulsive exertion, which in the month of May fixed victory once more to his standards in the fields of Lutzen and Bauzen. His policy with respect to Spain was of an equally grasping nature. Too obstinate to relinquish for a moment the nominal sovereignty of the country, he employed 140,000 good troops to support it ; half of which number, concen-

trated for defensive war near the Pyrenees, would have been a more formidable body than the whole, as spread over the Peninsula, and left, under every possible military disadvantage, exposed to the tactics and combined operations of the allies. The contention, by this arrangement, was, for the first time since the commencement of the war, brought to an equality; and, as the power of reinforcing the French armies and filling up their losses at pleasure had ceased, success against them might be pushed to the utmost.

CHAP.  
XVI.  
1813.

Five years of uninterrupted service together as a body under the same commander, had given a unity of action and feeling to the allies rarely enjoyed by any army: men and officers had an hundred times proved, and been satisfied with each other's exertions, and all felt that to engage was to conquer. The French, on the contrary, weakened by the loss of more than 10,000 picked veterans sent to organize the new levies in Germany, and deprived of the watchful superintendence of their most able leader (Marshal Soult), were neither so formidable from skill or confidence as hitherto: judging therefore, from the events of the previous summer, every thing promised that the campaign of 1813 would end with the deliverance of the Peninsula.

Forty thousand of the French troops were in Catalonia and Valencia, under Marshal Suchet,

Distribution  
of the  
French army.

CHAP. and two independent divisions in Aragon and  
 XVI. Biscay under Generals Clausel and Foy; the  
 1813. remainder, under the immediate command of  
 Joseph Buonaparte, having Marshal Jourdan as  
 his Major General, being spread over Castile,  
 Leon, and the central provinces, for the facility  
 of procuring subsistence, and to make face  
 against the various Spanish corps, which, since  
 the liberation of the south, had sprung up in all  
 directions. They occupied Toledo and Madrid  
 with their left, keeping a small corps in La  
 Mancha; but every arrangement was subservient  
 to guarding the line of the Douro, behind which  
 river they had increased their defensive works,  
 and anticipating an attack from the left bank  
 only, felt confident in the strength of their  
 position.

Project of  
 the cam-  
 paign.

In this campaign, the near equality of numbers  
 between the hostile armies giving opportunity  
 for a full display of strategy, all petty success  
 and ephemeral triumph were disregarded, and a  
 series of grand manœuvres was planned to force  
 the French back, and fix the contention at a  
 point where a victory would affect every part of  
 the country in their possession. The first object  
 was to render null the formidable line of the  
 Douro, which, as there was no longer any oppo-  
 nent on the right of the allies to take advantage  
 of a wide movement, it was decided to effect  
 by a flank march through the province of


Tras os Montes, a country which, from its natural wildness, and the extreme badness of its roads, had hitherto been avoided in military operations. The large boats, which, by the improvements made to the navigation of the Douro, now constantly ascended to the mouth of the Agueda, afforded great facilities for this measure; a number of them being detained at different points, on various pretences, to convey the troops across, when the moment should arrive, without much previous preparation to excite suspicion of the intended movement.

CHAP.  
XVI.  
1813.

In the middle of May, five divisions of infantry, and two brigades of cavalry, under Sir T. Graham, by this means crossed the Douro at various points between Lamego and the frontier, directing their march on Zamora; whilst Lord Wellington in person, with two divisions of infantry, a corps of Spaniards, and some cavalry, advanced by the direct road from Rodrigo to Salamanca, and Sir Rowland Hill, with the right from Upper Estramadura, swept round on the same point by Alba de Tormes. This double movement cloaked Lord Wellington's views completely, as the French, unacquainted with the improved navigation of the river, never suspected that the main force of the allies could be in a moment crossed over to their rear, and gave all their attention to the front.

The allied  
army ad-  
vance,  
23d May;

The officer commanding in Salamanca having entered Sala-  
manca:

CHAP. XVI.  1813.   
 23d May; barricadoed the bridge, and the principal communications through the town, allowed himself to be so long amused by demonstrations of a direct attack, that detachments crossed the Tormes above and below the place, before he moved; in consequence, he lost part of his artillery and many men, and nothing but the exceedingly brave and steady conduct of the remainder enabled them to reach the Douro.

The corps on the right of that river marching by Mirandella, Braganza, Outeiro, and Vimiosa, had to contend with unusual difficulties, most of the roads, bounded by thick stone walls, being so narrow as barely to allow the passage of carriages, and many of the rivers running in the bottoms of deep ravines encircled by lofty mountains: the ascent from some of the rivers, more particularly the Sabor, was found so unusually steep, that sixty men with difficulty enabled the horses to move the artillery; by great exertion, however, all impediments were overcome, and the corps reached the frontier on the appointed day, and established their communication with the Galician army at Carvajales and Tabara. The French were first seen on the Esla; but although the banks were steep and high, the water deep, and the current rapid, no opposition was offered to the men whilst fording;\* on the contrary, their

29th May.   
 cross the Esla.   
 31st May.

\* The difficulty and danger of fording was found so great, that after losing several men in the attempt to pass a brigade of

commanders were so alarmed at the unexpected appearance of such a considerable force, that they not only precipitately retired, but also abandoned Zamora and Toro, destroying the bridges as soon as menaced by the advance of the columns, and retired towards Morales.

CHAP.  
XVI.

1813.

2d June.

The same day, the Hussar brigade under Colonel Grant, by an impetuous charge, overthrew the French cavalry rear-guard in front of that town, and pursued them with considerable success for two miles, until supported by their main body, which immediately afterwards retired, and concentrated behind Torre-lobaton and Tordesillas: at night, the Guerrilla Chief Don Julian surprised and made prisoners the French piquet at Castronuño, and obliged their guard to retire from the ford at Pollos. The different corps during this time kept concentrating, and, on the 3d June, Lieutenant General Hill's division having crossed by the bridge of Toro, the whole of the allied force united at that place on the right of the Douro, accomplishing the first object of the campaign.

Affair of  
cavalry.

Army uni-  
ted at Toro.

Joseph Buonaparte immediately on becoming acquainted with these movements, abandoning Madrid, hastened to concentrate his army behind the Pisuerga, and the same day that the allies united on the right bank of the Douro, at Toro,

Counter-  
movements  
of the  
French.

3d June.

infantry over behind the cavalry, a bridge was obliged to be put down for the remainder of the corps.

CHAP. his rear-guard crossed at the Puente de Duero.

XVI.

1813.

abandon  
Valladolid;

June 11th.

destroy the  
Castle of  
Burgos.

In that situation the French covered the main road to the north, along which are to be found many fine defensive positions, and where some small dépôts had been formed, to enable them to remain for their defence, and where, moreover, they had the support of the Castle of Burgos, the fortifications of which they had been diligently strengthening from the period of the late siege. That road was consequently their vantage ground, and Lord Wellington, to force them to abandon it, again manœuvred to his left on the 4th to Ampudia, which caused the enemy to abandon Valladolid, and throw themselves behind the Carrion. On the 7th, the army crossed that river at Palencia, on which the French fell back behind the Hormaza. During the three following days, the left of the allies was brought forward across the Pisuerga, and several strong bodies being assembled near Villa-diego, so closely threatened the line of communication of the retiring force, as to create serious apprehension for every part of it.

On the 12th, a strong reconnoissance made with the right of the army, dislodged a French corps from the heights of Estapar, on the left of the Hormaza, and threw them in confusion on Burgos, and the same afternoon a demonstration of pushing onward, induced them to blow up the castle with such precipitation, that three or four

hundred men perished by the explosion, and Joseph Buonaparte, placing a garrison in the castle of Pancorbo to block up the great road, directed the different divisions of his army to gain Miranda with all possible dispatch.

CHAP.  
XVI.

1813.

retire  
behind the  
Ebro.

Thus a succession of masterly manœuvres, almost without firing a shot, obliged the French to abandon more than one hundred and fifty miles of country, and to seek security behind the formidable barrier of the Ebro. The next object was to attack them before they could draw to their assistance the corps in Biscay, Aragon, &c. or make arrangements for the maintenance of the several posts and fortresses in the northern provinces. To effect the passage of so considerable a river as the Ebro, in face of such a powerful enemy in possession of the principal communication, was a most momentous concern, the country above Miranda being exceedingly mountainous and rocky, and no road being in existence deemed practicable for carriages: a diligent reconnoissance, however, having discovered pathways by which, if unopposed, artillery might be lowered down the banks, Lord Wellington, trusting to the difficulty of the operation, to prevent a suspicion of the attempt, again marched to his left of the great road, and, by exertions almost incredible, transported his whole army with its wheel carriages across the Ebro on

Allies cross  
the Ebro;



CHAP. the 14th and 15th by the bridges of St. Martin,  
XVI. Rocamude, and Puente de Arenas.

1813. On the following day, the army moved to its  
16th June. right, and after some slight affairs at St. Millan  
and Osma with French corps manœuvring in  
manœuvre observation, dislodged on the 19th a considerable  
on the river force posted in a formidable position behind the  
Bayas. river Bayas, having its right at Subijana, and its  
left on the heights in front of Pobes.

On the 20th, the different divisions of the allied army assembled on that river, the left corps being at Murquia, flanking the enemy's line of movement, and only separated by a bold range of heights of no great extent from the plain of Vitoria, their point of concentration.

Battle of Lord Wellington, the same evening, after a  
Vitoria. close reconnoissance, made arrangements for a  
21st June. general action, and, on the morning of the 21st  
June, moved his army in three corps over the heights which separated them from the enemy; the right commanded by Sir R. Hill, consisting of the allied division of Sir W. Stewart, the Portuguese division of the Conde de Amarante, and a division of Spaniards under General Morillo; the centre in two columns, composed of the divisions of Sir Lowry Cole and Baron Alten, and those of Lord Dalhousie and Sir Thomas Picton; and the left commanded by Sir Thomas Graham, consisting of his own and General Oswald's di-

vision, two brigades of infantry, two of cavalry, and a division of Spaniards under Longa. The great body of the cavalry was formed in readiness to support the efforts of the infantry, as might become necessary.

CHAP.  
XVI.  
1813.

On attaining the summit of the ridge, the position of the French could be distinctly traced; their centre extended along a range of strong hills on the left bank of the Zadorra, which runs in a southerly direction in front of Vitoria; their right was posted on some heights in advance of the river above the village of Abechuchcho; their left being thrown far back behind the river to the village of Gomecha. A small corps occupied the bold mountains of La Puebla, in front of the river some miles lower down, to support their centre, which might otherwise have been turned from that point where the main road crosses the Zadorra.

Thus their position embraced an extent of eight miles, covering the three great communications which from Logroño, Madrid and Bilboa converge on Vitoria, the whole being a protection to the main road to Bayonne, which, for some distance after quitting Vitoria, runs nearly parallel to the course of the Zadorra. Upon this road were observed immense convoys moving towards France, and the town was crowded with others waiting their turn to depart.

The strength of the two armies was nearly

CHAP. equal, as the French, forced by the necessity of  
XVI. seeking subsistence, and to keep at a distance the  
1813. powerful guerrilla bands of Mina and others, had 12,000 men under General Foy in the neighbourhood of Bilboa, and 15,000 men under General Clausel, at Logroño; and the allies were obliged to employ 7000 men under General Packenham to guard their line of supply.

The Zadorra in front of Vitoria not being fordable, it was impracticable, whilst the enemy's main body continued firm, to take advantage of their extended front, and, by piercing their centre, separate their wings: it was therefore arranged that Sir R. Hill should force and press their left, and Sir Thomas Graham their right, and that as soon as either of these attacking corps should be in a situation to manœuvre on the left of the river, the four divisions composing the centre of the army should advance, and the whole pushing forward on the town, should simultaneously attack it in front and flank, and force the French either to abandon Vitoria and their valuable convoys, or give opportunity for a most decisive victory, should they obstinately contend for their preservation under such disadvantages. The right, under Sir Rowland Hill, advancing by the high road from Miranda, became first engaged with the enemy's corps above La Puebla, about 6 A.M. and after a short resistance dislodged it from the mountains. Strong

reinforcements, however, being immediately sent to its support, the contest was renewed, and continued for some time with much obstinacy; at length it ended to the advantage of the allies, who crossed the Zadorra at La Puebla, and following up their success for two miles through a difficult defile, attacked and gained possession of the village of Sabijana de Alva, covering the left of the enemy's line.

CHAP.  
XVI.  
1813.

This was too important a point to be quietly resigned, and the French drew from their centre a considerable force, which made many gallant but unsuccessful efforts to retake the village. During the struggle the division of Sir Thomas Picton closely menaced the French centre, which being much weakened by the detachments employed against Sabijana, they withdrew their advanced posts on the Zadorra, when Sir Thomas seized the favourable moment, about 10 A. M. to pass the river by the bridges on the roads leading from Mendoza, which through neglect had not been destroyed, and was shortly afterwards followed by the divisions of Lord Dalhousie, Sir L. Cole and Baron Alten, by the bridges of Nonclares and Tres Puentes.

The heights occupied by the enemy were lined with a numerous artillery, which opened on the divisions the moment they attempted to advance from the river, and rendered their pro-

CHAP. **gress** so destructive, that it became necessary to  
XVI. halt and unite two brigades of guns to oppose  
1813. the French artillery. During this time the  
struggle to recover the village of Sabijana continued with the utmost fury, the enemy constantly feeding his attacks from a wood, where his troops were assembled in great force. At length a brigade, detached by Sir R. Hill along a range of mountains to turn the flank of the French, made their appearance, at the same time that Sir Thomas Picton approached their front, on which they desisted from their efforts against the village, and Sir R. Hill resumed the offensive.

At this time the four divisions composing the centre of the allies, having formed on the left of the Zadorra, advanced against the heights occupied by the French centre, when their whole force prepared to fall back on Vitoria. Sir Thomas Picton's division first came in contact with the columns, and by a rapid and determined attack, captured 28 pieces of cannon, which they had not time to draw into a road, and the other divisions equally pressed the troops in their front. The movements of the hostile bodies on this occasion were particularly fine and skilful, the allies advancing by echellons of battalions in two or three lines according to the nature of the ground, and the French retiring before them

in the most orderly manner, and taking advantage of every favourable opportunity to make a stand.

CHAP.

XVI.

1813.

In successful manœuvres on an extended scale, it will frequently happen that opportunities arise for brilliant actions in detail. On this occasion, General Colville's brigade being on the left of the centre, and most in advance, became separated by an accident of the ground from its support, and was attacked in overwhelming force by the enemy: nevertheless the brigade steadily maintained its ground, and, although it lost 550 men and officers disabled out of 1800, did not for a moment relax in its exertions.

The right and centre of the allies had thus for two hours been vigorously following up their success, and pushing back their opponents on Vitoria, when the left wing commenced its attack. That body under Sir Thomas Graham, moving on the high road from Bilboa to Vitoria, had such a considerable détour to make, that it did not begin to descend into the plain till ten o'clock: as soon afterwards as arrangements could be completed, Sir Thomas (supported by the Spanish army under General Giron) attacked and drove the French right from the heights above Abechuchó; on which Joseph, seeing his communication with Bayonne threatened, marched a corps still farther to his right, to occupy the villages of Gamarra Major and Menor on the

CHAP. Zadorra, where the high road nearly touches the  
XVI. banks of the river. The possession of these  
1813. points enabled him to dispute the passage, and to cover the march of his convoys and the retreat of his army on Bayonne. Sir Thomas Graham therefore dispatched the Spaniards under Longa to drive the French from the one, and General Oswald's division to drive them from the other; whilst in person, with the remainder of his corps, he attacked the village of Abechuchu, above the river. Gamarra Major was carried at the point of the bayonet, about 3 P.M. by the determined advance of General Robinson's brigade in columns of battalions, exposed to a heavy fire of artillery and musketry, without returning a shot: the march of the troops was so rapid that the French forced back at the same moment on the bridge from the different parts of the village, obstructed each other's passage, and the communication being for some time suspended an unusual slaughter followed. Abechuchu fell to a less exertion, after it had been for some time cannonaded, and a light brigade had by a spirited charge captured the enemy's guns protecting the bridge. The French, to recover the posts thus lost, collected a strong body of troops in rear of Gamarra Major, a detachment from which made an instant advance to retake the village, but was repulsed with the bayonet by Major General Hay's brigade. They

then prepared a greater effort, but Sir T. Graham had in the mean while caused the houses near the bridge to be loop-holed, the artillery to be put in position to flank the approach, and several battalions to be concealed along the walls, which poured such a fire on the assailants as induced them to retire, as also on a third advance, after which they confined their efforts to a warm cannonade. Notwithstanding that the French failed in their several bold attempts to retake the village, they were too powerful for a single division to advance and attack, and prevented General Oswald immediately following up his first success; but about 6 P.M., when the centre of the allies had penetrated beyond the town of Vitoria, the corps which thus held him in check, fearing to be taken in rear, retrograded. The division then crossed the Zadorra, and possessed themselves of the high road to Bayonne, forcing back into the Pamplona road the right as well as the left and centre of the French.

The confusion amongst the different French corps thus thrown upon each other was exceedingly great, and rapidly augmented with the pressure, till at length their army became an immense mob, the cavalry alone preserving some degree of order, and endeavouring to cover the retreat. The country was much intersected with ditches, and very unfavourable for artillery to gain the road. The allies made a most pressing

CHAP.  
XVI.  
1813.



CHAP. advance, not allowing the defeated force a moment's respite to overcome any obstruction; and  
XVI. treasure, guns, caissons and baggage were indiscriminately abandoned as soon as checked in  
1813. their progress. No considerable bodies of prisoners, however, were made, as the infantry could not come up with the retiring force, and the country was too enclosed for the cavalry to act: the horse-artillery, however, did great execution, wherever the rear attempted to halt, for some miles beyond the town, till darkness, and the fatigue of sixteen hours exertion, caused the pursuit to be suspended, when 151 guns and 415 caissons, with above 14,000 rounds of ammunition, nearly two millions of musket cartridges, the military chest, the bâton of Marshal Jourdan, and various other trophies remained in the hands of the victors; the French succeeding in carrying off only one gun and one howitzer, the former of which was taken from them on the following day.

Near Vitoria two thousand carriages of different descriptions were abandoned by the fugitives, containing money, valuables, and all the royal establishment—Joseph Buonaparte himself only escaped being killed or made prisoner, by jumping out of his vehicle, and mounting a horse at the moment that a British officer, at the head of a squadron of dragoons, charged through his escort and reached the opposite door; the

carriage which he quitted containing his most splendid trinkets, and other highly-prized objects of royal plunder, remained in possession of his pursuers. So little anticipated was such a disaster, that the wives of the courtiers, and of the chief officers of state, were obliged to seek safety in personal exertion, and some hundreds of terrified women and children fled over the fields, and subsequently accompanied the march of the army on foot; among them were many Spaniards of high rank and previous affluence, who, exhausted with fatigue and hunger, crossed the frontier barefooted, and not possessing a single article of any value.

CHAP.  
XVI.  
1813,

The number of killed, wounded, and prisoners, of the French, consequent on this success, was not in proportion to their loss of artillery, ammunition, and baggage, probably little exceeding 10,000: nevertheless, the panic was so great and general, that the troops, on reaching Pamplona, finding the gates closed, strenuously endeavoured to force over the walls, and only desisted from the attempt on being seriously opposed by a fire of cannon and musketry. Nor were their chiefs altogether exempt from similar feeling: in a council of war it was decided to blow up the works and abandon Pamplona, as being insufficiently supplied. Joseph, however, feeling that the fortress would in some degree cover his retreat, commanded, as a last

**CHAP. XVI.**  
 1813. act of authority, that every article of food and fuel should be taken by force from his neighbouring subjects. These commands rigorously executed, more than doubled the quantity of provisions, and prevented the execution of a resolve which would have completed the measure of his disgrace. A garrison being selected, the fugitive force, after a short halt on the glacis, hastened onward towards the Pyrenees in the greatest disorder, their rear being still in sight of Pamplona, when the pursuit of the right and centre of the allies was checked by a fire from the walls.

Movements  
 of General  
 Foy.

The left of the allied army, under Sir Thomas Graham, marched from the field of action towards Bilboa, to intercept General Foy; but that officer, on ascertaining the complete defeat of Joseph, retired by the road of Bayonne. At Tolosa, he barricadoed the streets, and endeavoured to make a stand. Sir Thomas Graham, however, quickly dislodged him: having brought up artillery, he forced open the gate, and charging into the town, gave the French no respite till he had driven them beyond the boundaries of Spain, and destroyed their tête-de-pont at Irun.

Movements  
 of General  
 Clausel.

The corps under General Clausel marched on Vitoria the day after the action, unacquainted with the event: on arriving near the town, finding General Packenham's division in possession,

without having the power to communicate with Joseph and receive his orders, Clausel counter-marched on Logroño, where he halted for some days, to obtain information of the movements of his chief. Three divisions marched on the 25th towards Tudela to intercept his return to France, whilst a force proceeded direct to attack him at Logroño. Clausel, to avoid the latter, moved on Tudela, where he crossed the Ebro on the 27th, but somehow ascertaining that his retreat on that road was cut off, he recrossed the river the same evening, and marching rapidly through Zaragossa, gained the pass of Jaca far to the right, and entered France with little further loss than the sacrifice of his artillery, and a garrison of 500 men left in a redoubt to block up the road at Zaragossa, which surrendered to Mina at the end of the following month.

CHAP.  
XVI.  
1813.

1st July.

The effects of the battle were felt in every quarter. A few days subsequently the Condé de Bispal brought up the Spanish army of reserve, and by means of bombardment, forced the little castle of Pancorva, with 700 men in it, to surrender: that post, situated on the top of a high inaccessible rock, overhanging the great road from Madrid to Vitoria, where it passes through a ravine, entirely blocked up the main communication, which now became open.

Effects of  
the battle.

1st July.  
Pancorva  
surrenders.

Passages, situated close to the left of the line of operations, into which General Foy threw a

Passages  
surrenders.

CHAP. garrison of 150 men, surrendered on the 30th  
XVI. June to a body of Spaniards under Colonel

1813. Longa, offering a good harbour for communicating with England, which became for the remainder of the war, the channel of every supply.

Castro and Guetaria evacuated.

1st July.

The French garrisons of Castro and Guetaria, cut off from all hope of relief by land, evacuated those places in boats, and entered Santoña and St. Sebastian: the several fortified posts in Old Castile and Aragon, south of the Ebro, surrendered to the Spaniards, and finally Marshal Suchet, on the 6th July, evacuated the city of Valencia.

Summit of the Pyrenees gained.

During this time, Sir R. Hill continued to pursue the main body of Joseph's army over the Pyrenees, driving them from every point they attempted to hold till he had gained the summit of the range, and the troops were in full possession of the passes of St. Estevan, Donna Maria, Maya and Roncesvalles, concluding a series of brilliant triumphs from Portugal to the frontiers of France, achieved with a loss to the allies under 5,000 in killed and wounded.\*

7th July.

\* The only officer of rank among the number was Colonel the Honourable Henry Cadogan, who fell at the head of the 71st Regiment, on the right of the attack at Vitoria. Colonel Cadogan united to the advantage of a military education, good talents, unwearied zeal and great experience; and being in possession of youth, health and bodily activity, ranked high on the list of those thought destined to attain fame and eminence in command, when thus prematurely cut off.

These splendid successes were gained at a period when the feelings of the whole world were held in painful suspense by the long duration of an armistice concluded between the hostile forces in Germany under the surprise created by Napoleon's success at Lutzen and Bauzen, and by negotiations for peace, carrying on in that quarter under the mediation of the Emperor of Austria. The intelligence of the victory at Vitoria was in consequence received in England with unusual joy and exultation, and it was boldly anticipated that it would prove a stimulus to renewed exertions in the north, and lead to the freedom of the world as well as of Spain. Illuminations and public rejoicings were spontaneous and general in every town and village, and a most splendid military fête in honour of the day was given in the capital, under the sanction of royalty. Both Houses of Parliament voted their thanks to the conquerors, as did many corporate bodies. Lord Wellington was promoted from the rank of Lieutenant General to that of Field Marshal, and the Prince Regent, by a condescending and happy compliment, notified the promotion in his own handwriting, styling it a return for the Staff of Marshal Jourdan, which had been sent to His Royal Highness from the field of battle. The Cortes of Spain considered the victory as decisive of the independence of their country, and to the

CHAP.

XVI.

1813.

CHAP. title of Duke of Vitoria which they coupled  
 XVI. with that of Ciudad Rodrigo, annexed the  
 1813. royal domain of Soto de Roma, in the kingdom  
 22d July. of Granada.

To revert to the military narrative. The fortresses of St. Sebastian and Pamplona being left to their fate by the retreat of Joseph's army into France, Lord Wellington, who was provided with only a very small battering-train, decided to besiege the former, where further means of attack could readily be obtained by sea, and to trust to the more dilatory operation of famine to give him possession of the latter.—The Spaniards were entrusted with the blockade of Pamplona, to facilitate which and prevent the escape of the garrison, strong works and various impediments were ordered to be thrown up on every side.

Siege of St.  
 Sebastian.

Sir Thomas Graham, with 10,000 men, was allotted for the siege of St. Sebastian. The town stands at the foot of a promontory washed by the sea, the approach being over a low sandy isthmus occupied by one front of fortification, on the left flank of which, at 6 or 700 yards distance, are considerable sand-hills, which completely enfilade and take in reverse its front defences. From this point also the sea-wall of the town is seen to its base from the opposite bank of the Urumea, which recedes so much at low water as to leave a passable communication

round the left flank of the line of works which cross the isthmus. To abridge the labours of the siege and save time, it was decided to limit the operation to raising batteries on the sand-hills from which to form a breach in the exposed wall, and so soon as it should become practicable to storm it, trusting by quick movement of the assaulting columns to pass through the fire of the front line of works. Previously to commencing the attack, the fortified convent of St. Bartolomeo, situated 7 or 800 yards in advance of the place, was to be reduced: that effected, batteries were thrown up on the sand-hills and armed with twenty heavy guns and twelve mortars and howitzers. On the 20th they opened, and on the 25th July, two breaches being practicable, one thirty yards in front, the other ten, they were assaulted at the hour of low water.

CHAP.  
XVI.

1813.

17th July.

The storming party, about 2,000 men, being in readiness, a mine which had been formed under the glacis of the front line of works, was sprung as the signal to rush forward, the unexpected explosion of which created so much alarm among the defenders, that the advance reached the breach with little loss; on attempting, however, to ascend it, so much fire was brought upon them from the interior, and from different flanks which had not been silenced, that in a short time five hundred were killed

25th July.



CHAP. and wounded, and the remainder returned into  
XVI. the trenches.\*

1813.

Battles in  
the Pyre-  
nees.

13th July.

The day the garrison obtained this triumph, the enemy commenced a series of manœuvres against the right of the army. To retrieve the honour of the imperial arms, Marshal Soult, considered the most able of the French captains, returned in the middle of July, from the army in Germany, to assume the command of the forces in the south, as Lieutenant de l'Empereur. These, by desertion and other casualties, had been reduced to 80,000; nevertheless, the Imperial Lieutenant proclaimed his intention of carrying the war beyond the Ebro; and, as proof of his expectations of success, used every exertion to bring forward fresh artillery and to augment the strength of his cavalry, arms of little value for a struggle in the Pyrenees. His first enterprise was to relieve Pamplona, with which view, at the end of July, he assembled a convoy of provisions and stores at St. Jean Pied de Port, and concentrated the main body of his army in the environs of the town.

Of all the undertakings in war, the most hazardous is to defend the passes through a

\* When Marshal Berwick attacked St. Sebastian in 1719, he formed his breaches in a similar manner and from the same spot; after which, having lodged on the covered-way of the land front, the place capitulated.

range of mountains, as it obliges a separation of force, which gives an enemy the choice of directing his principal strength against any particular corps, and to select the point most eligible for that purpose. Success of the assailants, at any single pass, compromises the safety of all the defensive corps, which are consequently less firm in proportion to the number of passes; and the resistance of the weakest becomes equally important to the safety of all, as that of the strongest. The surest plan therefore is to concentrate in rear of the passes to be defended, leaving at them only posts of such strength as shall give warning of the points attacked in force, and allow time to make suitable dispositions for their support. In the Pyrenees, however, such an arrangement for defence is impracticable, as nature, acting on the great scale, has so jumbled mountain alongside of mountain, that all lateral communication is cut off, or is rendered too tedious to be of any advantage. The allies were therefore obliged to attempt the defence of the passes under the disadvantage of having two points to cover, sixty miles distant from each other, and two blockades to maintain.

To unite these four objects, the following were the dispositions :—The besieging force at St. Sebastian, under Sir T. Graham, with its covering army (chiefly Spaniards) on the Bi-

CHAP.  
XVI.  
1813.

CHAP.  
XVI.

1819.

assoa, formed the extreme left. A brigade of British infantry under General Byng, with Morillo's corps of Spaniards in the pass of Roncesvalles, formed the extreme right, having, as their support, Sir Lowry Cole's division at Biscaret, in their immediate rear, and Sir Thomas Picton's division in reserve at Olaque.—General Hon. William Stewart's division, with Silveira's Portuguese division under Sir R. Hill, were posted at the passes near Maya, about twenty miles on the left of Roncesvalles, having General Campbell's Portuguese brigade detached to Los Alduides. The light division under Baron C. Alten guarded the heights of St. Barbara, and Lord Dalhousie's division the Puerto de Echalar, intermediate points between the right and left; General Pack's division, (the sixth,) being in reserve at the interior pass of St. Estevan, and the Condé de Bispal, with 10,000 Spaniards, being charged with the blockade of Pamplona.

Soult's arrangements were to attack, on the same day, in force, the passes of Roncesvalles and Maya, the roads from which converge on Pamplona; thus acting against the extremities, every advance he should make on either flank would oblige the other defensive corps to fall back, which would affect the resistance of his immediate opponent, and it would require only one advantage of combat or manœuvre, in a

distance of thirty miles, to force one of the defensive corps from the road of Pamplona, where his own forces would be certain to unite.

CHAP.  
XVI.  
1813.

These manœuvres were commenced by the French on the 25th July, under the great advantage of Lord Wellington being at the opposite extremity of the line near St. Sebastian. Count Erlon, who commanded the right of the attacking army, about 13,000 men, and was destined to force the position of Maya, defended by Lieutenant General W. Stewart's division, began early in the morning to make demonstrations against each of the four passes, and against the division of the Condé de Amarante posted on the right of Maya: under cover of these manœuvres he collected the main body of his forces behind a hill immediately in front of the pass of Aretesque, from whence about noon he made a sudden and rapid advance against the pass; the defenders were not sufficient to resist his formidable numbers; the troops to watch the other passes could not leave them totally unguarded, and were brought up by successive battalions as the pressure augmented; whereas Count Erlon's whole force acting compactly, each endeavour to check them proved too feeble; some of the defensive battalions became separated from the others, and the division was forced back several miles with the loss of four guns, and 1600 men killed and wounded, to a strong piece of ground,

25th July.

CHAP. where being concentrated, and joined about  
 XVI. 6 P. M. by a brigade from Echalar, they re-  
 1813. newed the struggle with success till 9 P. M.,  
 when the firing ceased: during the night the  
 troops fell back on Elizonda.

25th July. Marshal Soult in person, with 35,000 men, directed the effort against Roncesvalles. General Byng, who commanded the advance of the allies in the pass, aware that a few miles to his right a road through Arbaicete turned his post, detached Morillo's corps as far to the right as consistent with mutual support, and placed his own brigade in a situation to cover the direct communication from St. Jean Pied de Port to that town. To effect the latter object, he was obliged to descend from the summit of the pass, which Marshal Soult observing, he slightly attacked Roncesvalles in front, whilst he marched a very considerable corps along the ridge of Arola to his right to cut off the retreat of those disputing the pass. The troops on the ridge, part of General Cole's division, being very inferior in numbers to the assailants, were beaten back with much loss along the plateau of Altabisca, till strengthened by the Fuzileer brigade, which moved to their support, and enabled them to form on some very strong ground, which their pursuers did not think proper to attack.

Marshal Soult then directed his main effort against the front of General Byng's force, and

drove it to the top of the mountain, which uncovered the road to Arbaicete. The same evening the Spanish regiments defending that town, were successfully attacked and driven back on General Cole's division, who, having a superior force in his front, and on his flank, with the chance of one also moving into his rear, retired, as soon as it became dark, to Lizoain, where the troops from Alduides joined him through Egue. In consequence of this retrograde movement, Sir R. Hill's corps fell back behind Irueta, where it took up an almost unattackable position.

CHAP.  
XVI.  
1813.

General Picton with his division crossed over to Zubiri as soon as informed of Soult's movements, from whence, on the 26th, he moved forward to support the troops at Lizoain, of which, as senior officer, he assumed the command. At 2 P. M. the enemy's whole force advanced, when Sir T. Picton retired skirmishing to a strong bluff hill, which, with the ground on its right, he maintained in order of battle till dark, when he again fell back.

26th July.

On the 27th, the two divisions resumed their march, men and officers dejected to think that a few hours would carry them beyond Pamplona, when a communication was received from Lord Wellington directing them to halt, as he had ordered up the Condé de Bispal to their support. Soon afterwards his Lordship himself appeared,

27th July.

CHAP. a sufficient presage of victory, and the troops  
XVI. took up their ground with full confidence of  
success.  
1813.

Lord Wellington received information of the enemy being in movement on the night of the 25th, and with his usual activity hastened to the scene of action, dictating, as he rode past the different corps, the movements proper to support the retiring force. Previously to their arrival, General Cole's division had formed on the high ridge between the rivers Arga and Lanz, and General Picton's division on the left bank of the former river, occupying also a strong ridge. The Spaniards were formed in reserve on the left of the two divisions, and the cavalry in reserve near Huarte on the extreme right, being the only ground where they could act: thus the front extended across the two principal roads, which, from Maya and Roncesvalles, converge on Pamplona, in similar manner as has since been practised near Waterloo, by the roads converging on Brussels from Genappes and Nivelles. Orders had been sent to Sir R. Hill to retire behind the Lizasso, where he would be sufficiently near to support the position now occupied, and yet cover the road leading from Irantzum and Berisplano to Pamplona, into which Soult might throw himself by a wide movement to his right, or Count Erlon's force

might enter direct; and Lord Dalhousie was ordered to bring his division from St. Estevan to the same point.

CHAP.  
XVI.  
1813.

Marshal Soult formed his army in a similar manner to that of the allies, on the ridge of a lofty mountain between the two roads, occupying Souraren as a detached post on his right, and on his left placing one division on some bold heights beyond the road of Zubiri. The same evening he pushed forward a corps to take possession of a rugged steep hill on the right of General Cole's division, commanding the main road from Zubiri, and which was occupied by one Spanish and one Portuguese battalion. These troops steadily resisted with the bayonet and drove the assailants back, when a reinforcement being immediately marched to their aid, prevented any further effort of the enemy against that point.

Early in the morning of the 28th, General Pack's division (the 6th) arrived, and were so disposed across the valley in rear of the left of General Cole, with their right at Oricain, as to make face against the village of Souraren, where the enemy had collected in force. Scarcely had the troops taken up their ground when they were vigorously attacked from that point: the French steadily advanced; but after a little time, the front fire, aided by that in flank from the



CHAP. troops on the position, caused such destruction  
XVI. amongst them that they retrograded.

1813.

Marshal Soult, on this failure, prepared for a general attack of the whole line. At 1 P. M. a strong column advanced up the hill, on which the centre of the allies was formed, and attacked the left of General Cole's division, posted at a small chapel behind Souraren on the high road from Ortix to Pamplona; a Portuguese battalion which defended it was quickly dislodged, but on the approach of Major General Ross's brigade to their support, it returned to the charge, and the enemy in their turn were driven back. They then directed their efforts against the hill on its right, where the 40th regiment, supported by a body of Spaniards, was in line; the latter instantly gave way, and the French gained the summit. Their triumph, however, was of short duration; the 40th, with much steadiness, gave them a volley, and rushing to the charge, drove them down again with great loss. Soult then covered his whole front with a cloud of tirailleurs, and under their fire attacked at the same time both flanks of General Cole's division: repulsed with great loss, three times he renewed the attempt, and at each suffered most severely. The only success he met with was on the left, where, in the last attack, he regained the chapel, and following up

his advantage, established his columns on the position of the allies. The nearest battalions were ordered to drive them back, and never was more spirit shown on any occasion. General Ross's brigade was particularly engaged: the 7th, 20th and 23d regiments repeatedly used their bayonets with success, and the 48th literally charged to their front and to their flank, and with the bayonet dislodged the enemy from the chapel, which brilliant action closed the contest, as immediately afterwards General Pack's division moved forward and gave a decided superiority to the allies on that point.

CHAP.  
XVI.  
1813.

On the 29th the two armies remained quiet in their respective positions. In the course of the day, the allies were reinforced by Lord Dalhousie's division, which was posted near Marcalain, assuring the communication of Sir R. Hill's corps with the main body, and firmly connecting the operations of the two defensive corps. This was a death blow to Marshal Soult's system of manœuvres, and even placed him in an awkward dilemma, should he attempt to retire without a further effort; as the allies were now become one army, having their left wing much nearer Lanz, or St. Estevan, than the main body of their opponents.

Marshal Soult perceived the difficulty of his situation, and the same evening made dispositions to extricate himself, and attain his object

CHAP. of relieving Pamplona by a different manœuvre.

XVI.

1813.

The position occupied by the French between the Arga and Lanz was by nature so exceedingly strong, almost inaccessible, as to leave little apprehension of its being attacked when moderately guarded; Soult, in consequence, (having previously drawn in the division from the ground beyond the Zubiri road,) marched the bulk of his army to his right, and at Ortix formed a junction with Count Erlon, with the intention of overwhelming the left of the allies. The resistance, however, he had experienced on the preceding day, had so lessened his hopes of success, that he deemed it prudent, whilst his rear remained open, to send back his artillery to France.

30th July.

The movement of so many troops to the mountains on the right of the Lanz, leaving no doubt of the enemy's intentions, Lord Wellington, to prevent his right wing being detained inactive by an inferior force, (which would have given his antagonist nearly the same advantage as a separate attack of Sir R. Hill,) decided to make the corps in his front move, and with that intent, on the morning of the 30th, began to manœuvre on its flanks. Lord Dalhousie with General Inglis's brigade gallantly carried a height which supported their right, and Sir Thomas Picton turned their left from the high road to Roncesvalles by crossing over the heights from

which the French division had been withdrawn, and General Packenham, in command of the 6th division, drove them from the village of Ortix. These movements having shaken their confidence, an attack in front was made by Lieutenant-General Cole's division, on which the enemy abandoned a position from its appearance impregnable, and were pursued beyond Olaque to the rear of the troops opposed to Sir Rowland Hill, who had been warmly engaged throughout the day. Whilst his left flank was threatened by a wide movement of Count Erlon, a strong force made many vigorous efforts to break his front. Sir Rowland repulsed every attack, and being constantly reinforced from the right in the same degree as the French moved, maintained his position till Count Erlon was absolutely round his left flank, when he leisurely retired to a range of heights near Eguarras, and bade defiance to the enemy, who were unable to dislodge him.

CHAP.  
XVI.  
1813.

Thus foiled in their efforts against the left as well as the right of the Allies, the French army, on the night of the 31st, made a creditable retreat through the pass of Donna Maria, where they left a strong corps in an excellent position. Nevertheless, Lord Dalhousie and Sir R. Hill, marching in parallel columns, simultaneously ascended the two flanks of the mountains, and quickly dislodged it; a brigade under General

French re-  
tire.  
31st July.

CHAP. Barnes, by a spirited attack, literally driving more  
XVI. than double its number from one of the most difficult points. Lord Wellington at the same time  
1813. marching through the pass of Vilate on Irueta, the line of the Bidassoa became completely turned, and the enemy lost many men in the further pursuit, as well as a considerable convoy of stores and provisions previously captured at Berueta, swelling their casualties to a number unusually great: those of the Allies amounted to 6,000.

The garrison of Pamplona received the first intimation of the advance of their friends by the desertion of thirty-five of the Walloon guards. These men representing relief as certain, their hopes and expectations were raised to the highest pitch on hearing the firing only five miles distant, and they made a gallant effort to force through the lines of the investing corps, and raise the blockade; but by the spirited exertions of Don Carlos de España they were repulsed, after having obtained possession of several batteries. On the 1st of August the posts of the army were established in nearly the same situation as previously to the advance of the enemy.

Siege of St.  
Sebastian  
renewed.

On this success, the siege of St. Sebastian, which since the failure of the assault had been converted into a blockade, was resumed. It was decided, to renew the former attack with an increased power of artillery, and by additional

batteries to be established on the isthmus, to continue the breach round the angle of the land front; a good battering train had arrived from England, and Sir George Collier, commanding the squadron, landed both men and guns to aid in the operation:—thus provided, the besiegers opened a direct fire from eighty pieces of ordnance on the 28th, and on the third day, when the breaches appeared in a state to be assaulted, a proportion was turned against the defences, which, in a few hours, nearly subdued the fire of the place. A little before noon, on the 31st of August, the columns advanced to the assault. The enemy on their approach exploded two mines on the left flank of the front line of works, which blew down the counterscarp wall, under which the assailants were passing; luckily, however, the troops not being in very close order, few were buried, and they reached their point of attack with little loss. Many desperate efforts were made to carry the breach; but each time, on attaining the summit, a heavy and close fire from the entrenched ruins within, destroyed all who attempted to remain, and those at the foot fell in great numbers from the flank fire. To supply these losses, fresh troops were sent forward with laudable perseverance as fast as they could be filed out of the trenches, and a battalion of Portuguese gallantly forded the Urumea, in face of the enemy's works, the whole

CHAP.  
XVI.

1813.

31st Aug.

Breaches  
carried by  
assault.

CHAP. of which were strongly lined with men, who  
XVI. kept up an incessant fire of musketry, particu-  
1813. larly from a rampart more elevated than the  
spot where the breach had been formed. Sir  
Thomas Graham seeing this, trusted to the well  
known accuracy of fire of the artillery to open  
upon that spot, over the heads of the assailants.  
This they did with much effect; nevertheless,  
two hours of continued exertion had fruitlessly  
passed away, and the troops were still on the  
face of the breach, falling in great numbers,  
without being able to establish themselves on  
its summit, when a quantity of combustibles  
exploded within, which shook the firmness of  
the defenders: they began to waver, and the  
assailants to redouble their efforts to ascend.  
The most advanced works were successively  
abandoned by the garrison, and ultimately the  
retrenchment behind the breach. The troops  
immediately pushed up in great numbers, as-  
sisted each other over the ruins, and descended  
into the town, after which, every attempt to  
check them behind various interior defences was  
in a moment overcome; 670 of the garrison  
were made prisoners, and the remainder driven  
into the castle.

In this attack, nearly 2,000 men and officers  
were killed or disabled. Generals Leith, Os-  
wald, and Robinson were wounded at the final  
assault, and Colonel Crawford, Major Rose and

many other valuable officers fell, but none more regretted than Lieutenant Colonel Sir Richard Fletcher, Bart., the commanding-engineer, an officer esteemed by the whole army for gallantry and professional talent: the former was advantageously displayed in conducting the attacks of Rodrigo and Badajos; the lines covering Lisbon bear honourable testimony to the latter.

CHAP.  
XVI.  
1813.

The same day the French made a great effort to draw off the garrison by forcing through the covering army, the principal strength of which consisted of 8000 Spaniards, under General Freyre, posted on the heights of St. Marcial, on the left of the Bidassoa, covering the high road from Bayonne. The position occupied by the Spaniards was exceedingly strong, their front and left flank being covered by the river, and their right supported by the bold mountain of Haya.

31st Aug.  
Effort to relieve St. Sebastian.

During the 29th and 30th August the enemy assembled in force at Vera; in consequence of which, General Inglis's brigade was ordered to the bridge of Lezaca, and General Ross's brigade took post on the left of the mountain of Haya, as an immediate support to the right of the Spaniards; and a Portuguese brigade occupied the right of the same mountain to prevent it being turned. The first division under General Howard, in rear of Irun, formed a reserve to the left of the Spaniards, and Longa's guerrillas, on the mountain of Haya, a reserve to



CHAP.  
XVI.

1813.

Affair at St.  
Marcial.

their right. In the evening a large park of artillery and a pontoon train were clearly seen on the high road from Bayonne, and various large bodies of troops were observed in movement, but nothing hostile occurred. The night was exceedingly tempestuous; nevertheless, at day-light on the 31st, it was perceived that a French division had crossed the Bidassoa, by a ford in front of the left of the Spaniards, and that a second division was in the act of crossing at the same spot, whilst a third division, under protection of several batteries thrown up during the night, were constructing a bridge over the river about half a mile above the main road. At the same time a very strong body was effecting the passage by the fords of Salim, to the right of the mountain of Haya. The two French divisions, as soon as formed, attacked the left of the Spaniards: despising their antagonists, they advanced with precipitate boldness; the hill they ascended was exceedingly steep, and the defenders firmly waited till the assailants had nearly attained the summit, when they charged them with the bayonet whilst in column, a movement so little expected that the French instantly broke, and were pursued to the bank of the river, which they recrossed in so much disorder, that many who mistook the direction of the ford were drowned.

A subsequent attempt made on the right by a

French division, pushed across the Bidassoa to protect the construction of the bridge, was attended with a similar result; a considerable bend, however, in the river, flanked by batteries, prevented the Spaniards following up their success, and interrupting the labours of the pontooneers, who early in the afternoon completed the bridge. The French immediately passed over 15,000 men, and made a general attack on the heights of St. Marcial. At the moment of their advance, Lord Wellington appeared in front of the line: the Spanish troops expressed their joy by loud and repeated vivas. Encouraged by his lordship's presence, and deriving confidence from their previous success, they behaved most nobly: the French were repulsed at all points, and being pursued to the banks of the river, individually endeavoured to recross. Some discovered fords, to which they owed their safety, but many less fortunate in their researches being drowned, the eagerness with which the fugitives latterly pressed on the bridge became so great, that it sunk from being overloaded, and most of those passing at the moment, perished.

CHAP:  
XVI.  
1813.

Simultaneously with the attack of the Spaniards, the corps which crossed the river at Salim endeavoured to penetrate by a road to the right of the mountain of Haya, which leads to St. Sebastian through Oyarzun. The Portuguese were soon reinforced by General Inglis's brigade, 31st Aug.

CHAP. which was relieved in the defence of the bridge of  
XVI. Lezaca by a similar force from the light division.

1813. The two brigades retired before the enemy, and, favoured by the great strength of the country, reached the ridge on which the convent of St. Antonio stands, without serious loss: there the divisions of Sir L. Cole and Lord Dalhousie also assembled, as well as the Spaniards under Longa, and the enemy were unable to dislodge them. Being thus checked at all points, the French retired in the night, and rain having rendered the fords impracticable, were obliged to recross the Bidassoa by the bridge at Vera, exposed to the fire of part of the light division. This added much to their casualties, which cannot be estimated at less than 2000, in the course of the operation: amongst the number were two generals of division killed.

This action was of considerable importance; as the position of St. Marcial being exceedingly strong, Lord Wellington trusted to the Spaniards alone to maintain it, giving them the opportunity, like the Portuguese at Busaco, to imbibe confidence, and to lay the foundation of military character: thus, at the same moment, improving his own force, and causing incalculable harm to the French soldiers, who, beaten by the Spaniards they had been taught to despise, could not but feel a sense of growing inferiority.

Castle of St.  
Sebastian  
surrenders.

Immediately after the capture of St. Sebastian,

operations were commenced for the reduction of the castle, which stands on the summit of a rock, rising 200 feet almost perpendicularly from the sea. During the contest amongst the buildings on the day of the assault, various houses caught fire, which progressively spread over the whole town, causing the greatest impediment to the workmen, and it was the 9th September before the batteries were armed. On that day fifty-nine heavy guns, howitzers, and mortars opened, and the interior space of the castle being too confined to admit of cover being thrown up to lessen the effects of the shells, the garrison did not long resist. After enduring the bombardment for two hours, and being reduced to 1300 effective, and 500 sick and wounded, they surrendered prisoners of war. General Rey, the governor, whose resolute and intrepid defence had gained him the esteem of his garrison and the respect of the besiegers, was happily among the survivors. The casualties of the allies in the two attacks rather exceeded 3,700.\*

CHAP.  
XVI.  
1813.

9th Sept.

The end of September passed in closing up

\* Sir George Collier displayed the utmost seamanship and daring in his efforts to maintain the blockade of St. Sebastian, nevertheless the danger of the coast and the immediate vicinity of the French ports, enabled the garrison to have constant communication with France, and even after being shut up in the castle to obtain some artillery and ammunition.

CHAP. the troops, in replacing the ammunition, re-or-  
 XVI. ganizing the divisions which had most suffered,  
 1813. and other general arrangements for an offensive movement. During this time, the troops posted on the summit of the Pyrenees to cover the blockade of Pamplona, suffered most severely from wet and cold, which, added to great privations, almost shook their constancy: the frequent view of a serene and sunshiny day in the plains of Gascony beneath them, whilst they were enveloped in mists, deluged with rain, or cut through with sleet—the wretched accommodation of their bivouacs and quarters, contrasted with the comfortable villages and smiling valleys of France—the unremitting fatigue of guarding their numerous posts—the frequency of night-duties, and a necessity for the strictest enforcement of military discipline, added to their discontent; and as the duration of their tedious state of inactivity diminished the stimulus of hope and expectation, desertions became numerous.

Allies cross  
 the Bidas-  
 soa.

The right of the army at Roncesvalles and Maya held a most commanding situation, and might at any moment descend into France.— Lord Wellington, as soon after the surrender of St. Sebastian as arrangements could be completed, determined to place his left in an equally menacing posture, by dispossessing the enemy of some strong ground they occupied as an ad-

vanced position on the right of the Bidassoa, the key of which was a high steep mountain, called La Rhune, situated in front of the passes of Vera and Echalar. CHAP.  
XVI.  
1813.

On the 7th October, two divisions under Sir Thomas Graham crossed the Bidassoa at low water, near its mouth.—The Spanish army of Galicia under General Freyre crossed at the ford of St. Marcial, and the light division under Baron C. Alten with Longa's Spaniards attacked the entrenched pass of Vera, whilst General Giron with the army of Andalusia advanced against the entrenchments on La Rhune mountain.

Sir Thomas Graham and General Freyre both carried the enemy's works in gallant style, and captured six pieces of artillery. General Alten's attack of La Vera was peculiarly brilliant: the approach, narrow and of a continued ascent, was occupied by five strong redoubts domineering over each other; nevertheless, the division advanced in column, and in that formation successively carried each work; the firmness of the defenders being probably shaken by the appearance of small parties of Spaniards detached to occupy various points on their flanks and in their rear. General Giron also carried the lower parts of La Rhune. The superior eminence, however, proved nearly inaccessible, and after many fruitless efforts to ascend, the troops bi-

CHAP.

XVI.

1813.

vouacked below it. In the morning the defenders, finding themselves left to their fate, gave up the post after a feeble resistance, and the Spaniards, immediately pushing forward, carried an entrenched line beyond the mountain, which was not obstinately disputed. The French commanders throughout the day evidently turned their chief attention to concentrate behind a fortified line along the Nivelle, a few miles in rear of La Rhune mountain, which apparently they had occupied merely as a temporary advanced position, as they even abandoned many intermediate works between it and the river on being seriously menaced. Bridges of communication were speedily established over the Bidassoa, and works were thrown up to strengthen the ground gained on the French side, where the left of the army took post in an equally commanding attitude with the right.

App. XVI.

On the 31st October the garrison of Pamploña, 4,000 in number, after a blockade of four months, without once having been able to communicate with Marshal Soult, surrendered prisoners of war, which event concludes the war in the western parts of Spain; and the operations in the eastern provinces alone remain to terminate the narrative.

## CHAPTER XVII.

*Operations in the Eastern Provinces—Affair at Castalla—Sir J. Murray disembarks in Catalonia—lays siege to Tarragona—Marshal Suchet moves to its relief—the British raise the siege, and re-embark for Alicante—French evacuate Valencia, and retire into Catalonia—the British follow their march—attempt the reduction of Tarragona—the siege raised by Marshal Suchet, who dismantles the works—Affair at Ordal—Secret Treaty between Ferdinand and Buonaparte—Lerida, Mequinenza, and Monzon, recovered from the French by stratagem—Return of Ferdinand VII.—General Peace.*

THE allied forces in Valencia were augmented during the winter of 1812-1813, to 16,000 men, in nearly equal proportions of Spanish and British, and the chief command was transferred to Lieutenant General Sir J. Murray. During the same period, a separate Spanish corps of 12,000 men, under General Elio, was organized in Murcia to act in conjunction with them. The two commanders, early in March, made a combined forward movement; General Elio, on the left, to Yecla, Villena, and the flat country in their vicinity, and Sir J. Murray on the right to the mountainous district of Castalla, when, having forced the French to fall back from Alcoy, he established his advanced posts at Ibi and Biar. 3d March.

CHAP.  
XVII.  
1813.



CHAP. XVII.

1813.

In this position they remained till the beginning of April, when Marshal Suchet having put a strong corps in movement against them, General Elio decided to retire to a less open situation. Intending to march from Yecla early the next morning, he imprudently withdrew his cavalry out-posts on the night of the 10th April, which gave the opportunity to General Harispe to enter the town by surprize. The Spaniards attempted to retire over the plain, which movement having been anticipated, the French cavalry waited their approach, and, by repeated charges, sabred or made prisoners nearly the whole number. A battalion of 1000 men, newly clothed and appointed, left in Villena, being separated by this success of the French from the right wing of the army, capitulated the following day.

12th.

Affair at  
Biar.  
12th April.

On the 12th Marshal Suchet advanced from Villena, with 5,000 men, and after a contest of two hours at the pass of Biar, forced the defenders to fall back on Castalla, with the loss of two mountain-guns, on which the army took up the ground in position, the left on some strong rocky heights, the centre near the old Moorish castle, from which the place takes its name, and the right thrown back behind a deep ravine. The next day, Marshal Suchet assembled in front of the allies three divisions of infantry and fifteen hundred cavalry, and it

Battle of  
Castalla.  
13th April.

being the first time the army of Aragon had come into contact with the British, he, with unhesitating confidence, directed a column of 4,000 men to attack the left of their position, and was obeyed with alacrity by the troops. The ground over which the assailants marched being rocky and uneven, their progress was slow, and they covered their advance with numerous tirailleurs, between whom and the Spaniards under General Whittingham a continued firing was kept up for nearly an hour. The column, however, gradually ascended the slope till nearly in contact with the 27th Regiment, formed in line, which rushed forward, and in a moment bayoneted them down. The Spaniards, encouraged by the example, joined in the charge, and the loss of the French was so considerable, that they immediately commenced their retreat on St. Felipe, which they effected without molestation through the pass of Biar on Villena, and from thence by Fuente La Higuera and Ontimiente, as Sir J. Murray, in preference to pressing their rear, put his army in movement on Alcoy the day after the battle, with the expectation of reaching the Xucar before the defeated force; but after the first day's march, finding that he was too late, he halted and returned to his former position at Castalla. The allies lost in the two days 146 killed, and about 500 wounded and missing.

CHAP.  
XVII.  
1813.

15th.

CHAP.  
XVII.

1813.

Marshal Suchet, after this repulse, concentrated 15,000 infantry, with a formidable cavalry, in readiness to occupy the strong line of the Xucar, should the allies pursue the offensive; but at the moment of their success, 2,000 of the British were recalled to Sicily to enforce the compliance of the feudal Barons with the articles of a free constitution, and each party remained quiet till the movements of the forces on the eastern coast were combined with the general operations of the campaign.

Operations  
in Catalo-  
nia,

By instructions from Lord Wellington, Sir J. Murray was directed, on the opening of the campaign, to transport his army into Catalouia, and possess himself of some maritime fortress which might enable him to co-operate with the Catalan chiefs. This junction of force, it was expected, would induce Marshal Suchet to abandon Valencia, and perhaps the lower Ebro, and also prevent him giving support to Joseph's army. Sir J. Murray was further directed, in the event of Suchet bringing up his troops in time to prevent the capture of a maritime fortress, instantly to re-embark and sail to Valencia, and possess himself of the strong lines hitherto occupied by the enemy, which must necessarily be left in a very unguarded state. To aid these enterprises, a body of Spanish troops, brought forward from Murcia and Grenada, under the Duke del Parque, were to threaten the line of the Xucar.

The transports, which had rode out the whole winter in Alicante bay, were in readiness for the reception of the troops at the appointed moment: on the 31st May they sailed, and being favoured by the wind, anchored off Tarragona at dusk on the 2d June.

CHAP.  
XVII.

1813.

The troops began to disembark at day-light the following morning, and by the indefatigable exertions of Admiral Hallowell, who took the personal superintendence of the operation, 14,000 men, with the artillery, were on shore and the place invested by 3 P. M. These movements were effected so much more quickly than troops could march by land from Valencia, that the garrison, watched by the army of General Copons, which was in the immediate neighbourhood, had not been able to receive any reinforcement, and scarcely mustered 700 men. Whilst preparations were making to commence the siege, a brigade under Colonel Prevost attacked the post on the Col de Balaguer.

Tarragona  
invested.  
3d June.

Fort Balaguer is a small square casemated work, standing on a bare rock 400 feet above the sea, from which its distance does not exceed a thousand yards; but the only communication open to the besiegers was a circuitous route of a mile and a half over the face of the hill. Every supply, even water, was to be brought up by manual labour from the fleet, and the earth to construct the works of the siege

Fort Balaguer re-  
duced.  
6th June.

CHAP.

XVII.

1813.

from the plain beneath, consequently the attack of this little fort presented many peculiar difficulties; nevertheless, on the night of the 5th, batteries were established within 100 yards, and by the skill and labour of the seamen, artillery being dragged up the mountain, they opened on the following day. The practice from the mortars was excellent; every shell fell into the work, and after a few hours the governor, with his garrison of 100 men, capitulated as prisoners of war.

The possession of Fort Balaguer effectually shut out Suchet from any immediate interference with the operations of the main body of the army, as the range of mountains, at the extremity of which it is built, wind round in a semicircular form, and encompass the plain on which Tarragona stands. A single passage, impracticable for carriages of any description, about seven miles inland, forms the only communication over the ridge, between the great road which the fort commands and the town of Mont-blanc, to reach which from Tortosa it is necessary to make nearly the *détour* of Mequinenza. The siege of Tarragona, therefore, commenced under the most favourable auspices. The strength of the fortifications had been considerably diminished by the French, who had dismantled or destroyed most of the exterior defences, and had proportioned the garrison to the

interior line only. This, however, not being  
 fully known to the besiegers, many days were  
 spent in cannonading a detached work, which it  
 was not judged advisable to assault before the  
 night of the 11th June.

CHAP.  
 XVII.  
 1813.

Marshal Suchet, with his wonted activity, profited by the time thus afforded him: he arrived at Tortosa on the 9th, and finding the direct communication impracticable, from the loss of Fort Balaguer, marched the next day, with a division of infantry without artillery, by the mountain track before mentioned, leaving orders for the remainder of his army successively to follow as they should arrive. At the same time a corps from Upper Catalonia assembled at Vendrels, rather more than a day's march to the eastward of Tarragona. On receiving information of the approach of these two hostile bodies, General Murray raised the siege, and re-embarked the infantry on the 12th June, leaving nineteen pieces of artillery in the trenches, which he did not deem of sufficient value to risk an affair by waiting till night to effect their removal. The cavalry and field artillery marched to the Col de Balaguer as more favourable for their embarkation. Soon after their arrival a party of French cavalry from Tortosa skirmished with the out-piquets, which induced Sir J. Murray to disembark infantry to cover the re-embarkation of the cavalry and artillery, and suc-

Siege of  
 Tarragona  
 raised.  
 12th June.

CHAP.  
XVII.

1813.

Lord W.  
Bentinck  
assumes the  
command.

17th June.

cessively the whole army was relanded at the Col de Balaguer, where Lord W. Bentinck found it on the 17th June, on his arrival from Sicily to assume the chief command.\* Lord William immediately blew up the fort, and re-embarked the troops for Alicante to follow up Lord Wellington's instructions, and take advantage of the absence of Suchet's army from the line of the Xucar.

Sir J. Murray, for a deviation from his orders in not having pursued the same course, and for unnecessarily abandoning before Tarragona a considerable quantity of artillery and stores, which he might have embarked in safety, was, after the conclusion of the war, arraigned before a court-martial at Winchester. The latter part of the charge alone having been proved by circumstantial evidence, the court attributed it to an error in judgment.

French evacuate  
Valencia.

6th July.

Lord W. Bentinck advanced from Alicante, and joined the Duke del Parque, to operate on the side of Valencia; but the splendid victory of Vitoria had rendered the retention of that province by the French impracticable. Suchet prudently abandoned Valencia on the 6th July;

\* The communication of the fleet with the army in this situation was exceedingly precarious, as frequently sudden gales come off the land from Balaguer with such violence that no cables will hold, and sometimes the surf is so high for days together, that no boat can land.

but, like his master on the Elbe, too confident of returning fortune, and too desirous to profit by it in the most rapid manner, threw away the means of commanding success by shutting up nearly ten thousand troops in Denia, Murviedro, Peniscola, Tortosa, Lerida Mequinenza, and Monzon, mostly situated on or to the south of the Ebro, and unconnected with his immediate operations, and which, with the garrisons of Barcelona, Hostalrich, Gerona, Figueras, Olot, Rosas, &c. diminished his moveable army fully 18,000 men, and left him scarcely 20,000 to keep the field and make face against his numerous antagonists.

The Spaniards formed the blockade of the first mentioned fortresses, while Lord W. Bentinck followed the retiring force into Catalonia: the several divisions passing between Murviedro and the sea, and crossing the Ebro on flying bridges at Amposta, invested Tarragona on the 30th July. Better informed of the strength of the place, that operation was vigorously performed: a brigade at the dawn of day advanced in line on the side of the Francoli, and obtained cover under some banks, 300 yards nearer the place than the most advanced point occupied during the previous attack. The commencement of the siege, and landing of the heavy artillery, however, were deferred till the army of the Duke del Parque should come up, and the provincial

CHAP.  
XVII.  
1813.

Tarragona  
invested.  
30th July.



CHAP. forces of General Sarsfield be assembled in sup-  
 XVII. port of the operation: the former joined on the  
 1813. 3d August, the latter on the 11th; and the pre-  
 parations for breaking ground were nearly com-  
 pleted when the movements of Marshal Suchet  
 caused them to be abandoned. That commander,  
 knowing the little power of resistance of the  
 place, directed his forces to assemble at Villa  
 Franca for its relief as soon as informed of the  
 investment: it was, however, the 14th before he  
 was prepared to move: on that morning he at-  
 tempted to pass a column along the road which  
 skirts the sea by Altafalla, but the powerful fire  
 of the men of war quickly made them strike  
 into the interior: in the afternoon his main body  
 crossed over the Cols of San Christina and Lle-  
 bra, and marched directly on Tarragona, through  
 Brafia: on their approach the allied troops took  
 a position immediately in front of the town, to  
 give battle; but in an affair of out-posts, the  
 number of the French being judged to exceed  
 20,000, the army, on the night of the 16th  
 August, retired to Cambrils, and the Duke del  
 Parque's forces recrossed the Ebro for the sake  
 of subsistence. Marshal Suchet quickly disman-  
 tled the Tarragona, and having made various  
 breaches in its walls, again fell back behind the  
 Llobregat, over which river he established a tête-  
 de-pont at Moulins del Rey, as also various re-  
 doubts on its right bank. The allies then took

Marshal  
 Suchet re-  
 lieves Tar-  
 ragona.  
 14th Aug.

Dismantles  
 the fortifica-  
 tions.

18th Aug.

possession of the unfortunate town, and made it their point of communication with the fleet for the remainder of the war.\*

CHAP.  
XVII.

1813.

Affair at  
Ordal.  
13th Sept.

The hostile armies remained inactive after this brush till the beginning of September, when, it being understood that a large portion of the French had been withdrawn from Spain, the allied forces concentrated at Villa Franca; a corps of observation, composed of the 27th British regiment, three Spanish battalions, a battalion of Calabrians, and four mountain-guns, under Colonel Adam, being placed on the main road at Ordal, about ten miles in their front, and equally distant from the enemy's posts on the Llobregat. The advanced corps reposed in position at about one o'clock in the morning, when their piquets were rapidly pushed back, and in a few minutes they were attacked in force: the guns were on the road, and were ably fought for above an hour, during which the contest was firmly maintained along the whole front, when the attacking force pressing forward in overpowering numbers, their cavalry penetrated to the rear of the position, upon which the defenders individually dispersed. The guns

13th Sept.

\* Gales from the south-east frequently blow in Tarragona bay with alarming violence: the men of war nevertheless rode them out all the winter of 1813 and 1814, the transports always getting under weigh on their approach, and running round Cape Saló.

CHAP. remained in the power of the French; but the  
 XVII. greater number of the fugitives, favoured by the  
 1813. obscurity of night, eventually reached the main  
 body. This rencontre has all the appearance of  
 having been unlooked for by Marshal Suchet,  
 whose whole army was advancing against the  
 force at Villa Franca, probably ignorant of Ordal  
 being occupied; or otherwise it can scarcely be  
 supposed he would have confined himself to a  
 front attack of a position completely open on  
 both flanks.

14th Sept. On the approach of the French the following  
 day, the allies retired over the plain of Villa  
 Franca. Being rather closely followed, a halt  
 made on a favourable spot for closing up the  
 ranks brought on an affair of cavalry, wherein  
 the Brunswick Hussars were conspicuous in a  
 rencontre with a regiment of Cuirassiers, after  
 which the French returned to the Llobregat,  
 and the allies continued their retreat to Tarra-  
 gona. Lord W. Bentinck immediately afterwards  
 returned to Sicily, and was succeeded in the  
 command by Lieutenant General Clinton.

Secret  
 treaty be-  
 tween Na-  
 poleon and  
 Ferdinand.

At this time the affairs of Napoleon becom-  
 ing desperate, the recovery of 15 or 20,000 men  
 left in the several garrisons in Catalonia and  
 Valencia became an object of the highest im-  
 portance, as also drawing to his own assistance  
 the effective troops under Marshal Suchet: with  
 this hope he secretly concluded a treaty with his

prisoner, Ferdinand the Seventh, by which it was stipulated that Spain should be evacuated by the troops of both belligerents, and that all prisoners should be restored, whether in the power of England or Spain. The Duke of St. Carlos was immediately dispatched to Madrid with a letter from Ferdinand to the government, communicating the treaty which he had concluded, and desiring the Regency to return it to him duly ratified, according to customary form. To this letter the Regency replied by expressions of joy at the approaching liberation of their sovereign, but parried the execution of the treaty by enclosing a copy of the decree of the Extraordinary General Cortes of the 1st January, 1811, which decided that no act of his Majesty, whilst under restraint, should be binding on the nation. A second letter from Ferdinand to the Regency, brought by Don Joseph Palafox, pressing the ratification still more strongly, was answered in a similarly evasive manner by the president, Cardinal Bourbon, who took the opportunity to notify to his Majesty, that an ambassador had been sent in his name to a congress of the belligerent powers to treat for a general peace. The Cortes, on the 2d February, passed a string of regulations to guard against any infraction of the laws of the state, and to preserve their own authority: among other things they decreed that the king should not be considered

CHAP.  
XVII.

1813.

11th Dec.

18th Dec.

8th Jan.  
1814.

CHAP. free till he had sworn to observe the articles of  
XVII. the constitution; that he should not be permitted

1814.

to bring any armed force with him, nor be accompanied by any Spaniard who had served under Joseph; that the Regency should fix the road for the King to travel; that the president should meet the king on the frontier and accompany him to Madrid; that on his Majesty's arrival he should alight at the hall of the Cortes and swear to the constitution; that he should then be attended by a deputation of thirty members to the Regency, who should resign the executive authority into his hands. These decrees and regulations being communicated to the people in a proclamation, the government reposed in the fatal confidence of full security.

In December Marshal Suchet made a general movement of his force to cover the pillage of the town of Martorelli, the inhabitants of which had the misfortune to incur his displeasure. This was the last offensive effort of the French in Spain, as, in the end of January, 10,000 of their best troops quitted Catalonia to defend their own territory, and the remainder retired for security under the walls of Gerona, on which Barcelona and Hostalrich, where they left garrisons, were immediately blockaded: Lerida, Mequinenza and Monzon were recovered by stratagem. An aide-de-camp of Marshal Suchet having deserted, bringing with him the cypher

French begin to evacuate Catalonia.

25th Jan.

Lerida, Mequinenza and Monzon recovered.

14th and 15th Feb.

in which the correspondence with the French garrisons was carried on, advantage was taken of the occurrence by the governor-general, Copons, to write in Suchet's name to the commandants of the different places occupied by the French, that a convention had been concluded between him and the Spaniards, by which their garrisons should march to Barcelona, giving up their respective places on the appearance of his aide-de-camp in company with a Spanish staff-officer. The governors of Lerida, Mequinenza and Monzon fell into the snare, not suspecting deceit till they arrived at the strong mountain-pass of Martoral, where they found a British force in position which demanded the object of their march. On their reply General Clinton denied all participation in the convention, and refused to admit them into Barcelona, which he was blockading and about to besiege; but left them at perfect liberty to proceed to any other point. Whilst hesitating what course to pursue in this dilemma, Copons closed upon their rear with a superior force, and acquainting them with the stratagem, they capitulated with between 3 and 4000 men. The Governor of Tortosa, Baron Robert, more wary, or having, as he stated, received letters from Marshal Suchet only a few days previously, begged to postpone the delivery of the place till the arrival of the garrison of Murviedro, when he would march out and retire in company with them. The aide-

CHAP.  
XVII.

1814.

14th and  
15th Feb.

18th Feb.

CHAP. de-camp, however, terrified at some strong  
 XVII. symptoms of an inclination to hang him, which  
 1814. he observed whilst in Tortosa, declined to enter  
 Murviedro, and those two fortresses were thus  
 preserved by the prudence or superior discern-  
 ment of an individual.

In the beginning of March Marshal Suchet  
 was ordered to detach other ten thousand men  
 from his army into France: in consequence he  
 blew up the works of Olot, Palamos and Besca-  
 ra, and the northern fronts of Gerona, and con-  
 centrated the remainder of his forces behind Fi-  
 gueras, between the rivers Lleró and Castellón.

Ferdinand :  
 VII. re-  
 stored to his  
 country.  
 23d March.

At this period the increasing difficulties of  
 France, and the ascendancy of the allies no  
 longer admitting a hope of Joseph recovering  
 his usurped dominions, Napoleon decided to li-  
 berate Ferdinand, and trust to his honour and  
 the influence of intrigue for the fulfilment of  
 the treaty of Valençay: having first secretly  
 passed General Zayas through the posts of the  
 allied army, to treat with the anti-constitutional  
 party at Madrid, he sent Ferdinand and his  
 whole family into Catalonia, where, on the 23d  
 March, under a suspension of hostilities, Mar-  
 shal Suchet, at the head of the French forces,  
 delivered him, on the banks of the Fluviá, to  
 General Copons at the head of the Spanish  
 army.

10th Mar.

General  
 peace.

By the treaty of general peace, which imme-  
 diately followed, the boundaries of Spain were

extended to the limits occupied on the 1st Jan. 1792, and the Spaniards had the satisfaction of seeing their exertions against foreign usurpation crowned with complete success. Not so, however, the attempts made to procure them domestic freedom. The Regency, which had so well parried the first attempt of Ferdinand to dictate to the government, by appealing to the decree of the Cortes that no promises extorted from the King whilst under restraint should be binding on the nation, did not, unfortunately, in their subsequent acts on this trying occasion, display the same degree of judgment. Without having prepared the means of commanding obedience, or being certain of the fidelity of the military commander, they caused it to be notified to Ferdinand, soon after entering Catalonia, that he would be required to swear, not only faithfully to observe and maintain the total change which, without his knowledge or concurrence, their predecessors had made in the fundamental laws of the state, but also to accede to the various other restrictions which the Cortes had placed on the royal authority and revenue since he had notified his being at liberty. The King, whose ideas had not changed with the circumstances of the times, was unprepared to make such concessions to those he considered merely as delegates of his authority, and possessing their power solely in consequence of his misfortunes;

CHAP.

XVII.

1814.



CHAP.  
XVII.

1814.

and there were not wanting individuals of rank and military influence, forward to seek the royal favour by encouraging him in resistance. These counsellors recommended Ferdinand to temporise; and, as a means of trying the feelings of the people before he should be obliged to declare himself openly, they caused him to avoid meeting the President of the Regency by a deviation from the route traced out for his journey, and going round by Zaragossa: the reception the young monarch met with in that city was so enthusiastic, and so personally flattering, that instead of proceeding directly to Madrid, he was encouraged further to deviate to Valencia, where, being greeted in an equally enthusiastic manner, he fixed his court. The President of the Regency arrived immediately after his Majesty at Valencia, but instead of finding himself in a condition to dictate terms, was received with cold hauteur, and being made to kiss the royal hand in token of obedience, was put under restraint.

Most of the principal nobility and dignified clergy, with many members of the Cortes, flocked round their king; also a host of ci-devant counsellors of state, of the inquisition, war and finances; with a numerous train of retired generals, uncloistered monks and ejected canons, each bringing the homage of his own fidelity and that of his brethren: assurances of loyalty

and attachment to the royal person were also received from various parts of the kingdom, and General Elio engaged for the obedience of the troops under his command to any orders their sovereign might think fit to issue.

CHAP.  
XVII.  
1814.

In the course of three weeks it became evident that the new constitution, by its sweeping changes, had offended the prejudices and feelings of every class of society, and that nearly the total of the nation would rejoice in its modification. Emboldened by this belief, and the support of the army, Ferdinand, on the 4th May, under a promise of reforming abuses, dissolved the ordinary Cortes then sitting, abrogated the acts of the late extraordinary Cortes, and resumed all the powers he had previously exercised; declaring guilty of high treason, and denouncing the punishment of death against whomsoever should oppose the execution of the decree. His Majesty a few days subsequently entered Madrid, where he was received with tumultuous joy, the populace even vying with each other in endeavours to destroy every public monument designed to commemorate the exertions that had been made for their benefit. The Cortes thereupon, deeming resistance vain, quietly separated. The most distinguished of the patriotic members, as also the regents, were soon afterwards either banished, imprisoned, or condemned to degrading punishments; the li-

App. XVII.

15th May.

CHAP. berty of the press was abolished, the Inquisition  
XVII. re-established, and the kingly government re-  
1814. stored, without a single amelioration of the  
various encroachments which for some centuries it had gradually been making on the other branches of the constitution.

Thus the ill-judged attempt of speculative men, suddenly to raise a people to the enjoyment of unbounded freedom, lost the Spaniards the most favourable opportunity that ever presented itself to a nation to renovate and improve its institutions, affording sad proof that theoretical wisdom is little fitted to direct the affairs of the world. A free government, to be duly valued and inviolably maintained, must be a work of gradual improvement, arising out of the increased knowledge and experience of those who live under it. Communities, equally with individuals, require training to habitual firmness and forbearance, qualities necessary in the highest degree to the preservation of rational freedom; such being the tendency of the different orders of men to encroach upon each other, that, without their constant and watchful exercise, a constitution, however perfect in its institutions, will infallibly sink into some description of despotism, or the still greater evil of a turbulent democracy. However much, therefore, we regret the acts of Ferdinand, and his compliance with the ungenerous counsels to

deny the slightest boon to a loyal and confiding people, whose fortunes had been so freely sacrificed, and whose blood had so copiously flowed for the preservation of his throne, we cannot but regard the failure of the efforts made in the cause of freedom to have been a natural consequence of the confined education and contracted ideas of the present race of Spaniards. This is the more lamentable, as the events in the narrative just concluded show them to possess many great national virtues. Be it ever remembered that when betrayed into the power of Buonaparte, pride of independence led them to refuse submission to his fetters: the manly firmness of their character rendered vain the number of his forces; and their persevering fortitude gave opportunity for those combats which stripped his legions of their boasted invincibility, and stimulated continental Europe to exertions which broke the tyranny of France, and probably saved the world from retrograding in civilization and refinement under the oppressive influence of a powerful and widely spreading military despotism.

CHAP.  
XVII.  
1814.



**ACCOUNT OF THE WAR**  
**IN THE**  
**SOUTH OF FRANCE.**

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## CHAPTER XVIII.

*Military Position of Europe—Lord Wellington forces the Passage of the Nivelle—places the Right of his Army beyond the Nive—Marshal Soult successively attacks the Left and Right of the Allies—is repulsed at both Points—the Army goes into Winter Cantonments—again moves forward—the Left blockades Bayonne—the Right forces the Passage of the Gaves of Mauleon and Oleron—gains a Victory over Marshal Soult at Orthes—who subsequently manœuvres to his Left—a Detachment of the Allies, in consequence, gain Possession of Bordeaux—the remainder manœuvre against Soult in the direction of Toulouse—attack and carry his Entrenched Position round that City—General Peace.*

**DURING** the summer and autumn of 1813, the military affairs of Europe underwent a complete change, and the French armies, heretofore so formidable, were beaten in every quarter. An armistice to negotiate a peace, under the mediation of Austria, followed the battles of Lutzen and Bautzen, in which the arrogant pretensions of Buonaparte proving that nothing less than the dictatorship of Europe would satisfy his ambition, the Emperor Francis, whose alliance had been that of temporary convenience and family interest, rather than cordial attachment, joined his forces to those of Russia and Prussia to limit the French empire to the boundary of

CHAP.  
XVIII.  
1813.



CHAP. the Rhine. An outline of the military events  
XVIII. which followed this decision may be traced in a  
few sentences.

1813.

Buonaparte had 250,000 men to support his pretensions; the allies to oppose them, a still greater number. The former made Dresden the pivot of his actions, stationing there his guard, his cavalry, and the élite of his troops, to the number of 70,000; the remainder of his force he divided into three armies, making face to Silesia in his front, towards Berlin on his left flank, and towards Bohemia on his right: Dresden, being thus a reserve and point of support to all his corps, and containing every thing he possessed in the shape of a depôt, was entrenched. His left army had the further support of the fortress of Magdeburg, and several well secured bridges over the Elbe; his right had no local advantages, and opposite to it the main force of the confederates assembled.

Early in August the Prussians seriously pressed the French troops in Silesia, which inducing Buonaparte to march his reserves to their support, the allied main body, crossing the Elbe in Bohemia, attacked Dresden on the left of the river. Buonaparte, interrupted in his operations by intelligence of this movement, hastened back, and luckily arrived to succour the town at the moment the assailants were penetrating through its weak retrenchments. The confederated ar-

mies, foiled in this well-judged attempt, bivouacked in position from the river above to the river below the town, forming nearly a semicircle on the left bank, of seven miles periphery. The communications along this extensive front being every where bad and tedious and nearly impracticable in the centre, Buonaparte endeavoured, by a vigorous attack, separately to overwhelm one wing.

CHAP.  
XVIII.  
1813.

Having detached 30,000 men to cross the Elbe about fifteen miles above Dresden, and take post in rear of the right flank of the confederates, he attacked them in front with his main body. In person he was successful, completely beating back those opposed to him; but not pressing the retiring force, they proved too powerful for the corps detached to their rear, which, attempting to stop their retreat, was, after a short combat, made prisoners. A variety of minor affairs, generally successful, followed, with the French corps in Buonaparte's front and on his left flank; nevertheless he remained obstinately stationary at Dresden, wearing away his troops with attempts to make head on each point, till at length the allies, having completed their arrangements, decided to unite their forces in his rear. Having drawn their separated armies together, into two bodies, one marched from Prussia by the French left, the other from Bohemia by their right; and on the

CHAP. 15th October were within a few miles of effect-  
XVIII. ing their junction at Leipzig, when Buonaparte  
1813. interposed between them, having remained till the last moment at Dresden, and ultimately leaving there above 30,000 men. His little care of his troops, and his losses in battle, added to 70,000 locked up in various garrisons, had reduced his forces to 170,000 combatants. He endeavoured, with 25,000 men, to check the march of the corps of the allies advancing from Prussia, whilst with the remainder of his army, he attacked the other. This manœuvre, which had so frequently given him victory when tried on a great scale, and by a wide movement, failed of effect when the two corps were within a few hours march of each other: the operations of his main body promised success; but his weak defensive corps being forced back on Leipzig, his only passage over the Elster, he was paralysed in his exertions, and finally obliged to retrograde to preserve his communications. The main body of the allies pressed around him in overpowering numbers, and the Saxons quitted his ranks: retreat could not be attempted in day-light, from the numberless obstacles in his rear, and he had to contend for existence till night, when about two-thirds of his force filed through the town, the remainder surrendering prisoners the following morning on being attacked. The premature explosion of a bridge

a few miles in rear of Leipzig, caused a further loss of 15,000 of the fugitives. The defection of Bavaria, a corps of which nation unsuccessfully attempted to intercept their retreat at Hanau, diminished them 10,000 more: the army, shut up at Dresden, surrendered prisoners of war, as did, successively, the various garrisons left in the north of Germany, and with difficulty Buonaparte collected some fifty thousand men on the banks of the Rhine, having, in the short space of eighteen months, sacrificed to his obstinacy above half a million of admiring warriors.

CHAP.  
XVIII.  
1813.

Napoleon individually hastened to Paris, and having, in a violent and declamatory speech to his Council of State, represented the danger of the country, "Wellington already in the south; the Russians menacing the northern, and Austria the south-eastern frontier," obtained from his complaisant senate decrees for a levy of 300,000 men, and for doubling the public contributions. These decrees, however, were at the moment mere words: time was required to give them effect, and little or nothing interposed, on the eastern frontier, between the allies and Paris: a considerable interval, nevertheless, elapsed (caused, perhaps, by political considerations, and the hope that a negotiation, then going forward, might end in a general peace) before they followed up their success, and the

Nov. 9th.

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1813.

example of invasion, as well as of victory, was doomed to spring from the south. Lord Wellington, for that object, immediately on gaining possession of Pamplona, on the 1st November, concentrated his forces to their left; but heavy rains near the coast, and snow in the mountains, attended with exceedingly inclement weather, retarded any forward movement till the 10th November, when the whole\* advanced to dislodge Marshal Soult from a formidable line of works on the Nivelle, which, with great labour and expense, he had been preparing since the failure of his efforts in the Pyrenees. The

Passage of  
the Nivelle.  
10th Nov.

\* The organization of the army was into three corps, as follows: the right, consisting of the second division, Honourable Sir W. Stewart; sixth division, Sir Henry Clinton; Sir J. Hamilton's Portuguese division; Morillo's Spanish division; and Colonel Grant's brigade of cavalry, under Sir Rowland Hill. The left, consisting of the first division, Major-General Howard; fifth division, Major-General Oswald; Generals Wilson and Bradford's Independent Portuguese brigades; and Lord Aylmer's Independent British brigade, under Sir John Hope. The centre divided into two bodies, the right of which, consisting of the third division, Major-General Honourable Charles Colville, in the absence of Sir Thomas Picton; fourth division, Lieutenant-General Honourable Sir L. Cole; seventh division, Mariscal del Campo Le Cor, in the absence of Lord Dalhousie, under Sir W. Beresford. The left formed of the light division under Baron C. Alten; the Spanish army of reserve under General Giron, and that of Don Manuel Freyre, supported by Baron Victor Alten's brigade of cavalry; altogether amounting to 85,000 men.

French position did not follow the windings of the river, but extended in nearly a direct line on either bank from the sea to Ainhoe on the left. The right was particularly strong, being covered by various advanced works, and by an interior line formed round the bridge on the main road to Bayonne, which was further supported by the town of St. Jean de Luz partially retrenched, the Nivelle not being fordable. The left ran in rear of the river along the heights of Ainhoe, which were occupied by five redoubts and other works, extending on that flank to the lofty mountains in which the Nivelle rises, and terminating favourably at a fortified rock on the same range. This part of their position being considered by the French as the weakest, and offering the most favourable ground for attack, had been further strengthened by a line of works in front of Ainhoe, also appuying its left on the fortified rock before mentioned. In the centre, the Nivelle forms a very considerable interior bend, and their line was formed almost entirely on its left. The bridge at Ascain, and that a little below it, were covered by strong *têtes-de-pont*; and the space included in the bend of the river, from thence, to the heights of Ainhoe, was studded with enclosed works and lines of entrenchments, of which the main defence was on a range of heights behind Sare. That village was barricadoed, and the approach

CHAP.  
XVIII.  
1813.

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1813.

covered by two redoubts (*a. b.*), and by La Petite Rhune mountain, also retrenched, forming a strong advanced post in its front. The centre being the point where success would be most decisive, as the penetrating columns would separate the wings of the French army, and cause the immediate abandonment of St. Jean de Luz and the right of the line, Lord Wellington ordered it to be attacked simultaneously with the heights of Ainhoe, its immediate support on the left. The latter operation was entrusted to Sir Rowland Hill. Marshal Sir W. Beresford, with three divisions, was charged with the right of the centre attack. General Giron, with the Spanish army of reserve, was ordered to act on his immediate left; and Baron Alten's light division, with Longa's corps, against La Petite Rhune. General Freyre, with a body of Spaniards, was employed to threaten Ascain, and prevent the enemy detaching troops from thence to the support of those engaged. Sir John Hope had to perform the same service along the remainder of the French line to the sea.

The division of General Cole commenced the operations of the day: after the artillery had warmly cannonaded the principal redoubt in front of Sare for a short time, the infantry advanced with ladders to the assault, and the skirmishers moved to its rear. The defenders, alarmed at these appearances, attempted to

escape by leaping over the parapet, but rather too late, many being made prisoners in the ditch. The horse artillery directly galloped to some ground which took the other work in rear, and General Le Cor's division passed its flank, on which the garrison, even less resolute than their neighbours, secured safety by timely flight, and the divisions, instantly pushing forward, obtained possession of Sare without serious difficulty.

CHAP.  
XVIII.  
1813.

General Alten was equally successful against La Petite Rhune: having formed his division before day-light within 300 yards of the retrenchment with which the face of the mountain was covered, as soon as day dawned the whole rushed to the attack with irresistible impetuosity, forcing line after line, till, approaching near the redoubts, the garrisons, fearing to stand the assault, abandoned them, and the troops, without further opposition, formed on the summit of the hill.

These preliminary attacks thus successfully executed, the whole moved forward against the retrenched range of heights in rear of Sare. The divisions of Generals Colville and Le Cor steadily advanced up the hill, covered by their respective light troops. The acclivity was so steep that the men could with difficulty scramble up, and the whole face was garnished with thick abbatis and various lines of entrenchment,



CHAP. from which a destructive fire of musketry was  
XVIII. maintained on the assailants: they, however,  
1813. steadily advanced to assault, but on a close  
approach the French abandoned their different  
lines of defence, as also the enclosed works,  
*g h*, on their left, which were in an unfinished  
state. They even evacuated, without a struggle,  
a redoubt (*f*) capable of a good defence, and the  
two divisions formed in line on the crest of the  
position. The defenders retired without order,  
and in great haste, down the reverse of the  
heights to the bridges over the Nivelle; one  
battalion alone, posted in rear of a strong work  
(*e*), preserving its formation, and making a show  
of resistance. On a similar force of Portuguese,  
however, moving forward, it retired, and the  
Portuguese, closely following for some distance,  
took up ground in rear of the work which yet  
resisted (*e*), the attention of whose garrison was  
occupied by General Alten's division in its  
front. That officer moved forward at the ap-  
pointed time from La Petite Rhune to the at-  
tack of the enemy's ground in his immediate  
front. The flanks of it were covered by imprac-  
ticable ravines, and it could only be approached  
in front over a very narrow low neck exposed to  
the fire of two redoubts, and of trenches cut in  
the hill half way down the slope. Seeing, how-  
ever, that shelter could be obtained under a  
bank on the opposite side, the 52d, headed by

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1813.

Lieutenant Colonel Colborne, crossed the ridge in single file, regardless of the fire from the defences: when collected under the bank the bugles sounded the advance, and the men ran up the slope with cheers, which had the effect of inducing the enemy to abandon his lines and the redoubt which supported them. The capture of one work (e) alone remained to complete their triumph, and the division were forming for the assault of it, when they were made acquainted with the success of Marshal Beresford's operations, which ensured its fall. The troops in consequence retired under cover from its fire, by which they had already lost above 200 men, and shortly afterwards the garrison, 560 in number, seeing all hope of retreat cut off, surrendered prisoners.

Sir Rowland Hill attacked the heights of Ainhoe in echellons of divisions, Sir H. Clinton's leading: nothing could exceed the firmness of their movements; they marched directly on the right of the five redoubts, fording the Nivelle, the banks of which were steep and difficult, and, scarcely firing a shot, ascended the face of the hill, and attacked the enemy's troops posted in front of the work. These being quickly driven back with loss, the garrison, astonished at the boldness of the assailants, ran out of the work on their approach, which

CHAP. caused the troops on its left also to give way.  
XVIII. The fugitives were closely pursued by Sir H.  
1813. Clinton, who joined with Sir J. Hamilton's division in the attack of the other redoubts, which the enemy scarcely attempted to defend. A work on a parallel ridge in the rear was carried by Sir W. Stewart's division, and the enemy was driven completely from his strong defences behind the river with a loss to the assailants of less than 500 men. Two divisions immediately marching on Espellete, caused the French to abandon their advanced line in front of Ainhoe, so soon as pressed by Morillo, and to make a circuitous retreat.

These movements firmly established the allies on the right of the upper part of the Nivelle; but further efforts were necessary to the complete success of the day, as the French troops, driven from the centre of their line, were concentrating on the heights above St. Pé, and making fresh arrangements of their artillery above Ascaïn. The army, having the full command of the left bank of the river, and being in possession of the bridges, found no difficulty in crossing. Generals Colville and Le Cor's divisions passed without opposition at St. Pé, and dislodging the enemy from the points on which they were forming, established themselves in rear of the right of the enemy's line, the troops

guarding which still remained in their works. The approach of night here terminated the operations of the day, and Marshal Soult gladly availed himself of darkness to retire the force from his right—a movement which, if attempted in day-light, would have been closely pressed by Sir J. Hope, and which the slightest retardment would have rendered fatal, the allied divisions at St. Pé being in a situation to interpose between the retiring force and Bayonne. Early the following morning they moved forward with that intent, but heavy rains having rendered the cross-roads nearly impracticable, and all the bridges on the main communication having been destroyed by the French, the progress of the different columns was so much retarded that the right wing, having marched all night, gained Bayonne without molestation.

CHAP.  
XVIII.  
1813.

Fifty pieces of cannon, fifteen hundred prisoners, with a quantity of ammunition and stores, enhanced the value of this triumph, which cost the victors little more than 500 killed and 2000 wounded. The position on the Nivelle had many great natural advantages: it was taken up with judgment, and neither labour nor expense had been spared for three months to strengthen it to the utmost. Marshal Soult had fully 70,000 men applicable for its defence, he disputed every inch of the ground till dislodged, and no charge

CHAP. has been brought against him of serious error in  
 XVIII. his dispositions;\* therefore, to account for such a  
 1813. line having been forced on two points at so small  
 a loss, more seems necessary than that the attack

\* An error of minor arrangement might possibly be pointed out in the plan he adopted of forming his lines between the works and the attacking force, by which means the fire of the redoubts was completely screened till after the repulse of his line, when the assailants following close, the garrisons generally gave way at the same time, and the support merely served to cover their retreat. The redoubts on the heights of Ainhoe were very respectable; and if the six or seven thousand men formed in front of them had been kept in reserve in their rear, leaving the fire of the work free, and had only acted against the allies when giving the assault, would not that operation have been rendered infinitely more difficult, or even hazardous?

Another secondary error might also be mentioned, which is the blind confidence felt by the French that the attack of Sir R. Hill would be directed along the ridge of mountains on their extreme left, which they carried to such a pitch, that whilst the columns were absolutely in march to the attack of the position of Ainhoe, they were observed to be detaching troops from thence to their left; and during the combat, so far from attending solely to the main point, and moving to the assistance of those engaged, the troops on the ridge amused themselves with driving the force under Mina up the pass of Maya: there they fell in with the baggage of a dragoon regiment, which they plundered, and immediately returned with their booty; otherwise, had they followed a little farther, their capture was inevitable, as, notwithstanding their accidentally accelerated retreat, the troops detached for that purpose had nearly effected it.

should have been planned with judgment and executed with ability: upon the whole it is probable that the statements of the French officers at the period were correct; that ill success had lowered the spirit of their men, and that they fought on this occasion with less than their accustomed gallantry. The allied army certainly was never in finer order, nor manœuvred better. The artillery under Colonel Dickson was conspicuously active, without any diminution of its usual destructive powers, which, as the country was unfavourable to its movement, shows to what a high degree arrangement and experience can unite those primary qualities in that arm.

After this brilliant action the allies went into cantonments between the Nivelle and the sea, till preparations should be organized for their further operations. The French at the same time concentrated in great numbers round Bayonne, only two miles in their immediate front; and as they might from thence make a sudden advance, a defensive line was appointed for the different divisions, which they were employed to strengthen with works. It commenced on the left at the sea, in rear of Biaritz, from whence it passed over the main ridge of heights, crossing the Chaussée at a country house belonging to the Mayor of that town; from thence it followed the right bank of a valley in front of Ar-

CHAP. cangues, falling on the Nive near a large cha-  
XVIII. teau, called Garrat's House, the right being  
1813. thrown back along the left of the Nive by Ustariz and Cambo.

Passage of  
the Nive.  
9th Dec.

Whilst the army occupied only this confined space in rear of the Nive, and the communication between Bayonne and St. Jean Pied de Port remained free, the French continued to have access to all the country on the right of the river, and were profiting by the opportunity to appropriate its resources to their own use, and to interrupt the foragers of the allies; therefore so soon as preparations were completed for crossing the Nive, it was decided to extend the cantonments of the army, and block up the front of the enemy, by driving back their advanced posts, and seizing some strong ground they occupied between the Nive and Adour. The army moved forward bodily on the 9th December. Sir J. Hope, with the left, met with little opposition, and closely reconnoitred Bayonne. Sir R. Hill crossed the Nive by some fords at Cambo without resistance, as the French in his front hastily retired towards Bayonne to prevent General Clinton's division, which crossed by a bridge of boats at Ustariz, intercepting their retreat. The retiring force attempted to make a stand at Ville Franche; they were, however, quickly dislodged by the light infantry of the troops from Ustariz, when, dark-

ness approaching, the operations of the day closed. The enemy in the night withdrew all his posts into Bayonne; and on the 10th Sir R. Hill's corps was established with its right on the Adour, its left on the height of Ville Franche above the Nive, and its centre across the great road from Bayonne to St. Jean Pied de Port, at the village of St. Pierre. Morillo's Spaniards were detached to Urcuray, and a brigade of cavalry to Hasparren, to observe the French troops in the vicinity of St. Palais. Sir J. Hope resumed his former cantonments in the course of the night; and the centre, under Marshal Beresford, withdrew to the left bank of the Nive, maintaining a communication with Sir R. Hill by a bridge of boats.

CHAP.  
XVIII.  
1813.

Bayonne is situated at the junction of the Nive with the Adour; the former not being fordable for several miles up its course, and the latter being a very considerable river. The town, which is fortified strongly, contains secure bridges over both streams, and the French had added to its capacity by an entrenched camp on the left of the Adour, nearly inattackable from natural obstacles, and sufficiently spacious to contain an army. The only two good roads through this corner of France, those from Paris to St. Jean de Luz and St. Jean Pied de Port, pass through the town: all the other roads are of the very worst description of cross country communica-



CHAP. tion, and become quite impracticable in winter.  
 XVIII. Marshal Soult; at Bayonne, had consequently  
 1813. the advantage over the allies of holding the  
 radii of excellent roads to the arc of their position, the communications along which were exceedingly bad, and intersected by a river; he had moreover all his communications assured from interruption, and all his movements supported by the fortress.

Actions before Bay-  
 onne.  
 10th, 11th,  
 12th, and  
 13th Dec.

10th Dec.

Marshal Soult lost not a moment in profiting by his advantageous position; and judging that the principal strength of the allies would be on the right of the Nive, supporting Sir R. Hill's corps, he marched his main force from Bayonne early in the morning of the 10th by the high road of St. Jean de Luz to overwhelm their left. The troops under Sir J. Hope, in position, guarding that road, were Major-General Hay's division (the 5th,) and two Portuguese brigades, posted on a strong narrow ridge, and Baron Alten's light division likewise on a strong piece of ground at Arcangues, about two miles to their right; no defensive connexion, however, existing between the two, except along a range of hills which projected too much to be occupied otherwise than by small posts. The position of each was strong in itself, the flanks being on difficult valleys, and so near to each other that no enemy dared to penetrate between them. The French, without halting, attacked,

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1813.

and vigorously drove the light division into their entrenchments, establishing themselves on the connecting ridge between the two allied corps, and then immediately turned their main effort against the left. The defenders displayed a spirit worthy of their reputation, and, favoured by the ground, were immovable: at one moment only was there any appearance of faltering; the enemy, after skirmishing for a considerable time, issued from a wood on the right of the high road, in such numbers as to drive back the advance on their support, which they likewise overpowered, and were rapidly following up their success, when a Portuguese battalion boldly moved forward on the road, and wheeled into the rear of the wood; the 9th British regiment, under Lieutenant Colonel Cameron, which was formed on the extreme right, perceiving that the enemy had penetrated beyond their front, immediately faced about, and uniting in a charge to the rear, with the Portuguese, caused the pursuing column to retrograde with the loss of many killed and prisoners. The French, even after this severe check, firmly persisted in the combat, which only closed with the night; when the remainder of the left wing having been brought up from its cantonments, Major-General Howard's division relieved the fatigued troops on the field of action. At the same time Sir Lowry Cole and General Walk-

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1813.

er's division, (the 7th) took post immediately in rear of the position in a situation to support either of the defensive corps.

11th Dec. Marshal Soult employed the night in making dispositions to force General Alten at Arcangues, moving many of his troops in that direction. Sir J. Hope seeing this, made a counter movement on the 11th, to be nearer to support General Alten, on which his opponent again changed his dispositions, and directed several columns against the left. Sir J. Hope lost not a moment in resuming his former ground. Soult, however, was in time to molest his rear in their march, and drove it back hastily; but made no attack after the troops had fully resumed their ground, which movement terminated the operations, though not the events of the day, for soon after the firing ceased, three battalions of Nassau troops, informed of the liberation of their country from the sway of France, came over to the allies, as the means of rejoining their prince.

12th Dec. The next morning the French still occupied the ridge in force, and in the afternoon there was a sharp affair of outposts; but no serious movement took place on either side.

Marshal Soult, foiled in his endeavours to overwhelm the left of the army, profited by the position of Bayonne to move his whole force during the night of the 12th against the corps under Sir R. Hill, on the right of the Nive, the

position of which he naturally expected would be much weakened by its supports being turned to resist his formidable and obstinate attacks of three days on the left. Such, however, was by no means the case; on the contrary, arrangements had been in progress from daylight in the morning to reinforce it with Sir H. Clinton's division; and Sir L. Cole's, with the greater part of the 3d division, was held in readiness to cross to the right of the Nive. Sir R. Hill had under his immediate command about 13,000 men: four brigades occupied the village of St. Pierre on the high road from Bayonne to St. Jean Pied de Port, Sir H. Clinton's division being a support in their rear: two brigades were at Ville Franche, with one on some strong ground in its front, and a brigade at Vieux Moguere on the right. Soult advanced with 30,000 men, evidently directing one powerful effort against the centre: Sir R. Hill, in consequence, ordered all the troops from the flanks to the support of that point, except one battalion to guard Vieux Moguere. The French came on with great boldness and celerity, and in such superior numbers, that they were fast dislodging the centre, when the brigades from the flanks arrived with a rare precision to its assistance, and repulsed the advancing force. The battalion on the right being menaced, retired from Moguere to the heights in its rear,

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1813.

13th Dec.

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1818.

13th Dec.

from whence, ascertaining the enemy to be in little force, it re-entered the village, making some prisoners. Soult's attention was entirely directed to the centre, which he repeatedly attacked: at last, finding his most strenuous *endeavours* fruitless, he began to draw off. To hasten his movements, General Byng's brigade advanced, and carried in superior style a hill on the French left, which covered their *manœuvres*, capturing two guns. The enemy after this abandoned all thoughts of further resistance, and hastily retired to some very strong ground near Bayonne, having their left on the Adour, and Sir R. Hill's corps took up a parallel position.

These attacks of Marshal Soult were judiciously conceived, ably executed, and persevered in with firmness; nevertheless on both fields his most forcible efforts were repulsed by a small portion of the allied army—being incontestible proof of inferiority in his troops. The conscription, that powerful engine which, if duly applied, would have given endless vigour to the French armies, had, by its abuse, brought on their premature decay. Men being by its action the supply most readily attained were, on all occasions, made the principal sacrifice. Buonaparte, beside his excessive losses in battle, threw them away by hundreds of thousands, to save the incumbrance and expense of hospitals

and magazines. His generals followed his example on a smaller scale, engaging incessantly, without care or thought, in useless affairs, serving merely to bring their names into notice. Similar prodigality of life extended to the lowest officer. Still, however, men were forthcoming; each latter year saw half the number of the army replaced; but four times that period failed to render them veterans; and those legions so incessantly stimulated to exertion under the flattering address of heroes of Austerlitz, Friedland and Jena, were, at this period, composed of young and unwilling conscripts, trained in a school of misfortune and retreat.

The efforts last detailed must have been attended with excessive loss to the French, as the victors, under their more favourable circumstances, had above 1200 killed and wounded on the left, and nearly 2000 on the right.\* Marshal Soult, although he had 50,000 infantry and 6000 cavalry effective† in the field under his command, considered the trial of strength decisive, and cantoned his army in a defensive position, with its right under Count Reille, in the entrenched camp round Bayonne; its centre,

\* It has been ascertained since the first edition of this work, that the French returns from the several corps made their loss 1,314 killed, and 4,600 wounded.

† Eighty battalions, and forty-five squadrons, exclusive of the garrison of Bayonne.

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1813.

under Count Erlon, spread along the right of the Adour to Port de Lanne; its left, under General Clausel, along the right of the Bidouse from its confluence to St. Palais, posting two divisions of cavalry on the immediate left of that place, and General Harispe with a weak division\* and two cohorts of national guards at St. Jean Pied de Port. Then, turning all his endeavours to defensive arrangements, he ordered the right of the Adour to be lined with strong redoubts, armed with heavy cannon, and a bridge to be laid down and well protected by works at Port de Lanne, eighteen miles above Bayonne, which place, under the apprehension that Bayonne might be invested, he made the principal dépôt for provisions and stores, collected by means of the navigation of the river. For the defence of the Pau, he retrenched Hastings, and covered Peyrehorade, the best communication over it, with a strong tête-de-pont: the several passages over the Bidouse at Guiche, Bidache and Came he also secured by good têtes-de-pont. The fortifications of St. Jean Pied de Port and Na-

\* Lieutenant-General Count Harispe was born in the valley of Baigorry, and having been a most active partizan in the war of the Pyrenees, in 1794-1795, possessed considerable influence with his countrymen: he was, in consequence, sent for from Catalonia, and on arriving, in December, was placed at St. Jean Pied de Port, to raise irregular corps of Basques: his exertions, however, produced no very great effect.

varreins were likewise ordered to be strengthened, and Dax to be retrenched as an entrepôt for provisions, stores, and reinforcements coming to the army from the interior. For the completion of these objects the French obtained a considerable period of quiet, as the winter set in particularly wet and inclement. The Nive, the Adour, the Pau, the Gaves d'Oleron and Mauleon, with various other streams, overflowed their banks, rendering the low grounds in their vicinity one continued marsh; the cross-roads became quite impracticable; the high roads, which were commanded by fortresses, could alone be used, and the allies were obliged to go into cantonments till a more genial season should admit of their pushing forward. The territory near the Pyrenees is exceedingly poor and ill cultivated, and carriage scarce; all the supplies for the troops were, in consequence, drawn from the Port of St. Jean de Luz, which, being situated in the innermost bite of the Bay of Biscay, is of dangerous approach, and many transports were stranded; nevertheless, except in the article of forage, the army was sufficiently supplied.

The inhabitants were peaceable: on the approach of the allies they had been encouraged to adopt a system of guerrilla warfare; but the wholesome corrective of sending prisoners of war to England those caught in acts of hostility;



CHAP. XVIII.  
1813. added to the unexpected generosity of paying for every thing taken for the use of the army, speedily changed their dispositions. Unlike the Spaniards, who, when they have driven their cattle to the mountains, can with ease transport all their remaining effects of value on the same mule with themselves, the French cultivators are, more or less, proprietors, and have too much at stake to become desperate enemies, unless driven thereto by continued ill-treatment. Neither do they possess the same steady and elevated patriotic feelings as the Spaniards; indeed, the patriotism and attachment of the French to their rulers had been so weakened by the successive changes of the Revolution, that when they found the sway of the allies the least oppressive, they lost sight of their duty in self-interest, and rather assisted than opposed the invaders.

On this point the unbending obstinacy of Buonaparte's conduct was producing a very considerable effect all over France: the sovereigns of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, at the head of an overwhelming force, crossed the Rhine on the 1st January, proclaiming their sole reason to be the failure of their efforts to induce Napoleon to consent to a general peace, which should leave France her natural boundaries of the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees; and pledging themselves to entertain no objects of

conquest or internal interference. This declaration gave a new character to the war, and roused into being a separation of feeling and interests between the military chief and his subjects, which had been long taking root in secret. Napoleon, firmly enthroned as emperor, allied by marriage to the first sovereign in Europe, and adored by a military force which he deemed invincible, no longer cared to preserve that character of moderation and equity which gained him his elevation; but, on all occasions, making the gratification of his own will, or the relief of his necessities paramount to the law, he daily weakened that sacred palladium, the inviolability of which can alone ensure freedom to the subject, and allegiance and respect to the sovereign. While success beamed on his arms, national vanity and military glory kept the people loyal under these infringements of their rights; but now in the hour of misfortune, on appealing to their patriotism to rally around him, he sorely felt the consequences of his arbitrary acts in the apathy and indifference manifested by all classes; and even his obsequious legislative body ventured to represent to him that personal freedom, the inviolability of public rights, and a free representative government, must be secured to France to render the war national. This frankness drew from Napoleon a further outrage on public feeling by the dis-

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1813.

28th Dec.

CHAP. missal of the assembly with an angry and insult-  
 XVIII. ing reprimand; he, nevertheless, found himself  
 1814. so reduced in means as to be obliged to make an  
 appearance of complying with the general wish,  
 and to send an ambassador to Chatillon to re-  
 open conferences for peace.

6th Jan.

In the mean while, with his usual personal activity, he prepared to take the field on the eastern frontier, where the danger was most imminent; and the army of the Pyrenees containing a larger proportion of veterans than any other corps, he drew from it, at the end of January, two divisions of infantry, and six regiments of dragoons, which he replaced by new levies.

10th Jan.

Under these circumstances nothing of any interest occurred (except some small affairs of cavalry on the Joyeuse, and the troops of Mina being driven back from Macaya into the valley of Bastan by General Harispe) till the middle of February, when, the weather having become more favourable, Lord Wellington commenced a series of manœuvres to draw Soult's force from its advantageous position on the lower Adour, to invest Bayonne, and carry the war into the heart of France. The first operation was to clear the right flank of the army, and assure its communications, by driving back the French troops from the vicinity of St. Palais, with which view Sir R. Hill broke up from Urcuray on the 14th. On his approach, General Harispe, leaving a gar-

14th Feb.

rison of 1500 men in St. Jean Pied de Port, retired with his division, and took post at Hellete; but being quickly dislodged from thence by Sir R. Hill, he fell back to the hills above Meharin, where he passed the night: the next morning, on the first movement of the allies, General Harispe again resumed his retreat, and hastened to join another body of troops near Garris.

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1814.

15th Feb.

The position of the enemy was very strong, but too much to their right of Garris to cover the road through that town, by which their retreat over the bridge at St. Palais might be cut off; it was consequently highly desirable to attack them; evening, however, was fast approaching, and only Sir W. Stewart's division, with Morillo's force, had arrived. Lord Wellington, therefore, not totally to lose the favourable opportunity that presented itself, having detached the Spaniards to occupy St. Palais, attacked them in front with Sir W. Stewart's division alone. The troops gallantly carried the heights on the first effort, and firmly maintained them against many equally gallant efforts of the enemy to recover their ground. Night came on during the struggle, and several charges were made by the French after dark, which being invariably met with firmness, more men were bayoneted than is usual in such small affairs. At length the French, finding their efforts ineffectual, and their loss considerable, retired, and

15th Feb.

CHAP. XVIII. passed through St. Palais about 1 A. M. without molestation, the Spaniards not having reached the town.

1814.

16th Feb.

Passage of  
the Gave de  
Mauleon.

The next day, the 16th, General Harispe's troops, considerably reinforced, were found in position behind the Gave de Mauleon, near Aravarete, the bridge at which place they had destroyed with the apparent intention of disputing the passage; but the allied artillery being advantageously placed, a battalion under their fire crossed the stream by a ford near Aravarete, and driving back the French posts from that village, the defensive corps instantly retired, and in the night passed the Gave d'Oleron, on which the right of the allies concentrated behind the Gave de Mauleon, and the corps of Mina blockaded St. Jean Pied de Port. The centre of the allied army made a corresponding movement on the 15th to the Bidouse river, Sir H. Clinton's and Baron Alten's light divisions remaining between the Nive and the Adour to watch the troops in Bayonne.

Marshal Soult, on ascertaining these movements, leaving Bayonne to its own resources, and destroying all the bridges over the Adour not protected by the fortress, hastened to concentrate his forces behind the Pau, and fixed his personal head-quarters at Orthes on the 22d February.

Investment  
of Bayonne.  
23d Feb.

The advance of the left wing of the allied

army, intended to form the investment of Bayonne, took place on the 23d. The passage of the Adour, part of the operation, was attended with the utmost difficulty and hazard, as from the impracticability of transporting a heavy bridge apparatus across the country to the eastward, it must of necessity be attempted below the town, where the river is 270 yards broad, and the tide and ripple so formidable as to preclude the use of any thing less than decked vessels of twenty or thirty tons burthen. These were collected and fitted out in the ports of Socoa and St. Jean de Luz, the navigation from whence was uncertain, and the entrance of the river being at all times hazardous, and frequently impracticable; moreover, the garrison, which exceeded 10,000 in number, were aided by a sloop of war and a flotilla of gun-boats.

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1814.

- Sir J. Hope moved to the left bank of the Adour about noon of the 23d with the ordinary pontoon train, and, finding the garrison maintained only a small guard of observation on the other side, immediately rowed over fifty men, and, having stretched a hawser across, endeavoured, by means of rafts, to ferry over the remainder of his force. The rafts, however, could only work during slack tide, and in the evening one battalion of Guards, about 600 in number, and a few rockets only, had been passed to the right bank. A little before dark about double

23d Feb.

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1814.

24th Feb.

that force advanced towards them: the Guards, to receive the attack, were judiciously posted by Colonel Stopford behind the sand hills, with their right on the Adour, and their left on a morass, the artillery on the opposite bank flanking the ground in their front; their firmness, however, was not put to any severe trial, as a well directed discharge of rockets induced the French to halt, and after some hesitation they returned into the place. During the night the pontoons, used as row-boats, were substituted for the rafts; fifteen men passed at each turn; and on the evening of the 24th the whole of General Howard's division, about 6000 men, with a few cavalry, were on the right bank.

25th Feb.

So soon as security was thus obtained against the enemy, Admiral Penrose, who had brought the vessels intended to form the bridge to the mouth of the harbour, prepared to force the entrance, which from the high surf then raging, and the uncertainty of the channel, appeared fraught with the utmost peril, and was pronounced impracticable by the French. British seamen under a British pendant, however, skillfully and boldly showed the way over the bar: the native crews of the remaining boats, kept in obedience by officers of engineers with armed sappers, were constrained to follow, and the flotilla effected the passage with the loss of only six of their number. The boats were immedi-

ately moored; the sappers worked incessantly, night and day, and by noon of the 26th a bridge was passable about two miles and a half below the town of Bayonne, which, for the remainder of the war, served as the regular communication with the army from St. Jean de Luz and Spain, by the road of Dax, thus avoiding all the difficult and exhausted country along the foot of the Pyrenees. The same evening, after a sharp affair, the garrison was forced to withdraw into their defences, and Bayonne was blockaded on both banks of the Adour preparatory to forming the siege; in consequence, the two divisions left to observe the place between that river and the Nive joined the main body of the army.

In the direct line of country from Bayonne to Bordeaux, the district next the coast called the Landes is so barren, wild and uncultivated, as to be most peculiarly unfavourable for military operations, and such as no commander would voluntarily choose. Lord Wellington, therefore, so soon as the troops were closed up, continued his movements to his right to force the passage of the Adour and the several intervening streams, so as to be able to manœuvre against Bordeaux through the rich country beyond them, with which view the right and centre made a general advance on the 24th. Sir R. Hill's corps crossed the Gave d'Oleron, without opposition, by a ford near Ville-nave: Sir T.

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1814.

26th Feb.

Passage of  
the Gave  
d'Oleron.  
24th Feb.



CHAP. XVIII.  
1814. Picton's, the 3d, and Baron Alten's light division followed at the same spot; and Sir H. Clinton's division effected the passage between Montfort and Laas, also without opposition. The Spaniards, at the same time, shut up Navarreins, a place on the right of the line of operations sufficiently fortified to require battering artillery for its reduction, and Marshal Beresford confined the French on the left within their tête-de-pont at Peyrehorade.

25th Feb.

On the 25th the whole of the army not employed before Bayonne advanced to attack the French position at Orthes. The passage of the Pau proved an extremely difficult operation, in consequence of an imperfect knowledge of the fords, and the French having had the opportunity to injure many of the communications, and to post troops for their protection. The left, under Marshal Beresford, after two or three fruitless efforts, crossed at some fords about four miles above Peyrehorade, and even there the current proved so rapid that the infantry of General Walker's division could with difficulty support each other against it, and serious apprehensions were for some minutes entertained that the column would be carried down the stream. The troops being at length safely over, they marched up the right bank of the Pau, and united with the cavalry and with General Pic-

ton's division, which had crossed by a ford below Berenx.

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1814.

Sir R. Hill's, Sir H. Clinton's and Baron Alten's divisions marched to force the bridge of Orthes, but being without artillery, and finding the approach defended by loop-holed houses, and a tower strongly occupied with infantry, the attempt was relinquished, and the three divisions, leaving a brigade in observation opposite the bridge, marched to force the passage at two fords which had been discovered during the day above Orthes. Intelligence, however, arriving of the Gave having been passed by Sir W. Beresford, the two former divisions counter-marched to their left, and crossed, by a bridge of boats, about 8 A. M. on the 27th, put down at the spot where Sir T. Picton had forded the preceding evening; the division under Sir R. Hill remaining on the left bank opposite to Orthes, on the high road to Sauveterre.

26th Feb.

27th Feb.

The French were found to be strongly posted, their left being supported by the town of Orthes and the river, from which their line extended along a chain of heights in the direction of Dax, the right terminating on a very commanding height, covered by the village of St. Boes in its front. The centre of the position from the retrocession of the hill was sheltered by the flanks from attack. A corps posted on an elevated mountain, on the high road to Sault de Na-

Battle of  
Orthes.  
27th Feb.

CHAP. vailles, served as a reserve to the whole. The ar-  
XVIII. rangements of the allies were, that Sir L. Cole's  
1814. and General Walker's divisions, (the 7th,) with  
Colonel Vivian's brigade of cavalry, under Mar-  
shal Beresford, should, by a wide movement, at-  
tack the French right, and Sir T. Picton and Sir  
H. Clinton, with Lord E. Somerset's brigade of  
cavalry, after being formed in parallel columns  
on the high road from Peyrehorade, should at-  
tack the centre and left; Baron Alten's division  
remaining in reserve as a support to each. To  
render success certain and decisive, and to pre-  
vent the enemy retiring in the direction of Pau,  
Sir R. Hill was directed to cross the river at a  
ford about two miles above the town, and fall on  
the flank or rear of their position.

Marshal Beresford carried the village of St.  
Boes after an obstinate resistance, and then di-  
rected his efforts against two lines of the enemy  
formed on the heights above it, the only ap-  
proach to which was along a narrow tongue of  
ground with a deep ravine on either side. The  
division of General Cole led the advance; the  
breadth of the ridge prevented more than two  
battalions deploying into line; fifteen pieces of  
French artillery played on them diagonally;  
the main line of their infantry opposed them in  
front; other strong bodies were formed in the  
ravines on their flanks, and after a long display  
of steady bravery in the troops, the Portuguese

brigade of the 4th division was completely broken, and the division, supported by a brigade of Baron Alten's division, which marched to their assistance, with difficulty covered their retreat, and the attack on this point totally failed. To turn the height by its right would have required an exceedingly wide movement; Lord Wellington, therefore, ordered the division of Major General Walker which had been kept in reserve, and a brigade of the light division, to advance in support of Sir T. Picton and Sir H. Clinton, and that they should attack the height by its left flank. These commands were boldly executed: the 52d regiment, under Colonel Colborne, led up the hill, closely supported on its right and left by the other troops, and the artillery, gained a rising knoll, from whence it swept the whole position of the enemy: the steady advance of the troops, exposed to a destructive fire, was particularly fine, and a brigade, under General Inglis, was distinguished by a gallant charge of the enemy's left flank. The artillery of General Clinton's division, advantageously posted, made great havoc during the advance, amongst the reserve masses of the enemy, and gave rise to a most daring movement of the French 21st Hussars to seize it: they suddenly galloped round the hill, and under a heavy fire of musketry, charged and drove back one of the supporting battalions; then, in

CHAP.  
XVIII.  
1814.

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1814.

an equally determined manner, they fell upon the 42d Regiment, but the Highlanders receiving the charge with cool resolution, it failed of effect, and the hussars, much broken by the effort, gave up the attempt. At length, after a considerable fire of musketry, and several partial rencounters, the French line on the close approach of the assailants, gave way, and the allies gained the summit of the position. The enemy, whose dispositions for retreat were well planned, (being by echellons of divisions, each successively covering the other,) moved off in good order, handsomely disputing the ground with General Clinton's division, which marched directly across the ravines, closely parallel to their line of retreat, to aid, by a flank attack, in dislodging them from their several positions: in these endeavours some sharp affairs took place, particularly at Sallespice, through which village the 42d Regiment drove the retreating force with the bayonet. About that time, Marshal Soult perceived that Sir R. Hill had effected the passage of the river, and was actually marching on a point in his rear, which would have cut off all retreat. Speed then became the order of the day: Soult precipitated the march of his divisions; Sir R. Hill pressed the advance of his; the French began to run, the allies ran also; the match was nearly even till the French completely broke, not a vestige of a

column remaining: after this each party continued in a swinging trot for above three miles, during which the French gained the lead, and passed Sault de Navailles, where the pursuit closed; as Lord Wellington, having been very severely bruised by a musket shot which struck the pommel of his sword, was unable to cross this intersected country on horseback in time to direct the further movements of the several pursuing divisions. The different enclosures, the ditches, and every obstacle to flight, were thickly strewn with killed and wounded; and nearly 2000 straggling fugitives unhurt, with twelve pieces of cannon, were picked up by the infantry, which number was much augmented by a gallant charge of cavalry made near the conclusion of the chase by Lord Edward Somerset. Could that arm have sooner acted off the great road, few of the French would have escaped, as they could have made no attempt at formation to oppose the cavalry without the certainty of Sir R. Hill gaining their rear, as his march was parallel to theirs, and even with their flank. A similar effect would probably have followed the success of the original plan of attack, as the French right and centre would have been thrown back on their left, and their whole army forced to retire by one road; and, as the communication from the right was difficult, probably at a much later

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1814.

CHAP. XVIII. period than under the actual circumstances. Their loss in the action and pursuit, and from subsequent desertions, must have amounted to several thousands; that of the allies was 2300 killed, wounded and missing.

1814. The main body of the French, which retired by Hagetman, having been joined by the garrison of Dax, halted to reorganize behind the Adour, near St. Sever, and the centre of the allies marched in three columns to envelop them. The column on the chaussée of St. Sever arrived at the appointed moment; but the flank columns on the unpaved roads were so retarded in their march, that the French moved off in the direction of Agen before they came up, and escaped an attack which threatened to have been fatal: the left of the allies, under Sir W. Beresford, advanced to Mont de Marsan, where it made considerable captures of provisions and stores, and the right, under Sir R. Hill, moved along the left bank of the river to dislodge a French corps which marched on Aire to cover the removal of some considerable magazines.

Affair at  
Aire.  
2d March.

The enemy were found strongly posted on a ridge of hills, extending across the great road in front of that town, having their right on the Adour. Sir W. Stewart's division was ordered to attack them along the road, seconded by General De Costa's Portuguese brigade on his left. Both columns drove their opponents from

the heights: the Portugeze, however, were so broken by the resistance they encountered, that they could regain no formation, and a strong body of French completely formed, was advancing to attack them in their disordered state, when General Barnes's brigade, detached by Sir W. Stewart, arrived to their assistance, and, charging the approaching force, drove it down the height; nevertheless, before the French finally moved off, they made several further creditable though unsuccessful efforts to regain their ground. At length General Byng's brigade, which had been kept in reserve, joining in the attack, they were driven down the heights and dislodged from the town. The main body crossed the Adour, a small number only taking the direction of Pau, from whence they were driven a few days subsequently by General Fane with the cavalry. In this affair the allies lost 20 killed and 135 wounded: amongst the former, Lieutenant Colonel the Honourable F. Hood on the General Staff.

Marshal Soult, by the movement of Sir R. Hill's corps at Orthes, was forced to retire by the road of Bordeaux, and the allies directed the war near the coast, ensuring, on their next success, the fall of a town which would give them inexhaustible supplies and a fresh point of support and communication with England; besides separating their immediate opponents



CHAP.  
XVIII.

1814.

from a detachment of 10,000 men, ordered from Catalonia to their assistance. Heavy rains, however, had so swelled the rivers, that many parts of the country were under water; and the French having broken down all the bridges in their retreat, a delay in the pursuit was unavoidable. Marshal Soult, who could not but perceive the advantage it would be to the allies to manœuvre to their left, endeavoured to prevent it by marching from St. Sever up the course of the Adour, under a feeling that his antagonist must of necessity follow his movements, and on the 3d March collected his army at Plaisance, Madiran, and Maubourget.

Bordeaux  
occupied by  
the allies.

This step, leaving open the high road to Bordeaux, was not taken with impunity, and Lord Wellington drew a splendid advantage from the over-confidence of his opponent. Having received assurances that the Bordelais were favourably inclined towards their former princes,\* and

\* The Duke of Angoulême landed at St. Jean de Luz in the month of January, and came to the head-quarters of the allied army, from whence he held direct communication with many friends of his family. The Marquis de la Roche-Jacquelin and others were extremely sanguine in their expectations of being able to effect a counter-revolution at Bordeaux, and pressed to have a corps of 3000 men placed at their disposal for that object; but their schemes were built on such slight foundations that they could not be permitted to influence the military movements.

only prevented expressing their sentiments by CHAP. XVII. 1814.  
 awe of a very small garrison, he detached Sir W. Beresford with three divisions, to drive out the military, and give the inhabitants an opportunity to act as their feelings might dictate. This measure, however, was delayed till the 8th, as previously to making such further division of force, the Spanish corps, under Don Manuel Freire, which had been in reserve near Irun, was brought up, and every other disposable body closed to the right. Sir W. Beresford accomplished the object confided to him without resistance. On his approach to the city, the 12th Mar. French troops withdrew to the right of the Garonne, and the civil authorities, with the entire population, came out to greet the allies, spontaneously mounting the Bourbon emblem, and destroying the badges of the existing government, without either pledge or promise of protection, or even a stipulation in their favour, in the treaty of peace still negotiating with Buonaparte at Chatillon. That extraordinary man, after having been outmanœuvred, and completely beaten by the allies when in command of an enormous army on the Elbe, now that mutual assistance and combined exertion were no longer absolutely necessary to the ascendancy of his antagonists, and each was endeavouring to be the first to arrive at Paris, had the ability so to manœuvre a handful of men by incessant marching, as

CHAP. alternately to oppose each with a superior force,  
XVIII. and to render himself so formidable as to obtain  
1814. from confederated Europe the continued option  
of peace on fair and honourable conditions.

March. The allies had at this time penetrated as far  
as Laon, and had temporarily occupied Soissons: still Napoleon, with an unreasonable confidence in his talents and fortune, made his negociator contend for the retention of various fortresses beyond the limits of ancient France, and only useful as means of regaining his military ascendancy over Europe; varying, however, his pretensions and his language according to the success of his arms, till, between insincerity and the chances of war, it seemed almost doubtful how the negotiation might terminate.

The full value or consequences of the popular movement at Bordeaux could not, therefore, be calculated. The French, generally speaking, were tired of a war, in the result of which they felt only a secondary interest; and the repeated conscriptions, exorbitant requisitions, and extra contributions necessary for the support of their armies, were daily irritating them against a ruler whom they considered as prolonging the struggle merely from a feeling of personal vanity. In La Vendée, attachment to the Bourbons, far from being extinguished, was but slightly smothered. A prince of that family was already in communication with the inhabitants: addresses contain-

ing strong appeals to their former sentiments of loyalty, with flattering promises of rewards and happiness under a sovereign trained in the school of adversity, were distributed with profusion by the friends of the expatriated monarch, and read with avidity by the people, and by the soldiery: another victory in the same quarter, and the flame might extend over all the western departments.

CHAP.  
XVIII.  
1814.

Marshal Soult showed by a proclamation he issued at this period, how sorely he felt the ascendancy gained by the allies: he not only loaded the British nation generally with opprobrium and abuse, but even, in the anguish of his feelings, descended to invectives against his watchful competitor. His actions, however, were far more worthy of a military chief, as, without hesitation, he made a most skilful endeavour to paralyse the progress of disaffection on the lower Garonne by carrying back the seat of war towards the Pyrenees. With that intention (having sent all his sick and encumbrances of every nature by Auch to Toulouse) he made a bold movement on the 13th to Conchez and Viella, on the right flank, or rather rear of the allies, driving in the piquets of Sir R. Hill's corps, and making a show of intending to attack with his whole force. Sir R. Hill in consequence concentrated his corps on a strong position, the left at Aire, and the right at Garlin, having the little river

13th Mar.

CHAP. Gros Lees in front, and the main road from Pau  
 XVIII. to Aire running parallel to its immediate rear;  
 1814. and Lord Wellington quickly moved two divisions to the Adour to his support. It was not, however, Soult's intention to engage, and he took post with his whole army on a ridge of extremely strong ground on the right of the Gros Lees, extending from Projan to Mascarras, hoping that, as 13,000 men were employed in the blockade of Bayonne, Lord Wellington would be under the necessity of recalling the force directed on Bordeaux to dislodge him. In this expectation he was disappointed, as, by the precautions taken to strengthen the right wing of the allies, it was sufficiently powerful alone to pursue the offensive. Lord Wellington, however, finding by this movement that the war was decidedly drawn to the eastward, recalled Sir W. Beresford with two divisions, entrusting the preservation of Bordeaux to Lord Dalhousie with 5000 men.

14th Mar. On the 14th Marshal Soult remained inactive on his ground, but observing in the course of the day that the allies were collecting for the attack, he moved off at night in the direction of Lembège.

15th Mar. On the 15th the enemy's main body halted in position near Burosse, covered by a strong rear-guard at Mascarras. On the approach of a single brigade of the allies, the whole retired upon Vic

Bigorre, not firing a shot to maintain their ground in a country peculiarly defensible. CHAP.  
XVIII.

During the 16th and 17th the allies halted to admit of the junction of some reserve artillery and cavalry on their march from Spain; which effected, the whole army moved, on the 18th, in pursuit of the enemy, the right by Conchez, the centre by Castelnau, and the left by Plaisance. 1814.

On the 19th the right marched on Vic Bigorre through Lembege, and the centre on the same place through Maubourget. The enemy were driven from Lembege after a slight skirmish; but at Vic a strong rear-guard made a determined stand in the vineyards in front of the town, affording Sir T. Picton an advantageous opportunity to display the bravery of the third division, which dislodged them in great style, and drove them to Pujo. In the evening Marshal Soult united his whole army on the right of the Adour, placing his left at Tarbes, and extending his right in the direction of Rabastens.

The 20th afforded a series of manœuvres highly creditable to both armies. Sir R. Hill's corps, with Sir T. Picton's division, moved from Vic Bigorre upon Tarbes to attack Soult's position in front, whilst three divisions crossed the Adour near Vic, and marched on Rabastens to turn his right. These movements were exceedingly well combined. The right flank of the

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1814.

French was turned, and the front attack was about to commence, when Soult drew off. The troops elated, ascended the French position to continue the pursuit, and reap the fruits of their exertions, when, to their great mortification, they discovered a large portion of the French army formed on a parallel height of great strength across the road of Tournay, and the former occupiers of the position they had just gained, about 15,000 in number, ascending the same height to join their comrades. The new alignment was too strong to be attacked in front without a most severe loss, and to preserve the advantage gained by the flank movement it was necessary that the corps at Rabastens should move still farther forward. So much time was required to communicate fresh arrangements, and for the additional march, that the day closed before any thing further could be attempted; and in the night, Soult, having previously sent off all his remaining encumbrances, retired by St. Gaudens on Toulouse, where he was assured of finding abundant supplies. In this light order he marched rapidly, and the bridge over the Garonne being at his command, he entered the city on the 24th March, without other loss than that occasioned by the steady pursuit of a corps of cavalry under General Fane, which in an attack of his rear-guard at St. Gaudens, on the 22d, made some prisoners. The allies, on the contrary,

were obliged to carry forward a pontoon train for the passage of the river, and most of the supplies necessary to their subsistence: heavy rains fell with little intermission during their march, and it was the 27th before they halted on the left of the Garonne, opposite the city.

CHAP.  
XVIII.  
1814.

Lord Wellington ordered a bridge to be thrown across the river at Portet, a village immediately below the junction of the Ariege with the Garonne, intending to cross above the town, which would have obliged Marshal Soult either to abandon Toulouse; or give up his junction with Marshal Suchet, who had not yet reached Carcassone, his march, like all Buonaparte's retrograde movements, having been too long delayed. The current, owing to the late rain, was exceedingly rapid, and it was with much difficulty the sheer-line could be stretched across; that effected, the width proved to be 159 yards, being 26 yards more than the pontoons would cover, and consequently the attempt was abandoned.

On the 31st March a favourable spot above the town, near Roques, was found, not exceeding a practicable width, and the pontoons being laid down, Sir R. Hill's corps crossed and seized the bridge over the Ariege, at Cintegabelle; but after persevering for some hours in attempts to advance, no road could be found from thence to Toulouse passable for an army, and the corps re-



CHAP.  
XVIII.

1814.

passed the Garonne. Convinced by this experiment of the impracticability of directing an attack from the upper side of the town, until finer weather should have hardened the roads, Lord Wellington turned his endeavours to effect the passage lower down the stream, and to attack Soult in front before he should be reinforced. A favourable bend in the river being selected about half a league above Grenade, skirting the main road from that town to Toulouse, heavy flanking batteries were established, and the pontoons launched at day-break on the 4th April, though the whole French army was within a short march. The current was rapid, and the river 127 yards wide; nevertheless, in four hours from the commencement of the operation, the troops began to pass over the bridge. Three divisions of infantry, and some cavalry, under Sir W. Beresford, were already over, and General Freire's Spaniards, with General Alten's division, were about to follow, when the river swelled so considerably, and the current became so rapid, that the bridge would no longer hold together, and the flooring was of necessity removed. On the 5th, the river continuing to swell, and the current to augment in force, the centre pontoons were successively removed, till at length the whole were taken up, and Sir W. Beresford, with three divisions only, remained on the right of the Garonne, separated from the main body

of the army, and affording Marshal Soult an opportunity for an advantageous rencontre. The time for brilliant affairs, however, is not when fighting for existence; as besides the discouragement to enterprize attendant on conscious inferiority, a defensive army cannot spare men proportionate in any ordinary degree to the loss their efforts might be expected to inflict on their opponents. It was now with the French as with the Portuguese and British at the commencement of the war; nothing could be risked extraneous from the main combat, and for that Soult was skilfully and diligently preparing at Toulouse, where he had nearly completed a superb position. That city presented many peculiar and great local advantages in furtherance of his labours, being surrounded by a defensible high wall flanked by towers, three fourths of which is protected by the Canal Royal du Midi, or by the Garonne—an impassable obstacle. Therefore, to give that considerable portion of the circumference the strength of a moderate fortress, it was only necessary to secure the communications over the canal, which (being zealously aided by the labour of the inhabitants) he quickly effected, by fortifying various buildings, and constructing field-works of a stronger profile than usual. All direct approach to the remaining fourth of the enceinte not covered by the rivers, was interdicted by the state of the

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1814.

CHAP. cross roads, being also flanked by a range of  
XVIII. bold hills, which lie to the eastward of the  
1814. town, just without the canal. The French had  
strongly occupied the summit of these heights  
with five redoubts, and had formed various lines  
of entrenchment in support of them, and to  
connect the flanks of the ground with the de-  
fences of the town. At the foot of the heights  
runs the river Ers, nearly all the bridges over  
which out of fire of the works were destroyed.  
Such was the advantageous situation in which  
Marshal Soult decided to try the fate of arms.

On the 8th, the current having subsided, the  
pontoons were again laid down, the Spanish  
army passed to the support of Sir W. Beresford,  
and every thing was prepared for a general at-  
tack on the succeeding day. The distance, how-  
ever, of the pontoon bridge from Sir R. Hill's  
corps, which remained on the left of the river,  
opposite the main bridge of Toulouse, being  
deemed too considerable for ready communica-  
tion during the intended operation, orders were  
given to move it the same night higher up the  
river, to the vicinity of Ausonne. Some delay  
occurred in the operation, and the removal was  
effected too late to admit of the passage of Gene-  
ral Alten's division in time to attack on the 9th;  
it was in consequence deferred till the morning  
of the 10th, when the division crossed, and the  
whole army moved towards the town.

The cavalry drove that of the French before them in good style beyond Fenouillet and St. Jean till the evening, when Colonel Vivian, with the 18th Hussars, most gallantly charged the brigade of General Vial, formed in front of Croix d'Aurade, and, being successful, pursued the fugitives through the village so closely that they had not time to destroy the bridge over the Ers, which was of material importance to the pending operations.

CHAP.  
XVIII.  
1814.

The arrangements for the attack were, Sir R. Hill's corps to confine the enemy within his lines on the left of the Garonne; Baron Alten's light, and General Picton's divisions to make a show of attack, and prevent the enemy coming out by the road of Paris; whilst the Spaniards under General Freire, and Sir L. Cole's and Sir Henry Clinton's divisions, under Sir W. Beresford, should attack the intrenched heights of Pujade and Calvinet, the cavalry keeping a look out above the town in the direction of Montaudran to prevent any movement of the French cavalry.

Battle of  
Toulouse.  
10th April.

Marshal Soult disposed of his army\* as follows: one division, under Count Reille, to guard the fauxbourg St. Etienne—one division, under the Comte d'Erlon, for the defence of the canal from the bridge of Montabiau to its junction

\* It consisted of 59 battalions, and 19 squadrons, mustering above 36,000 combatants.

CHAP. with the Garonne—the division of Generals  
XVIII. Clausel and Villatte in the works of Pujade,  
1814. having in their front the brigade of cavalry of  
General Vial—one division, under General Harispe, for the defence of the works on the heights of Calvinet—one brigade, under General Leseur, to guard the heights of Montaudran, with the cavalry of General Berton in their front on the road to Bordes. The division of General Taupin was in reserve behind the hill on the road of Caraman: the reserve conscripts guarded the bridge of the Demoiselles, and the national guard lined the walls of the town.

Sir Thomas Picton, early in the morning, drove the French piquets into the tête-de-pont of Jumeau; Sir R. Hill confined them to the exterior line of St. Cyprien, and Sir H. Clinton and Sir L. Cole crossed at the bridge of Aurade, and carried the village of Montblanc. The Spanish troops then formed in two lines in front of Croix d'Aurade, and the Portuguese artillery, protected by General Ponsonby's brigade of cavalry, took post very advantageously on a height to cover their movements. These preliminary arrangements accomplished, the Spaniards advanced in good order to assault the works on the heights of Pujade, driving before them a brigade of French: as they approached the entrenchments, an exceedingly severe fire of grape-shot annoyed them much, and to escape its

effects. they pushed forward with far too great rapidity; the stoutest and best runners greatly preceded their less active brethren, and before the first line arrived at a hollow road, fifty yards in front of the enemy's entrenchments, it was completely broken. The reserve, perceiving this, fell into the opposite extreme, and moved forward so slowly as not to be near enough to lend support. The French vigorously advanced upon the Spaniards, who had taken shelter under the bank, and notwithstanding the gallant conduct of General Freire and the superior officers, who were conspicuous in their endeavours to animate and encourage the several battalions, drove them down the hill, and would have seized the bridge over the Ers, isolating the divisions of Generals Cole and Clinton, which were now marching up its left bank, had they not been checked by part of General Alten's light division, which moved to their left to the support of the Spaniards, and caused the French to halt in the pursuit. Sir T. Picton, perceiving the great advantage to be gained at this moment by pushing across the canal, whilst the French were engaged so far in front, advanced, contrary to his instructions, against the work defending the bridge of Jumeau: when on the counterscarp, the assailants discovered the formidable nature of its ditch, which rendered an assault impracticable, and brought them to a

CHAP.

XVIII.

1814.

CHAP. stand; a heavy fire of musketry from within the  
XVIII. line was fast thinning their front, and a nume-  
1814. rous artillery was playing on their flank; there  
was no shelter of any kind near at hand, and a  
speedy retreat alone saved the division from an-  
nihilation.

Sir H. Clinton and Sir L. Cole, so soon as they had formed their divisions into columns of brigades near the village of Montblanc, commenced their march about 10 A. M. up the left bank of the Ers, along the foot of the heights; over most difficult ground, exposed to a heavy cannonade and sharp fire of tirailleurs till opposite to their respective points of attack, when they halted and formed into three lines. The face of the height was very steep and irregular, and the French had been enabled by the previous repulse of the Spaniards considerably to reinforce the troops allotted for its defence: nevertheless General Clinton's division steadily advanced up the hill without a waver, General Lambert's brigade leading: a body of cavalry, which made many serious attacks on their right flank, were totally routed by the 79th regiment, which received their charge, formed into a square, and the line, driving back every thing that attempted to oppose them, carried with the bayonet the right of the redoubts, and established themselves on the summit of the position. Sir L. Cole's division, in a similarly steady

manner, although menaced on their left flank by the cavalry, and opposed by infantry in front, successfully ascended the heights beyond the right of the entrenchments, and took up ground on the left of Sir H. Clinton without much loss.

CHAP.  
XVIII.  
1814.

Although above 10,000 of the allies were thus formed on the heights of Calvinet, complete success was still doubtful, as the French maintained in great strength their formidable line of entrenchments, and four redoubts; and an interval for arrangement was given them whilst the Spaniards were reforming, and Sir W. Beresford was bringing up his artillery, which, on his advance along the river, he had left in battery in front of the village of Montblanc to cannonade the works on the heights of Pujade. Marshal Soult diligently availed himself of the cessation of the attack to send reinforcements of cavalry to the heights of Montaudran, and to move the brigade Rouget from the fauxbourg St. Cyprien to the front menaced, so as to collect a body of troops near the heights of Calvinet capable of supporting the redoubts, and opposing the further advance of the allies.

About noon, the artillery having joined Sir H. Clinton's and Sir L. Cole's divisions, they steadily advanced in line against the redoubts: the French divisions of Generals Clausel and Taupin, the brigade of General Leseur, the 20th Chasseurs, and the cavalry of General Berton



CHAP.

XVIII.

1814.

instantly pushed forward beyond the works to meet them, and a fierce struggle took place: the fire of the entrenchments being screened by the situation of the combatants, the contention was on equal terms, and a determined charge of the bayonet, by which General Taupin was killed, having decided the flight of his division, the allies pressed on so rapidly that the garrison of the most advanced redoubt, panic struck, made little resistance, and the assailants entered it on all sides. The French, however, in a moment renewed the offensive, and made a desperate effort to retake the redoubt. A Scotch battalion placed in the interior fought most gallantly, but were nearly exhausted, when a brigade advanced to their assistance, which, charging the assailants, drove them down the hill. The French then formed the two routed divisions, and the brigade of General Rouget, in a line from the heights of Pujade to the bridge of the Demoiselles, from whence a most powerful body advanced to make a second attempt to recover the redoubt; seeing which the defenders, having been reinforced, planted their colours on the parapet, in proud defiance of the threatened effort.

French soldiers have more natural intelligence than those of other nations, and their conduct is more liable to be affected by their reason. In this case, seeing support at hand, and retreat assured, they fought with a courage worthy of

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1814.

their best days. The equal and unvarying firmness of their opponents, however, remained superior to the transient burst of heroism, and the most forcible efforts of the French failed to dislodge them from the work, though they surrounded it in such numbers that no one could with impunity show his head above the parapet; till at length, despairing of success against such cool resolution, they relinquished the attempt. The garrison of the remaining works on the heights of Pujade, witnesses of this failure, and seeing Sir H. Clinton's division advancing on their right, and the Spaniards on their left, feared to risk the assault, and evacuated their posts about 5 P. M., which accomplished the object of the attack, and the allied army with its artillery formed on the hills looking down on the city, the French continuing to occupy in strength an intermediate rising ground. Sir R. Hill had been equally successful in forcing the enemy's advanced line on the left of the river, and about seven in the evening all firing ceased, except an occasional musket shot from the young troops who lined the walls of the town. As the operations of the day consisted entirely in the attack of formidable entrenchments, the loss of the victors probably exceeded that of the vanquished, above 4500 Portugeze and British having been killed and wounded, and more than half that number of Spaniards. On the side of

CHAP. XVIII. the allies, Lieutenant Colonels Coghlan, of the 61st, and Forbes, of the 45th, were killed; and  
1814. Generals Mendizabal, Espalata and Brisbane were wounded: on the side of the French, Generals Taupin and Lamorandiere were killed; Generals Harispe, Burot and St. Hilaire were wounded and made prisoners.

At night every post of the French retired within their defensive line behind the canal. The allies had possession of the only bridge remaining over the Ers, and the debouché from that, over the Garonne, was too closely and too strongly guarded by Sir R. Hill to be forced: the place was consequently closed on three sides, and the victorious troops, who had driven the French from their formidable entrenchments, had but a step to surround the remainder; besides which, lines of works were commenced across all the communications from the city, and a famine within the walls must in a very short period have been the inevitable consequence. Thus, after a succession of masterly movements highly creditable to each chief, Soult was driven into a situation of extreme difficulty. He had, however, at his disposal 30,000 troops collected on a central point, from whence they might be directed in a mass against any part of the extended circumference occupied by the allies, and desperation would lend force to their expiring efforts; it was therefore necessary, previously to

completing the investment, to close up and make a different disposition of the army, and to replace the great quantity of ammunition expended on the attack of the heights: these arrangements being far advanced in the two following days, Marshal Soult avoided the last extremity by abandoning the town, and retiring by the road of Carcassone, on the night of the 12th April, to Ville Franche, from whence he continued his retreat next morning on Castelnaudary.

CHAP,  
XVIII.

1814.

The necessity of the utmost precaution in forming the blockade of a considerable corps in a large place, was forcibly exemplified two nights subsequently by the events before Bayonne, the governor of which fortress made a general sortie from the citadel, without any discoverable object, neither the stores nor the artillery being on the ground, nor the works of the siege having commenced. The French directed their principal effort against the entrenched village of St. Etienne, the greater part of which fell to their powerful and rapid advance. Proper dispositions, however, having been previously arranged for the support of the post, reinforcements were speedily brought up, and the assailants driven back with great slaughter; but not without a loss to the blockading force of more than 800 in killed, wounded and prisoners: amongst the latter was the commander of the

Sortie from  
Bayonne.  
14th April.

CHAP. XVIII.  
1814. corps, Lieutenant-General Sir John Hope, who, being early wounded, and his horse falling dead upon him, could not be extricated before the enemy seized his person. Major-General Hay, a gallant veteran, distinguished in most of the later triumphs of the war, fell whilst giving directions for the obstinate maintenance of his post, and Sir H. Sullivan at the head of his company of Guards. Major-General the Honourable E. Stopford, Lieutenant-Colonel Collyer, and above thirty other officers were wounded.

This sortie, considered without reference to these accidental losses, was far more advantageous to the besiegers than to the garrison, as the numbers disabled on either side were about equal,\* and by causing the former to redouble their vigilance and precautionary efforts, it deprived the latter of all chance of seriously injuring the works of the siege, or spiking the cannon, which might have been the consequences of a powerful effort made unexpectedly at a later period. Major-General Colville, on whom the command devolved, did not suspend for a moment bringing forward his besieging apparatus, the magnitude of which ensured success

\* The loss experienced by the French has been ascertained, since the first edition of this Work, to have been 910 killed and wounded.

to the operation, and must, in all human probability, in four or five weeks, have caused the standard of England to wave over the towers of Bayonne.

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1814.

At Bordeaux, Lord Dalhousie, feeling that the defence of the city would be best consulted by active operations, crossed the Dordogne on the 4th April to attack General L'Huillier, who was patrolling the country about Etauliers with a body of troops. Lord Dalhousie found him waiting his approach on the open common near that place, with 12 or 1500 men in line, having the woods on both flanks filled with light infantry: the day was soon decided; after a few well directed rounds from the artillery the whole retired in the utmost disorder, and the British cavalry, vigorously charging amongst the stragglers, made between two and three hundred prisoners. A squadron of men of war, under Admiral Penrose, ascended the Garonne as high as Castillon in defiance of the batteries at the mouth of the river; after which, that officer, having reconnoitred the position of the French naval force at anchor higher up the stream, made arrangements to attack it on the evening of the 6th; but the moment his squadron began to weigh, the French set their own vessels on fire and burned them to the water's edge: the British seamen then landed and destroyed the several batteries at Point Combre, Point Negre,

Events at  
Bordeaux.

4th April.

3d.

CHAP. Royan, Lonsac, Mecha, &c., without the loss of  
XVIII. a man, and the navigation became open as high  
1814. up as Fort Blaye: reinforcements of men, and  
supplies of every description, were daily arriving  
from England, and soon that ill-provided and  
ill-garrisoned post would have been reduced,  
when the whole course of the Garonne, and the  
immense tract of territory between it and the  
Pyrenees, would have been under the dominion  
of the allies.

The British government, seeing the moment  
approach for bringing to a successful issue their  
long and arduous struggle with France, were  
straining to the utmost every sinew of the state  
to hasten it, and the representatives of the  
people were affording an example of the purest  
patriotism in the liberality with which they  
were suspending party feeling and seconding  
the views of the executive. This happy unanimi-  
ty enabled the country to make exertions  
scarcely to be credited—that England, with a  
population of only eighteen millions, engaged in  
active hostilities on the North American conti-  
nent, having armies in Belgium, Italy, and  
India, with garrisons in every desirable naval-  
military station and colony on the globe, and  
subsidising the half of Europe, should have in-  
creased her native forces in France to more than  
60,000, and supported their operations by an  
annual expenditure of five millions sterling, was

App. 18.

assuredly an exercise of power, wealth and extended influence far beyond her natural strength, and must ever be regarded as a remarkable feature in political and military history.\*

CHAR.  
XVIII.  
1814.

Lord Wellington's army, thus rendered formidable in numbers and resources, was also become perfect in its component parts. Men of talent and military knowledge had worked themselves into command of the several corps and departments; the subordinate officers and soldiers were mostly become veterans, and long experience had perfected the organization, equipment and movements of the machine. Further, an equitable and liberal commissariat, with the enforcement of the strictest discipline, had softened all the most usual causes of vexation to the country; and the inhabitants, borne down by the demands and exactions of their own armies, were so far from answering to the calls of their ruler to wage deadly hostility with the invaders, that they rather received the soldiers as deliverers than oppressors.

Marshal Soult's legions, so recently driven by hard fighting from a position rendered of extra-

\* In 1813, England gave to Portugal one million sterling—to Spain, in value, two millions—to Sweden one million—to Sicily £400,000—to other powers five millions sterling; added to which, half a million of muskets were sent to the Peninsula, and 400,000 to other parts of the Continent, with two millions of pounds weight of gunpowder, and 48 millions of cartridges.



**CHAP.** ordinary strength by the combinations of nature and art, could not, even when united to the forces of Marshal Suchet from Catalonia, 13,700 men, hope for a moment to defend any adjacent line of territory, and every thing promised that Lord Wellington would speedily carry the war to the banks of the Loire, when success in another quarter brought hostilities to a termination.

**XVIII.**  
  
**1814.**

The congress at Chatillon broke up on the 19th March, with a declaration of the allied powers that, true to their principles, they desired nothing more than that France should enter into her ancient limits, and that, indissolubly united amongst themselves, they would never lay down their arms till they had obliged the government to assent to such an arrangement. Napoleon, however, still blindly confident in his talents and tactics, although beaten in a general action at Arcis on the 20th, and his whole effective force reduced to 70,000 men, 22d March. ventured, two days subsequently, on the extraordinary measure of marching with his main body on Vitry and St. Dizier, into the rear of the grand confederated armies, then on the banks of the Marne and Cosle, expecting that they would retrograde to preserve their communication with the Rhine. The allied commanders, however, detaching a cloud of light cavalry to hang on his march, and confirm him

in the belief of being followed, promptly united their forces at Chalons, and seized the opportunity afforded by Napoleon's temerity to march on Paris. The corps of Marshals Marmont and Mortier, in observation on the Marne, were, in consequence of this measure, attacked by the united strength of the confederates, and after several disastrous rencontres at La Fere Champenoise, Meaux and Claye, were forced into Paris, which was the same day invested on the northern side. Rare are the examples, except in cases of civil or religious wars, that capitals defend themselves to extremity, and Paris formed no exception; for although there were the remains of Marshals Marmont and Mortier's corps, (15,000 or 18,000) a numerous National Guard, the police and other corps, amounting all together to more than 30,000 effective men, no sooner were the heights of Belle-vue carried, than Joseph, the regent, sought personal safety in flight; the authorities begged to capitulate, and the barriers were the same evening given over to the assailants, on condition that the regular troops should be granted the night to retire with their artillery. The allied sovereigns entered the city on the following day amidst the cheers and congratulations of the inhabitants: the ferment of political feeling which followed was excessive, though divided into constitutionalists, royalists, and republicans: all, however, united in

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1814.

24th March.

29th.

30th.

31st.

CHAP. XVIII. the determination of ridding themselves of the despotic government of Buonaparte, and on the 2d April the Conservative Senate, encouraged by a declaration of the conquerors that they would not commence any fresh negotiation with Napoleon on account of his general insincerity and want of faith, resolved that the emperor had forfeited all right to the throne, and that the people and the soldiery were absolved from their oaths of allegiance.

To return to the movements of the French main army. Buonaparte, after a serious affair on the 26th at St. Dizier, with the light cavalry which followed his steps, discovering the nature of his opponents, began to suspect that the allies had marched on Paris; in this uncertainty he assembled his commanders for deliberation, and having listened to a variety of opinions, decided that the troops should countermarch on the capital; but on summoning Vitry, the Prussian commandant refused to surrender, and Napoleon, fearing that his army might be repulsed in an escalade, marched it back to St. Dizier, and from thence by Bar-sur-Aube and Troyes to Fontainebleau. The distance by this road being nearly 150 miles, himself in person, hoping to inspire confidence by his presence, preceded the march of the troops en poste, and had arrived within ten miles of Paris before he was made acquainted with its capitulation; on receiving

CHAP.  
XVIII.  
1814.

the intelligence he returned to Fontainebleau, and directed all his forces to assemble around him. On the 3d April the unyielding Chief had collected his army, and was again in movement on Paris, when a junta of his most confidential officers and chief favourites delivered to him the decree of the Senate, and pressed his acquiescence: to their entreaties he only replied by an attempt at evasion, and a conditional acceptance in favour of his son, expressing his determination to push on and recover his capital. Seeing his obstinacy unquarable, and his cause desperate, each person in command or office, endeavoured to secure their own acquisitions. The Marshals generally commenced treating for the interests of the army. Marshal Marmont, however, on obtaining some very favourable stipulations for his deposed master, first came to a conclusion, and passed within the cantonments of the allies: this step was decisive of Napoleon's fate: deprived of all chance of successful resistance, after some further negociation he submitted to the decree of the Senate, and was, by the overmagnanimity of the allies, permitted to enjoy the rank and influence of an independent sovereign in the island of Elba.

4th April.

7th.

Messengers arrived at Toulouse on the 13th to announce these events, and the restoration

CHAP. of the Bourbons to the throne of France.

XVIII.

1814.

App. 19.

Marshal Suchet gave an immediate assent to the new order of affairs: Marshal Soult hesitated, and having disregarded a friendly representation of the bad effect on public opinion that must attend his army being beaten into compliance, the allied troops were put in movement against him on the 17th. When the columns of attack had nearly reached his position, finding the serious consequences that must ensue from further delay, he sent a reluctant compliance. A convention for the suspension of hostilities, and for arranging a line of demarcation between the respective armies, followed on the 18th April. Soon after which the Portuguese and Spaniards recrossed the Pyrenees, and the British marched to Bordeaux to embark.

The French armies, deprived of their commanders, and without means of subsistence, speedily dissolved away: the young conscripts hastened to resume their peaceful labours, to which necessity soon drove the dissipated and idle veteran; civil society once more asserted its equal rights, and the honourable exertions of the confederated powers were rewarded by the attainment of every object for which their forces passed the boundaries of France. In reference to the termination of the contest, the more immediate object of this work, it may be

remarked that the page of history presents no stronger instance of full and complete retributive justice. (A war of unprincipled aggression, begun by Buonaparte in acts of fraud and perfidy, and carried on by his soldiers with violence and rapine, causing the destruction of half a million of unoffending beings, ended with the complete triumph of those marked for its victims—the downfall of its author, and the humiliation and utter dispersion of his previously invincible legions.

CHAP.  
XVIII.  
1814.

FINIS.



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## APPENDIX.

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## APPENDIX 1.

*Proclama de Don Manuel Godoy.*

**EN** circunstancias menos arriesgadas que las presentes han procurado los vasallos leales auxiliar á sus soberanos condones y recursos anticipados á las necesidades; pero en esta prevision tiene el mejor lugar la generosa accion del súbdito hácia su Señor. El reino de Andalucía, privilegiado por la naturaleza en la produccion de caballos de guerra ligeros: la provincia de Estremadura, que tantos servicios de esta clase hizo al señor Felipe V; verán con paciencia que la caballería del Rey de España esté reducida é incompleta por falta de caballos? No, no lo creo; antes sí, espero que del mismo modo que los abuelos gloriosos de la generacion presente sirvieron al abuelo de nuestro Rey con hombres y caballos, asistan ahora los nietos de nuestro suelo con regimientos ó compañías de hombres diestros en el manejo del caballo, para qui sirvan y defiendan á su patria todo el tiempo que duren las urgencias actuales, volviendo despues llenos de gloria y con mejor suerte al descanso entre su familia. Entonces sí que cada cual se disputará los laureles de la victoria: cuál dirá deberse á su brazo la salvacion de su familia: cuál la de su gefe: cuál la de su pariente ó amigo; y todos á una tendrán razon para atribuirse á sí mismos la salvacion de la patria. Venid, pues, amados compatriotas: venid á jurar bajo las banderas del mas benéfico de los soberanos: venid, y yo os cubriré con el manto de la gratitud, cumpliéndooos cuanto desde ahora os ofrezco, si el Dios de las victorias nos concede una paz tan feliz

## APPENDIX 1.

*Proclamation of Don Manuel Godoy.*

**U**NDER circumstances far less critical than the present, the good and loyal have been forward to assist the government with voluntary donations proportioned to the necessities of the state; but at this moment generosity towards the sovereign is urgently required. The kingdom of Andalusia, favoured by nature with a race of horses fit for light cavalry; the province of Estremadura, which rendered such important services on this head to Philip the Fifth, will they see with indifference the cavalry of the King of Spain incomplete for want of horses? No! I cannot believe it: on the contrary, I trust that in similar manner as the renowned ancestors of the present generation served the grandfather of our King with men and horses, will their descendants furnish regiments or troops of men, skilled in the management of horses, to serve and defend their country so long as the present danger exists, and then return full of glory securely to repose with their families: then every one may claim the honour of success: one shall say that his sword saved his family; another that he saved his chief; a third, his relation or friend; and every one may fairly attribute to himself the salvation of his country. Come then, beloved countrymen, come and enlist under the banners of the most beneficent of sovereigns; come, and I will receive you with gratitude. I promise it to you from this moment, if the God of Victory grants us a durable and happy peace, the only object of our wishes.

y duradera, cual le rogamos. No, no os detendrá el temor, no la perfidia: vuestros pechos no abrigan tales vicios, ni dan lugar á la torpe seducción. Venid pues, y si las cosas llegasen al punto de no enlazarse las armas con las de nuestros enemigos, no incurriréis en la nota de sospechosos, ni os tildareis con un dictado impropio de vuestra lealtad y pundonor por haber sido amigos á mi llamamiento.

Pero si mi voz no alcanzase á despertar vuestros anhelos de gloria, sea la de vuestros inmediatos tutores y padres del pueblo, á quienes me dirijo, la que os haga entender lo que debeis á vuestra obligación á vuestro honor, y á la sagrada religion que profesais.

San Lorenzo el real, 5 de Octubre de 1806.

EL PRINCIPE DE LA PAZ.

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No, you will never give way to fear or perfidy; your breasts will never be susceptible to such, nor to the influence of seduction. Come then, and if we be not forced to engage with the enemy, you will not risk being suspected, and you will not have given a false idea of your loyalty and honour in refusing to obey the summons I give you.

But if my voice be not sufficient to awaken your sentiments of glory, let that of the immediate instructors and fathers of the people, to whom I particularly address myself, that they may make you sensible of what you owe to yourselves, to your honour, and to the holy religion you profess.

From the Royal Palace of San Lorenzo, the 5th October, 1806.

EL PRINCIPE DE LA PAZ.

## APPENDIX 2.

## No. I.

*Secret Treaty between His Catholic Majesty and His Majesty the Emperor of the French, by which the high contracting Parties stipulate whatever relates to the future Condition of Portugal. Dated Fontainebleau, 27th October, 1807.*

ART. 1.—The province of Entre Minho y Duero, with the city of Oporto, shall be given in full property and sovereignty to His Majesty the King of Etruria, under the title of King of Northern Lusitania.

ART. 2.—The kingdom of Alemtejo, and the kingdom of the Algarves, shall be given in full property and sovereignty to the Prince of the Peace, to be enjoyed under the title of Prince of the Algarves.

ART. 3.—The provinces of Beira, Tras os Montes, and Portuguese Estramadura shall remain as a deposit till a general peace, to be disposed of according to circumstances, as shall be arranged between the two high contracting parties.

ART. 4.—The kingdom of Northern Lusitania shall be possessed by the hereditary descendants of His Majesty the King of Etruria, according to the laws of succession adopted by the reigning family of His Majesty the King of Spain.

ART. 5.—The principality of the Algarves shall be hereditary in the descendants of the Prince of the Peace, according to the laws of succession adopted by the reigning family of His Majesty the King of Spain.

ART. 6.—In default of legitimate descendants or

heirs of the King of Northern Lusitania, or of the Prince of the Algarves, those countries shall be given as an investiture to His Majesty the King of Spain, on condition that they shall never be united under one head, nor attached to the crown of Spain.

ART. 7.—The kingdom of Northern Lusitania, and the principality of the Algarves also, acknowledge as protector His Catholic Majesty the King of Spain: and the sovereigns of those countries shall in no case make either peace or war without his consent.

ART. 8.—In case that the provinces of Beira, Tras os Montes, and Portugueze Estramadura, held under sequestration, should at a general peace be returned to the House of Braganza in exchange for Gibraltar, Trinidad, and other colonies which the English have conquered from the Spaniards and their allies, the new sovereign of these provinces shall have, with respect to His Majesty the King of Spain, the same obligation that the King of Northern Lusitania and the Prince of the Algarves will be under, and shall possess them subject to the same conditions.

ART. 9.—His Majesty the King of Etruria cedes the full property and sovereignty of the kingdom of Etruria to His Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy.

ART. 10.—When the definitive occupation of the provinces of Portugal shall be effected, the respective princes who shall be put in possession shall jointly name commissioners to determine the proper limits.

ART. 11.—His Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, becomes guarantee to His Catholic Majesty the King of Spain for the possession of his dominions on the continent of Europe south of the Pyrenees.

ART. 12.—His Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, agrees to acknowledge His Catholic Majesty the King of Spain as Emperor of both Americas, at such time as may be convenient to His Majesty to assume that title, which may either be at a general peace, or, at latest, within three years.

ART. 13.—It is understood between the two high contracting powers, that they will make an equal distribution of all the islands, colonies, and other ultramarine property of Portugal.

ART. 14.—The present treaty shall remain secret—shall be ratified—and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Madrid, at latest, twenty days after being signed.

Done at Fontainebleau, 27th October, 1807.

(Signed)

DUROC,

IZQUIERDO.

Mem.—*This Treaty was drawn up and assented to at Paris on the 16th October, but not ratified till the 27th October.*

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## No. II.

*Secret Convention, signed at Fontainebleau, between His Majesty the King of Spain and His Majesty the Emperor of the French, by which the two high contracting Parties determine what relates to the Occupation of Portugal.*

ART. 1.—A body of imperial French troops, to the amount of 20,000 infantry and 3000 cavalry, shall enter Spain and march directly to Lisbon, where they will be

united to a corps of 8000 infantry and 3000 Spanish cavalry, with thirty pieces of artillery.

ART. 2.—At the same time a division of Spanish troops, to the number of 10,000, shall take possession of the province of Entre Minho y Duero, and of the city of Oporto, and another division of 6000 Spanish troops shall take possession of the province of Alemtejo, and of the kingdom of the Algarves.

ART. 3.—The French troops shall be provisioned and maintained by Spain, and paid by France, during all the time of their progress through Spain.

ART. 4.—From the moment that the combined troops enter Portugal, the provinces of Beira, Tras os Montes, and Portuguese Estramadura, (which are to remain under sequestration,) shall be administered and governed by the commandant-general of the French troops, and the contributions which they shall impose shall be for the benefit of France. The provinces which will be formed from the kingdom of Northern Lusitania, and the principality of Algarves, shall be administered and governed by the commandants-general of the Spanish division which shall enter them, and the contributions which shall be imposed shall be applied to the use of Spain.

ART. 5.—The central body shall be under the orders of the commander of the French troops, and to him shall be submitted the Spanish troops united to such central army. Notwithstanding, if the King of Spain, or the Prince of the Peace, shall unite themselves to such army, the commandant-general of the French troops, and the troops themselves, shall be under their orders.

ART. 6.—A body of 40,000 French troops shall be collected at Bayonne, at latest, on the 20th of November next, to be ready to pass through Spain for Portugal



in case the English shall send forces, or threaten an attack upon that country. This additional body, however, shall not enter Spain until the two high contracting parties shall have agreed upon the measure.

ART. 7.—The present convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at the same time with those of the treaty of this day.

Done at Fontainebleau, 27th October, 1807.

[Translated from Cevalhos.]

*The foregoing Treaty and Convention were kept a profound secret between the contracting parties until the Spanish secretary of state, Don Pedro Cevalhos, divulged them after the royal family were entrapped at Bayonne.*

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## APPENDIX 3.

*Decree of the King of Spain.*

THE following decree was issued from the Palace of San Lorenzo on the 30th of October, and addressed to the Governor of the Council *ad interim* :—

C. R.

GOD, who watches over his creatures, does not permit the consummation of atrocious deeds, when the intended victims are innocent. Thus his omnipotence has saved me from the most unheard-of catastrophe. My people, my subjects, all know my christianity and settled habits. They all love me, and I receive from all of them proofs of their veneration; such as the conduct of a parent calls for from his children. I lived persuaded of this felicity, and devoted to the repose of my family, when an unknown hand discovered the most atrocious and unheard-of conspiracy, which was carried on in my own palace, against my person. My life, which has so often been in danger, was too long in the eyes of my successor, who, infatuated by prejudice, and alienated from every principle of christianity that my paternal care and love had taught him, had entered into a project to dethrone me. Informed of this, I thought proper to inquire personally into the truth of the fact; and surprising him in his room, I found in his possession the cypher of his correspondence, and of the instructions he had received from the vile conspirators.

In consequence of this discovery, I immediately convoked the governor and council, in order that they might make the necessary inquiries; and the result has been the detection of several conspirators, whose imprisonment I have ordered, as also the arrest of my son at his residence. This is an additional aggravation of the affliction I labour under; but, however painful to my feelings, it must be submitted to, as it is of the utmost importance to the suppression of such a conspiracy. At the same time that I direct the publication of this affair to my subjects, I cannot avoid expressing to them the regret by which I am agitated; but that regret will be alleviated by the demonstrations of their loyalty.

You will take the proper measures to have this decree circulated in due form.

(Signed)

CHARLES R.

By command of his Majesty, I transmit this decree to your Excellency, in order that it may be duly promulgated.

Signed by the Ministers, and addressed to all Viceroy, &c. &c.

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*Second Decree of the King of Spain.*

*Madrid, Nov. 5.*

This day the King addressed the following decree to the governor ad interim of the council of Castile.

THE voice of nature unnerves the arm of vengeance, and when the offender's want of consideration pleads for pity, a father cannot refuse listening to his voice. My son has already declared the authors of that horrible plan which has been suggested by the evil-minded. He

has laid open every thing in a legal form, and all is exactly consistent with those proofs that are required by the law in such cases. His confusion and repentance have dictated the excuses which he has addressed to me, and of which the following are the chief:—

Sire and Father,

I AM guilty of failing in my duty to your Majesty, I have failed in obedience to my father and my king. I ought to do nothing without your Majesty's consent; but I have been surprised. I have denounced the guilty, and beg your Majesty to suffer your repentant son to kiss your feet.

(Signed)

FERDINAND.

*St. Laurent, Nov. 5.*

Madam and Mother,

I SINCERELY repent of the great fault which I have committed against the king and queen, my father and mother! With the greatest submission I beg your pardon, as well as for my obstinacy in denying the truth the other night. For this cause I heartily intreat your Majesty to deign to interpose your mediation between my father and me, that he may condescend to suffer his repentant son to kiss his feet.

(Signed)

FERDINAND.

*St. Laurent, Nov. 5.*

In consequence of these letters, and the entreaty of the queen, my well-beloved spouse, I forgive my son; and he shall recover my favour, as soon as his conduct shall give proofs of a real amendment in his proceedings. I ordain, also, that the same judges who have heard this cause from the commencement, shall continue the pro-

cess, and I allow them to conjoin others, as colleagues, if they shall find occasion. I enjoin them, as soon as it shall be finished, to submit to me their judgment, which shall be conformable to law, according to the magnitude of offences, and the quality of offenders. They ought to take for a basis, in reducing the heads of the accusation, the answers given by the prince to the interrogatories which he has undergone; they are copied, and signed by his own hand, as well as the papers also in his writing which were seized in his bureaux. The decision shall be communicated to my councils, and to my tribunals, and be circulated among my subjects, in order that they may acknowledge my compassion and my justice, and may alleviate the affliction into which they were thrown by my first decree; for in that they saw the danger of their sovereign and their father, who loves them as his own children, and by whom he is beloved.

(Signed)

D. BARTOLOME MUNOZ.

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## APPENDIX 4.

*Report to his Imperial Highness the Grand Duke of Berg,  
Lieutenant of the Emperor, Commander of his Forces  
in Spain.*

“ MONSEIGNEUR,

“ AGREEABLY to the commands of your Imperial Highness, I repaired with the letter of your Highness to the Queen of Etruria at Aranjuez. It was eight o'clock in the morning ; the Queen was still in bed ; she rose immediately, and made me enter. I delivered your letter to her. She begged me to wait a little, and said she would go read it with the King and Queen. Half an hour afterwards, I saw the Queen of Etruria enter with the King and Queen of Spain.

“ His Majesty said, that he thanked your Imperial Highness for the share you had taken in his affliction, which was the greater, as his own son was the author of it. The King said, that the revolution had been effected by forgery and corruption, and that the principal actors were his son and M. Cabellero, Minister of Justice ; that he had been compelled to abdicate the throne, in order to save the lives of himself and his Queen ; that he knows that but for this they would have been murdered in the course of the night ; that the conduct of the Prince of Asturias was more shocking, seeing that himself (the King) having perceived his desire to reign, and being himself near sixty years of age, had agreed to surrender

the crown to him, on his marriage taking place with a French princess, which the King ardently desired.

“ The King added to this, that the Prince of the Asturias was desirous that he and the Queen should repair to Badajos, on the frontiers of Portugal ; that he had found means to inform him that the climate of that country did not suit him ; that he begged him to permit his choosing another place ; that he sought to obtain permission of the Emperor to purchase an estate in France, where he might end his days. The Queen told me she had begged of her son to postpone their journey to Badajos ; that she had not procured this, and that the journey was to take place on the ensuing Monday.

“ At the moment I was departing from their Majesties, the King said to me, ‘ I have written to the Emperor, in whose hand I repose my fate.’

“ I wished to send my letter by a courier, but I know no surer mode of sending it than by your’s. The King left me then, in order to repair to his cabinet. He soon returned with the following letters (Nos. 1 and 2) in his hand, which he gave me, and added these words : ‘ My situation is most deplorable ; they have seized the Prince de la Paz, and will put him to death ; he has committed no other crime, than that he has at all times been attached to me :’ he added, there were no efforts which he would not have attempted to save the life of his unhappy friend ; but that he had found the whole world deaf to his entreaties, and bent on vengeance—that the death of the Prince de la Paz would draw after it his own, and that he should not survive him.

“ *Aranjuez, March 23d, 1808.*

B. DE MONTHION.

## No. I.

*Letter from King Charles IV. to the Emperor Napoleon.*

“ Sir, my Brother,

“ YOUR Majesty will assuredly hear with pain of the events which have taken place at Aranjuez, and their consequences; you will not without sympathy see a king, who has been compelled to resign his throne, throw himself into the arms of a great monarch, his ally, placing every thing in his protection, who alone can fix his happiness, and that of his whole family, and his trusty and beloved subjects. Under the pressure of the moment, and amid the clashing of weapons, and the cries of a rebellious guard, I found that I had to choose between my life and death, and that my death would be followed by that of the Queen; I was compelled to abdicate the throne: but to-day peace is restored, and full of confidence in the generosity and genius of the great man, who has at all times declared himself my friend, I have taken my resolution to resign myself into his hands, and await what he shall resolve on my fate, that of the Queen, and of the Prince de la Paz.

“ I address myself to your Majesty, and protest against the events which took place at Aranjuez, and against my dethronement. I rely with confidence, and altogether upon the cordiality and friendship of your Majesty, praying that God may have you in his holy keeping.

*Aranjuez, March 23d, 1808.*

“ CARLOS.”



## No. II.

“ I protest and declare, that my decree of the 19th March, in which I renounce my crown in favour of my son, is a deed to which I was compelled, in order to prevent greater calamities, and spare the blood of my beloved subjects. It is therefore to be considered as of no authority.

(Signed) “ I, the King.”

*Aranjuez, 21st March, 1808.*

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*On the preceding day, the 20th of March, Charles wrote to Napoleon from Aranjuez, that he had voluntarily abdicated on account of the infirm state of his health, trusting that the measure would be agreeable to Napoleon, Ferdinand his successor being most profoundly attached to the interests of Napoleon's family. On the 22d the Queen wrote to Murat also from Aranjuez, soliciting his mediation that herself, the Prince of the Peace, and the King might be permitted to spend the remainder of their lives in some climate suitable to the declining health of Charles, and making no allusion whatever to the Protest. These facts amount to strong presumptive proof that the Protest, whether real or forged, was not made on the 21st, but obtained by General Monthion at his interview on the 23d March.*

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## APPENDIX 5.

**SUSPENSION d'armes arrêtée entre Monsieur le Chevalier Arthur Wellesley, Lieutenant Général, et Chevalier de l'ordre du Bain, d'une part, et Monsieur le Général de division Kellermann, Grand Officier de la Légion d'Honneur, Commandeur de l'ordre de la Couronne de Fer, Grand Croix de l'ordre du Lion de Bavière, de l'autre part : tous deux chargés de Pouvoirs des Généraux respectifs des Armées Françaises et Anglaises.**

**Au Quartier Général de l'armée Anglaise.**

*Le 22 Août, 1808.*

**ART. 1.**—Il y aura à dater de ce jour une suspension d'armes entre les Armées de Sa Majesté Britannique et de Sa Majesté Impériale et Royale, Napoleon I. à l'effet de traiter d'une Convention pour l'évacuation du Portugal par l'armée Française.

**ART. 2.**—Les Généraux en Chef des deux Armées et Monsieur le Commandant en Chef la Flotte Britannique à l'entrée du Tage, prendront jour pour se réunir dans tel point de la côte qu'ils jugeront convenable pour traiter et conclure la dite Convention.

**ART. 3.**—La Rivière de Sizandre formera la ligne de démarcation établie entre les deux armées ; Torres Vedras ne sera occupé ni par l'une ni par l'autre.

**ART. 4.**—Monsieur le Général en Chef de l'armée Anglaise s'obligera à comprendre les Portugais armés dans cette suspension d'armes, et pour eux la ligne de démarcation sera établie de Leiria à Thomar.

ART. 5.—Il est convenu provisoirement que l'Armée Française ne pourra dans aucun cas être considérée comme prisonnière de guerre, que tous les individus qui la composent seront transportés en France avec armes et bagages, leurs propriétés particulières quelconques, dont il ne pourra leur être rien distrait.

ART. 6.—Tout particulier, soit Portugais, soit d'une nation alliée à la France, soit Français, ne pourra être recherché pour sa conduite politique; il sera protégé, ses propriétés respectées, et il aura la liberté de se retirer du Portugal dans un terme fixe avec ce qu'il lui appartient.

ART. 7.—La neutralité du Port de Lisbonne sera reconnue pour la Flotte Russe, c'est à dire, que lorsque l'armée ou la Flotte Anglaise seront en possession de la ville et du port, la dite Flotte Russe ne pourra être ni inquiétée pendant son séjour, ni arrêtée quand elle voudra sortir, ni poursuivie lorsqu'elle sera sortie, qu'après les délais fixés par les lois maritimes.

ART. 8.—Toute l'artillerie de calibre Français ainsi que les chevaux de la Cavalerie seront transportés en France.

ART. 9.—Cette suspension d'armes ne pourra être rompue qu'on ne se soit prévenu quarante-huit heures d'avance.

Fait et arrêté entre les Généraux désignés cy-dessus, au jour et an cy-dessus.

(Signé)

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Le Général de Division, KELLERMANN.

ARTICLE ADDITIONEL.—Les Garnisons des places occupées par l'armée Française seront comprises dans la

présente Convention, si elles n'ont point capitulé avant le 25 du courant.

(Signé)

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Le Général de Division, KELLERMANN.

(*A true Copy.*)—Signed, A. J. DALRYMPLE,  
Captain, Military Secretary.

[Extracted from the official account of the Proceedings upon the Inquiry relative to the Armistice and Convention of Cintra.—Page 1.]

*Definitive Convention for the Evacuation of Portugal by the French Army.*

The Generals commanding in chief the British and French armies in Portugal, having determined to negotiate and conclude a treaty for the evacuation of Portugal by the French troops, on the basis of the agreement entered into on the 22d inst. for a suspension of hostilities, have appointed the undermentioned officers to negotiate the same in their names, viz. on the part of the General in Chief of the British army, Lieutenant Colonel Murray, Quarter Master General; and on the part of the General in Chief of the French army, Monsieur Kellermann, General of Division, to whom they have given authority to negotiate and conclude a convention to that effect, subject to their ratification respectively, and to that of the Admiral commanding the British fleet at the entrance of the Tagus. Those two officers, after exchanging their full powers, have agreed upon the articles which follow :

ART. 1.—All the places and forts in the kingdom of

Portugal occupied by the French troops, shall be delivered up to the British army in the state in which they are at the period of the signature of the present Convention.

ART. 2.—The French troops shall evacuate Portugal with their arms and baggage; they shall not be considered as prisoners of war, and, on their arrival in France, they shall be at liberty to serve.

ART. 3.—The English Government shall furnish the means of conveyance for the French army, which shall be disembarked in any of the ports of France between Rochfort and L'Orient inclusively.

ART. 4.—The French army shall carry with it all its artillery of French calibre, with the horses belonging to it, and the tumbrils supplied with sixty rounds per gun. All other artillery, arms and ammunition, as also the military and naval arsenals, shall be given up to the British army and navy, in the state in which they may be at the period of the ratification of the Convention.

ART. 5.—The French army shall carry with it all its equipments, and all that is comprehended under the name of property of the army, that is to say, its military chest and carriages attached to the Field Commissariat and Field Hospitals, or shall be allowed to dispose of such part of the same on its account as the Commander in Chief may judge it unnecessary to embark. In like manner all individuals of the army shall be at liberty to dispose of their private property of every description, with full security hereafter for the purchasers.

ART. 6.—The cavalry are to embark their horses, as also the Generals and other Officers of all ranks. It is, however, fully understood, that the means of conveyance or horses at the disposal of the British Commanders are

very limited; some additional conveyance may be procured in the Port of Lisbon; the number of horses to be embarked by the troops shall not exceed six hundred, and the number embarked by the staff shall not exceed two hundred. At all events, every facility will be given to the French army to dispose of the horses belonging to it which cannot be embarked.

ART. 7.—In order to facilitate the embarkation, it shall take place in three divisions, the last of which will be principally composed of the garrisons of the places, of the cavalry, the artillery, the sick, and the equipment of the army. The first division shall embark within seven days of the date of the ratification, or sooner, if possible.

ART. 8.—The garrison of Elvas and its forts, and of Peniché and Palmela will be embarked at Lisbon. That of Almeida at Oporto, or the nearest harbour. They will be accompanied on their march by British Commissioners charged with providing for their subsistence and accommodation.

ART. 9.—All the sick and wounded who cannot be embarked with the troops are entrusted to the British army. They are to be taken care of, whilst they remain in this country, at the expense of the British Government, under the condition of the same being reimbursed by France when the final evacuation is effected. The English Government will provide for their return to France, which shall take place by detachments of about one hundred and fifty, or two hundred men at a time. A sufficient number of French medical officers shall be left behind to attend them.

ART. 10.—As soon as the vessels employed to carry the army to France shall have disembarked it in the harbours specified, or in any other of the ports of France to

which stress of weather may force them, every facility shall be given them to return to England without delay, and security against capture until their arrival in a friendly port.

ART. 11.—The French army shall be concentrated in Lisbon, and within a distance of about two leagues from it. The English army will approach within three leagues of the capital, and will be so placed as to leave about one league between the two armies.

ART. 12.—The forts of St. Julien, the Bugio and Cascaes shall be occupied by the British troops on the ratification of the Convention. Lisbon and its citadel, together with the forts and batteries as far as the Lazaretto or Trafaria on one side, and Fort St. Joseph on the other, inclusively, shall be given up on the embarkation of the second division, as shall also the harbour and all armed vessels in it of every description, with their rigging, sails, stores and ammunition; the fortresses of Elvas, Almeida, Peniché, and Palmela shall be given up as soon as the British troops can arrive to occupy them. In the mean time, the General in Chief of the British army will give notice of the present Convention to the garrisons of those places, as also to the troops before them, in order to put a stop to all further hostilities.

ART. 13.—Commissioners shall be named on both sides to regulate and accelerate the execution of the arrangements agreed upon.

ART. 14.—Should there arise doubts as to the meaning of any Article, it will be explained favourably to the French army.

ART. 15.—From the date of the ratification of the present Convention, all arrears of contributions, requisitions, or claims whatever, of the French government,

against subjects of Portugal, or any other individuals residing in this country, founded on the occupation of Portugal by the French troops, in the month of December, 1807, which may not have been paid up, are cancelled, and all sequestrations laid upon their property, moveable or immoveable, are removed, and the free disposal of the same is restored to the proper owners.

ART. 16.—All subjects of France, or of powers in friendship or alliance with France, domiciliated in Portugal, or accidentally in this country, shall be protected. Their property of every kind, moveable and immoveable, shall be respected, and they shall be at liberty either to accompany the French army, or to remain in Portugal. In either case their property is guaranteed to them, with the liberty of retaining or of disposing of it, and passing the produce of the sale thereof into France, or any other country, where they may fix their residence, the space of one year being allowed them for that purpose. It is fully understood, that shipping is excepted from this arrangement, only, however, in so far as regards leaving the port, and that none of the stipulations above-mentioned can be made the pretext of any commercial speculation.

ART. 17.—No native of Portugal shall be rendered accountable for his political conduct during the period of the occupation of this country by the French army, and all those who have continued in the exercise of their employments, or who have accepted situations under the French government, are placed under the protection of the British commanders; they shall sustain no injury in their persons or property; it not having been at their option to be obedient, or not, to the French government;



they are also at liberty to avail themselves of the stipulations of the 16th Article.

ART. 18.—The Spanish troops detained on board ship in the port of Lisbon, shall be given up to the Commander in Chief of the British army, who engages to obtain of the Spaniards to restore such French subjects, either military or civil, as may have been detained in Spain without being taken in battle, or in consequence of military operations, but on occasion of the occurrences of the 29th of last May, and the days immediately following.

ART. 19.—There shall be an immediate exchange established for all ranks of prisoners made in Portugal, since the commencement of the present hostilities.

ART. 20.—Hostages of the rank of Field Officers shall be mutually furnished on the part of the British army and navy, and on that of the French army, for the reciprocal guarantee of the present convention. The officer of the British army shall be restored on the completion of the Articles which concern the army; and the officer of the navy on the disembarkation of the French troops in their own country. The like is to take place on the part of the French army.

ART. 21.—It shall be allowed to the General in Chief of the French army to send an officer to France with intelligence of the present convention. A vessel will be furnished by the British Admiral to convey him to Bourdeaux or Rochfort.

ART. 22.—The British Admiral will be invited to accommodate his Excellency the Commander in Chief, and the other principal officers of the French army, on board of ships of war.

Done and concluded at Lisbon, this 30th day of August, 1808.

(Signed) **GEORGE MURRAY,**  
 Quarter Master General.  
**KELLERMAN,**  
 le Général de Division.

Nous, Duc d'Abrantes, Général en Chef de l'armée Française, avons ratifié et ratifions la présente Convention définitive dans tous ses Articles, pour être exécutée selon sa forme et teneur.

(Signé) **LE DUC D'ABRANTES.**  
 Au Quartier Général de Lisbonne.  
 Le 30me Août, 1808.

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*Additional Articles to the Convention of the 30th August, 1808.*

**ART. 1.**—The individuals in the civil employment of the army made prisoners, either by the British troops, or by the Portuguese in any part of Portugal, will be restored, as is customary, without exchange.

**ART. 2.**—The French army shall be subsisted from its own magazines up to the day of embarkation. The garrisons up to the day of the evacuation of the fortresses. The remainder of the magazines shall be delivered over in the usual form to the British government, which charges itself with the subsistence of the men and horses of the army from the above-mentioned periods till their arrival in France, under the condition of their being reimbursed by the French government for the excess of the expense beyond the estimation to be made by both

parties, of the value of the magazines delivered up to the British army.

The provisions on board the ships of war in possession of the French army, will be taken on account by the British government, in like manner with the magazines in the fortresses.

ART. 3.—The General commanding the British troops will take the necessary measures for re-establishing the free circulation of the means of subsistence between the country and the capital.

Done and concluded at Lisbon, this 30th day of August, 1808.

(Signed)      **GEORGE MURRAY,**  
                    **Quarter Master General.**  
                    **KELLERMAN,**  
                    **le Général de Division.**

Nous, Duc d'Abrantes, Général en Chef de l'armée Française, avons ratifié et ratifions les Articles additionnels à la Convention, pour être exécutés suivant leur forme et teneur.

(Signé)      **LE DUC D'ABRANTES.**  
(A true Copy)  
(Signed)      **A. J. DALRYMPLE,**  
                    **Captain, Military Secretary.**

[Extracted from the official Account of the Proceedings upon the Inquiry relative to the Armistice and Convention of Cintra.—Page 3.]

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*Articles of a separate Convention entered into between Vice-Admiral Seniavin, Knight of the Order of St. Alexander, and other Russian Orders, and Admiral Sir Charles Cotton, Bart. for the surrender of the Russian fleet, anchored in the river Tagus.*

ART. 1.—The ships of war of the Emperor of Russia, now in the Tagus, as specified in the annexed list, shall be delivered up to Admiral Cotton immediately, with all their stores as they now are, to be sent to England, and there held as a deposit by his Britannic majesty, to be restored to his Imperial majesty within six months after the conclusion of a peace between his Britannic majesty and his Imperial majesty the Emperor of all the Russias.

ART. 2.—Vice-admiral Seniavin, with the officers, sailors and marines under his command, to return to Russia without any condition or stipulation respecting their future services; to be conveyed there in men-of-war, or proper vessels, at the expense of his Britannic majesty.

Done and concluded on board the ship *Twerday*, in the Tagus, and on board his Britannic majesty's ship *Hibernia*, off the mouth of that river, the 3d day of September, 1808.

(Signed)      DE SENIAVIN,  
CHARLES COTTON.

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## APPENDIX 6.

*Proclamation by the British and French Commissioners for seeing carried into effect the Convention agreed upon between the respective Commanders in Chief.*

For the fulfilment of the stipulations made in the Convention agreed upon for the evacuation of Portugal by the French army, That property of every kind, confiscated or seized from subjects, or other persons, residing in Portugal, whether from the royal palace, royal and public libraries, and museums, and from individuals, which is still existing and in Portugal, should be restored.

We, the commissioners for seeing carried into execution the said Treaty, (his Excellency the Commander in Chief of the French army having already notified to his army,) think it also right to make public the same for the information of all concerned; and to facilitate the restitution, or the receiving back such property, we have judged it expedient to appoint a committee of three persons; viz. Lieutenant Colonel Trant, or St. Antonio Rodrigues de Oliviera, and Mr. Dublier, Commissaire des Guerres, to meet at Largo de Loreto, No. 8, who are appointed to receive, inquire into, and judge of all reclamations on this head; and whose orders for the restitution of property, to whomsoever addressed, are to be obeyed. And it is directed, that keepers shall have the charge of sequestrated or seized property, in every house to which it may have been removed, to assure the conservation of objects or moveables transported from royal or private houses to others, for the use or conve-

nience of such general, administrator, or other subjects of the French army. These keepers will make the description of all moveables, with the names of the owners, and be accountable that whatever is therein be delivered only on legal proof of ownership to the possessor of such articles as above described, will transmit to this committee a return of what each may have in his possession of the property designated. And all persons may with safety apply to this tribunal.

We think it necessary, also, to make known to whom it may concern, that any purchase of articles taken from the public arsenals or stores, since the 30th of August, or whatever shall, on trial, be proved to have been illegally sold or disposed of, at any time previous to the 30th of August, shall be null and void, the articles seized, and the persons purchasing subject to what the law may further direct.

The committee assembled to receive reclamations, and facilitate the restitution of property, holds its sittings at the house of St. Antonio Rodrigues de Oliviera, No. 8, Largo de Loretto.

*Lisbon, 10th September, 1808.*

(Signed)

W. C. BERESFORD, M. G.

PROBY, Lieutenant-Colonel.

Le Commissaire pour l'exécution de la Convention du  
30me Août,

Le Gen. KELLERMANN.

[Extracted from the official account of the Proceedings upon the Inquiry relative to the Armistice and Convention of Cintra.—Page 407.]

*General Beresford, &c. to Sir Hew Dalrymple.*

*Lisbon, September 18th, 1808.*

The Commissioners for executing the convention of the 30th August were informed, on their arrival in Lisbon, that individuals of the French army were selling, and preparing for embarkation, property to a large amount, which had been plundered in the most singular manner, without any acknowledged permission from General Junot. They also received intelligence that church-plate, arising from the extraordinary contributions, to the amount of forty thousand pounds, had been melted into bars, and was still in the hands of different French administrators, apparently intended to be carried to France; that a sum of about twenty-five thousand pounds, taken from the Deposito Publico of the city of Lisbon, on the 29th of August, was placed the same day in the treasury of the kingdom, and removed from thence on the 2d of September, in direct violation of the Convention, for the purpose of being paid into the military chest of the army; and it was also proved, that, with a still more shameless disregard of the stipulations of the treaty, effects had been taken out of the public magazines for the equipment of the French troops, and for the payment of debts, by the express order of General Junot, subsequent to the ratification, to the amount, as was afterwards ascertained, of about sixteen thousand pounds.

Upon the question of the plundered property, the Commissioners, after some discussion, persuaded General Kellermann to agree with them in thinking, that the restitution of all such effects was equally demanded by a

due regard to the honour of both armies, and by the spirit of the Convention : and it was by his recommendation that the accompanying General Orders were issued by General Junot to his army. These orders produced no effect whatever, although the reclamations of the inhabitants of Lisbon were hourly increasing, and many of those presented to the Commissioners were for effects of very great value. Much correspondence took place with General Kellermann on this subject, both in interviews and by writing. All the communications of the General were marked by subterfuge and vain professing, and the Commissioners were obliged at last to insist on the establishment of a committee, to inquire into all the claims presented by the Portuguese, and to be furnished, for that purpose, with full authority to summon persons, and to order restitution.

The city of Lisbon was informed of the institution of that committee, by the enclosed proclamation, signed by the Commissioners on both sides. The labours of the committee have been attended with the best effects ; they were continued till all the French had left the Tagus, and have obtained restitution of private and public property, to a very great amount, according to the report of the British member of the committee, Lieutenant-Colonel Trant, whose zeal and assiduity in this duty were most meritorious.

With respect to the church-plate, the Commissioners found no article of the treaty which authorized them to claim it, but as the fifth article clearly defines what it is that the French army is allowed to carry off, and as silver in bars, and even money to an unlimited amount, cannot fairly be said to be a military chest, they submitted their opinions upon this subject to head-quarters, on the 5th



of September; and the enclosed letters, the one containing Colonel Murray's understanding of the Convention, the other the instructions of the Commander in Chief, induced them to inform General Kellermann, that this silver could not be carried away in British vessels; but the Convention not authorizing the Commissioners to seize upon it, it was agreed it should be applied to the payment of debts contracted by the French army in Portugal; and this is the manner in which it has actually been disposed of, and by which the amount has been retained in Portugal, the object of the Commissioners.

General Kellermann retracted the consent he gave in the first instance to the proposals made to him upon this subject: he appealed to the decision of the Commander in Chief of the British forces; and it was in consequence of this misunderstanding, and in the presence of his Excellency and Colonel Murray, that the enclosed explanation of the Convention was agreed to by both parties at Oeyras on the 5th of September.

The Commissioners demanded the restitution of the 225,000 taken from the Deposito Publico, very soon after their arrival in Lisbon: they also required that complete satisfaction should be given to the directors of magazines, from which effects had been removed subsequent to the 30th of August. The justice of these demands was acknowledged, and promises of immediate payment were made as early as the 7th of September: these promises, however, had not been fulfilled when General Junot went on board; and when he was called upon to execute them, it was represented by General Kellermann to the Commissioners, that the sum of money remaining in the caisse militaire did not amount to the sixty thousand pounds which the explanation of the

Convention acknowledged to be a fair military chest; and that, under these circumstances, he considered the agreement entered into to refund the sums extracted from the *Deposito Publico*; and to restore or give compensation for the articles extracted from the public magazines, as cancelled.

The validity of this reasoning was of course not admitted, and the Commissioners applied to Admiral Sir Charles Cotton to detain the second division of the French, as well as General Junot, until these points should be satisfactorily arranged. After much litigation and discussion, it was agreed by General Kellermann, that the forty thousand pounds required for these two objects should be supplied from the *caisse militaire*. During the three last days that General Junot was in the river, orders were repeatedly given by General Kellermann to the *Payeur Général* to this effect, but they were always evaded, under some frivolous pretext, by that gentleman; and the Commissioners were obliged to order him on shore to the arsenal, with his chest, when the money was at length paid.

Some chests of natural history taken from the Royal Museum were restored without much difficulty, as were also a number of books collected from public libraries, and from those of Anaia and Anjujar, for the private use of General Junot. A bible of great value was repeatedly claimed; and it was asserted by those in whose charge it had been, that it was certainly still within reach at the moment the Commissioners demanded it. But they were not able to obtain its restitution; General Junot having authorized General Kellermann to give his honour in writing that it had been sent to France.

We will conclude this report by stating, that the con-

duct of the French has been marked by the most shameful disregard to honour and probity, publicly evincing their intention of carrying off their plundered booty, and leaving acknowledged debts unpaid; and, finally, they have only paid what they were obliged to disgorge, and were not permitted to carry off, though the British Commissioners represented to General Kellermann, that, whatsoever the words, it could never be the spirit of any Convention, that an army should, as a military chest, or otherwise, carry off public money, leaving public debts unpaid, and called upon him for the honour of the French army and nation, to act justly: and yet, unmindful of any tie of honour or of justice, the French army has taken away a considerable sum in the military chest, leaving its debts unpaid, to a very large amount.

(Signed)

W. C. BERESFORD, M.G.  
PROBY, Lieut.-Colonel.

*His Excellency Lieut. General  
Sir Hew Dalrymple.*

[Extracted from the official account of the Proceedings upon the Inquiry relative to the Armistice and Convention of Cintra.—Page 412.]

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The detail of the manœuvre practised by the 50th Regiment at Vimiera is here given, as it was the first example of troops formed in line, charging and breaking the heavy close column of the revolutionary school; and it will serve to render intelligible various other similar efforts mentioned in the course of the narrative.

The 50th Regiment, about 900 rank and file, were formed in line on the rising ground in front of Vimiera,

supported by three guns under Lieutenant Colonel Robe, (four guns under the same officer also flanking the approach,) and one company of the 95th Riflemen: (the others being out as tirailleurs, and the 60th Light Regiment having been moved from the plateau to the aid of the right wing on the first alarm) when a French column of 5,300 men in close order of half battalions, with seven pieces of artillery, approached their front. The fire of the British guns was very destructive, and shook the advancing force considerably, until, obtaining shelter from an inequality in the ground, they made a short pause, closed up their ranks, and then again moved forward to within 100 yards of the advanced guns, which could no longer be served, but the other four flanking the approach continuing to pour a most destructive fire into the column. The 50th Regiment had, till that moment, remained with ordered arms, when Colonel Walker, seeing the little chance of successfully resisting in line the heavy body approaching, made an attempt, with the sanction of General Fane, to turn the flank of the column. Leaving the left wing of his regiment, and a company of riflemen in line, forming a front nearly equal to that of the advancing force, the right wing was thrown into echellons of companies of about four paces to the left, and having advanced for a short distance in that order, was commanded to form into line on the left company. Time, however, was wanting to complete this manœuvre: the rapidity of the enemy's march had brought them almost into contact with the regiment when only two companies of the right wing had formed into line, and a very hot though confused fire had already commenced from the flanks of the advancing column. An instant decision became necessary; the two com-

panies in line bore precisely on the angle of the column. Colonel Walker ordered a volley and a charge. The angle was in a moment broken, and forced in on the centre ; the drivers of three French guns, a little advanced in front, alarmed at the firing in their rear, cut their traces, and rushing back on their friends, added to the confusion, which, on the three outer companies of the 50th taking part in the charge, became general. The cavalry at that moment made a most handsome charge, converting the column into an ungovernable mob, bearing down the officers, and flying without resistance for nearly two miles, harassed by the 50th, and the detachment of the 20th Light Dragoons. At that distance, a reserve of French cavalry lent the broken mass support, and protected their further retreat. The 50th Regiment in this affair lost only seventeen killed and seventy-one wounded, but the 20th Dragoons were dreadfully cut up.

The same principle acted on with some difference of detail produced similar results at Talavera, Albuera, &c. viz. charging in front and flank, or rear, a mass of men, the far greater number of whom, from their formation, are incapacitated from offensive or defensive action, and consequently, peculiarly subject to panic and alarm ; which, once created, neither the judgment of the officer, nor the innate courage of the soldier, can prevent the whole crowding back together.

The conclusion to be drawn, therefore, seems to be, that the attack in heavy close column was a good expedient at the commencement of the war, when the French troops were not sufficiently disciplined to advance steadily in line, nor their opponents sufficiently practised in field manoeuvres, to oppose weight by activity and

decision ; and when it was the practice to spread the artillery in battalion guns along the whole line, instead of, as at present, collecting them into brigades : but that it can never succeed against good troops supported by artillery, who meet it with a determined charge, and that as a tactical arrangement, it is utterly unworthy of the celebrity it so long enjoyed.



## APPENDIX 7.

*The following Statement is from the pen of one of Sir John Moore's Aides-de-camp, the present Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Henry Hardinge, K. C. B.*

I HAD been ordered by the Commander in Chief to desire a battalion of the Guards to advance; which battalion was at one time intended to have dislodged a corps of the enemy from a large house and garden on the opposite side of the valley; and I was pointing out to the General the situation of the battalion, and our horses were touching at the very moment that a cannon shot from the enemy's battery carried away his left shoulder, and part of the collar-bone, leaving the arm hanging by the flesh.

The violence of the stroke threw him off his horse, on his back. Not a muscle of his face altered, nor did a sigh betray the least sensation of pain.

I dismounted, and taking his hand, he pressed mine forcibly, casting his eyes very anxiously towards the 42d Regiment, which was hotly engaged; and his countenance expressed satisfaction when I informed him that the regiment was advancing.

Assisted by a soldier of the 42d, he was removed a few yards behind the shelter of a wall.

Colonel Graham Balgowan and Captain Woodford,

about this time, came up ; and perceiving the state of Sir John's wound, instantly rode off for a surgeon.

The blood flowed fast ; but the attempt to stop it with my sash was useless, from the size of the wound.

Sir John assented to being removed in a blanket to the rear. In raising him for that purpose, his sword, hanging on the wounded side, touched his arm, and became entangled between his legs. I perceived the inconvenience, and was in the act of unbuckling it from his waist, when he said in his usual tone and manner, and in a very distinct voice, " It is as well as it is. I had rather it should go out of the field with me."

He was borne by six soldiers of the 42d, and Guards, my sash supporting him in an easy posture.

Observing the resolution and composure of his features, I caught at the hope that I might be mistaken in my fears of the wound being mortal ; and remarked that I trusted when the surgeons dressed the wound, that he would be spared to us, and recover. He then turned his head round, and looking steadfastly at the wound for a few seconds, said, " No, Hardinge, I feel that to be impossible."

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*Instructions under which Sir JOHN MOORE acted.*

Downing Street, 14th Nov. 1808.

SIR,

WITH the exception of the four regiments of cavalry, and two troops of horse-artillery, which are



under orders to embark upon the return of the horse-transporters from Corunna, your army, consisting of the numbers stated in the margin, \* will, I trust, by the time this dispatch shall reach you, have assembled on such points of the Spanish frontier as have been concerted with the Spanish government, and be preparing to advance.

In entering upon service in Spain, you will keep in mind that the British army is sent by his Majesty as an auxiliary force, to support the Spanish nation against the attempts of Buonaparte to effect their subjugation.

You will use your utmost exertions to assist the Spanish armies in subduing and expelling the enemy from the peninsula, and in the conduct of your command you will conform to the regulations hereafter stated with respect to the question of military rank, and your intercourse with the government of Spain.

In framing these instructions, it is necessary distinctly to provide, first, for the case of the Spanish government having entrusted the command of their armies to a Generalissimo, or Commander in Chief; and secondly, for the case, which has hitherto existed, of distinct armies, each commanded by its own general.

Should the Spanish government appoint a Commander in Chief of all their armies, (the necessity of which appointment every day's experience appears to demonstrate) you will consider yourself as placed under the orders of that officer.

|                    |   |   |   |        |
|--------------------|---|---|---|--------|
| * From Portugal    | . | . | . | 23,745 |
| From England       | . | . | . | 14,561 |
| Cavalry, &c. to go | . | . | . | 2,760  |
|                    |   |   |   | <hr/>  |
| Total              | . | . | . | 41,066 |

If the armies of Spain should remain as they have hitherto done, under their respective chiefs, the co-operation of the British army must, in that case, remain to be settled, as a matter of concert, by you with the commanders of the respective armies of Spain, in connection with whom you may be carrying on operations.

When the officers of the British and Spanish armies meet in service, they must take rank according to the dates of their respective commissions, without reference to the powers from whom those commissions are derived, provided such commissions are at present acknowledged by the Supreme Government of Spain.

You are to consider, that the British force under your command is intended to act as a field-army, to be kept together as far as the circumstances of the war will permit; and that all orders from the Commander in Chief, proceeding either directly, or through his staff, are to be given to the British army through you as its immediate commander; that it is not to be separated into detachments, nor any detachment to be made from it but with your entire concurrence, and by your express order. It is not to be employed in garrisons, whereby a material diminution would be made of its effective strength in the field, nor to be occupied in sieges without your particular consent.

Whenever you shall have occasion to make any communication to the Spanish government, you are to correspond with it through the Minister at Madrid, and all communications from the Spanish government are to be made to you through the same channel; and although communications either from the Spanish government, or the British minister, are not to be considered by you as in the nature of orders; you will nevertheless receive

such requisitions or representations, upon all occasions, with the utmost deference and attention; and in case you shall feel it your duty to dissent from them, you will take care to represent, in the fullest manner, your reasons for so doing, as well to the British Minister, for the information of the Spanish government, as to the government at home.

You are also to keep up a constant and intimate correspondence with the British Minister, and to co-operate, in the most cordial manner, with him, in carrying on the public service.

Should any difference of opinion arise on important military subjects between you and the Spanish Commander in Chief, you are to consider it your duty to pay obedience, in the first instance, to the orders you may receive: but you will, if you shall think it necessary, make a representation thereupon, through the British Minister, to the Supreme Government of Spain, as also to me, for his Majesty's information.

As it is of peculiar importance, at the present moment, that his Majesty's government should receive early, regular, and detailed reports of your proceedings, I am to desire that you will make it a rule to address a dispatch to me, at least once in every week, or as much oftener as any occurrence of sufficient importance may arise, always being careful to send duplicates of the preceding dispatch by the subsequent conveyance.

It will be most grateful to his Majesty to find, that the intercourse between the British army and the Spaniards has been invariably distinguished by marks of reciprocal confidence and kindness. His Majesty cannot doubt that the most exemplary discipline will be observed; and his Majesty commands me particularly

to enjoin, that the utmost respect and deference should be shown, by his troops, upon all occasions, towards the manners and customs of the Spanish nation. His Majesty trusts that the example and influence of the officers will be directed to inspire this sentiment throughout every branch of the army.

(Signed)

CASTLEREAGH.

*To Lieut. Gen. Sir John Moore, K. B.*

*&c. &c. &c.*

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## APPENDIX 8.

The diplomatic correspondence being found far too voluminous to insert in this Appendix, it has been omitted, and the Letter of Instructions, under which Lord Wellington acted, has been substituted.

*Lord Viscount Castlereagh to Lieutenant General Sir A. Wellesley.*

Downing Street, 2d April, 1809.

SIR,

HIS Majesty having been graciously pleased to nominate Lieutenant General Sir John Cra-dock to the chief command at Gibraltar, has thought fit to select you to replace that officer in the command of his Majesty's forces in Portugal.

You will receive enclosed a return of all the troops, either actually arrived, or under orders for Portugal ; and it is his Majesty's pleasure that you do proceed, without loss of time, to Lisbon, in execution of the orders which I am now to convey to you by his Majesty's command.

Your attention will be directed, in the first instance, to prepare and equip the British army for the field. You will, in the next place, direct your utmost exertions to the bringing forward the Portuguese army, and rendering it capable of co-operating with his Majesty's troops.

In the furtherance of this latter object, in addition to the arrangement already made, you will make such re-

quisitions from time to time, either to the Portuguese government, or to the government at home, as, upon communication with General Beresford, you may deem requisite for rendering the Portuguese troops fit for service. The defence of Portugal you will consider as the first and immediate object of your attention. But, as the security of Portugal can only be effectually provided for in connection with the defence of the peninsula in a larger sense, his Majesty, on this account, as well as from the unabated interest he takes in the cause of Spain, leaves it to your judgment to decide, when your army shall be advanced on the frontier of Portugal, how your efforts can best be combined with the Spanish, as well as with the Portuguese troops, in support of the common cause.

In any movements you may undertake, you will, however, keep in mind, that, until you receive further orders, your operations must necessarily be conducted with a special reference to the protection of that country.

Mr. Villiers will be instructed to procure for you every necessary assistance from the Portuguese government, and you will consider him as the proper channel for such communications as you may have to make to the Regency.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

CASTLEREAGH.

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## APPENDIX 9.

*Proclamation of Marshal Augereau, Duke of Castiglione, &c., to the Inhabitants of Catalonia, on his arrival to assume the Command.*

**SPANIARDS! Catalonians!**—I am come in the midst of you. His Majesty the Emperor of the French, and King of Italy has given me the command of his armies in Catalonia.

Spaniards, I know and love you. Seduced by perfidious insinuations, unhappy victims and blind instruments of a Cabinet, the enemy of France and humanity, many and many of your brethren are obstinate in prolonging a war, the issue of which could never be doubtful. They deny and reject the benefits and favours which an august sovereign provides for, and is anxious to shower upon them: a hero whom heaven created, in its beneficence, for the felicity and glory of Spain and the world.

Spaniards, the hero of France loves and esteems you; his virtuous heart requires and needs your felicity. God, who granted to Napoleon his invincible valour, gave him at the same time his goodness and tender humanity.

Napoleon sighs over your afflictions; he has a paternal heart, and as such mourns over the terrible blows which are inflicted upon you, and which will be inflicted still more upon you, by his formidable armies, if you delay long in listening to the voice of truth, and continue in your fatal blindness.

Lay aside useless hopes; a false love and a criminal

honour, which, arming against a king who is truly paternal, the august brother of the great Napoleon, irritates heaven against you, which gave him to you in its mercy.

Abandon vain illusions. God protects France—a god walks with Napoleon, covers and shades him with his wings, and enchains victory to his triumphal car.

Brave Spaniards, submit! Europe is submitting and surrendering herself.

Spaniards, I know you, and you have to know me. I have long esteemed you; and when you submit you will find in me a true friend. Yourselves and your property shall be sacred for me.

Errors and faults shall meet with indulgence: moderation, loyalty, and fidelity may be secure of our aid; but let perfidy fear and tremble. Obstinate rebels, the evil-minded, who blow up the flames of dissension, shall meet with no pardon. The lightning is ready to fall on their heads.

Erring citizens, return to your hearths;—artizans, resume your labours and useful pursuits; good villagers, quit the sword; take once more the plough in your hand; come and cultivate in peace and repose the inheritance of your fathers; hasten to fertilize those fields which have been too long deserted. And you, ye faithful Spaniards, come and receive the happy fruits and rewards of your fidelity: join your voice to ours; call to those unhappy wretches, your brethren, who are led astray; tell them that we love them, that Napoleon will forget their errors and their faults; and that your felicity will be the constant object of his concern as your parent; tell these wandering brethren that they will ever find me ready to carry their cries to the foot of that monarch's throne, who is the friend of truth; that they



may depend upon the protection of our arms, which, formidable against rebels and the ill-disposed, however numerous, will ever be the defenders of the faithful citizen; and that we will avenge offences committed against them; but tell them at the same time, and above all things, that mercy has its limits, and that at length the day of vengeance will come. One powerful army is dispersed throughout your territory; another formidable army is coming, and woe to him that shall dare to resist me; for I shall then hearken only to a just indignation, a most just rage, and none of you will escape a terrible vengeance.

Saragossa is yet smoking; and you, ye towns of Catalonia, who please or dare to follow its example, behold its ashes, its ruins—tremble!

(Signed) AUGEREAU.

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## APPENDIX 10.

*Official Proclamation.*

"CONSIDERING the necessity of multiplying the resources of the army of his Imperial Majesty, and of depriving the rebels and traitors of the means of procuring animals to accomplish their atrocious designs, it is hereby declared, that all the horses and mares belonging to the provinces in Upper Spain, viz. in the districts of Salamanca, Zamora, Toro, Leon, Placentia, Burgos, Guipuscoa, and Alava, of the height of four feet four inches, or five feet half an inch, of the measure of Spain, and from thence upward, are in requisition for the armies of France, and are to be conducted to the capital of their respective governments, where they are to be received and maintained by the governors, until the returns made to me shall enable me to give directions for the disposal of them.

"All the horses of less than four feet four inches, or five feet half an inch high, Spanish measure, also mares pregnant for more than three months, and horses and mares that are not thirty months old, and less than the height mentioned, are to have the left eye put out, and are to be rendered by other proper means unfit for military service by the proprietors themselves. Those who presume to disobey this command, are to be mulcted in four times the value of the animals.

**“ The execution of this order is to be committed to the governors, commandants of arms, and to the commandants of detachments and flying columns.**

**(Signed)**

**KELLERMAN,  
General of Division, and  
Governor-General of  
Upper Spain.”**

***28th October, 1809.***

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## APPENDIX 11.

*Brigading of the Army, showing the Effective Rank and File,  
for March, 1810.*

|                                                 |   | Effective<br>Rank & File. |                                |  |            |
|-------------------------------------------------|---|---------------------------|--------------------------------|--|------------|
| <i>Cavalry.</i><br>Lt. Gen. Payne.              | { | Brig. Gen. de Grey .      | { 3d Dragoon Guards . . 414    |  |            |
|                                                 |   |                           | 4th Dragoons . . . . 443       |  |            |
|                                                 |   | Major Gen. Slade . .      | { 1st or Royal Regt. Drag. 567 |  |            |
|                                                 |   |                           | 14th Light Dragoons . 477      |  |            |
|                                                 |   | Brig. Gen. Anson . .      | { 16th do. . . . . 512         |  |            |
|                                                 |   |                           | { 1st do. K. G. L. . . . 342   |  |            |
| <hr/>                                           |   |                           |                                |  |            |
| <i>1st Division.</i><br>Lieut. Gen. Sherbrooke. | { | Col. Hon. E. Stopford     | { 1st Bn. Coldstr. Guards 537  |  |            |
|                                                 |   |                           | 1st Bn. 3d Guards . . . 655    |  |            |
|                                                 |   |                           | 1 Comp. 5th Bn. 60 F. 47       |  |            |
|                                                 |   | Lord Blantyre . . . .     | 24th Foot, 2d Bn. . . . 242    |  |            |
|                                                 |   |                           | 42d . . . . . 275              |  |            |
|                                                 |   |                           | 61st . . . . . 654             |  |            |
|                                                 |   |                           | 1 Comp. 5th Bn. 60th F. 47     |  |            |
|                                                 |   | Brig. Gen. Low . . .      | 5th Line Bn. K. G. L. 384      |  |            |
|                                                 |   |                           | 7th do. . . . . 339            |  |            |
|                                                 |   |                           | 2d do. . . . . 385             |  |            |
|                                                 |   |                           | 1st do. . . . . 392            |  |            |
|                                                 |   |                           | 1st and 2d Lt. Bn. do. . 66    |  |            |
| <hr/>                                           |   |                           |                                |  |            |
| <i>2d Division.</i><br>Lieut. Gen. R. Hill.     | { | Major Gen. Stewart .      | 3d Foot, or Buffs . . . 665    |  |            |
|                                                 |   |                           | 31st . . . . . 343             |  |            |
|                                                 |   |                           | 48th . . . . . 460             |  |            |
|                                                 |   |                           | 66th . . . . . 387             |  |            |
|                                                 |   |                           | 1 Comp. 5th Bn. 60th F. 47     |  |            |
|                                                 |   | Major Gen. Houghton       | 29th Foot, 1st Bn. . . . 384   |  |            |
|                                                 |   |                           | 48th . . . . . 453             |  |            |
|                                                 |   |                           | 57th . . . . . 881             |  |            |
|                                                 |   |                           | 1 Comp. 5th Bn. 60th F. 47     |  |            |
|                                                 |   |                           | 28th Foot, 2d Bn. . . . 482    |  |            |
|                                                 |   | Brig. Gen. Lumley .       | 34th . . . . . 528             |  |            |
|                                                 |   |                           | 39th . . . . . 405             |  |            |
|                                                 |   |                           | 1 Comp. 5th Bn. 60th F. 47     |  |            |
|                                                 |   |                           |                                |  | Musk. 4988 |
|                                                 |   |                           |                                |  | Rifles 141 |
|                                                 |   | 5129                      |                                |  |            |

|                                            |   |                   |   |                              |     |                                        |
|--------------------------------------------|---|-------------------|---|------------------------------|-----|----------------------------------------|
| 3d Division.<br>Major Gen. Picton.         | { | Colonel M'Kinnon  | { | 45th Foot, 1st Bn. . . .     | 550 | Musk. 2559<br>Rifles 141<br><hr/> 2700 |
|                                            |   |                   |   | 74th 1st do. . . .           | 637 |                                        |
|                                            |   |                   |   | 88th 1st do. . . .           | 527 |                                        |
|                                            |   |                   |   | 5th 2d do. . . .             | 508 |                                        |
|                                            |   |                   |   | 58th 2d do. . . .            | 337 |                                        |
|                                            |   |                   |   | 3 Comps. 5th Bn. 60th F. 141 |     |                                        |
| 4th Division.<br>Maj. Gen. Hon. G.L. Cole. | { | Colonel Kemmis    | { | 27th Foot, 3d Bn. . . .      | 813 | Musk. 3651<br>Rifles 94<br><hr/> 3745  |
|                                            |   |                   |   | 97th 1st do. . . .           | 344 |                                        |
|                                            |   |                   |   | 40th 1st do. . . .           | 909 |                                        |
|                                            |   |                   |   | 1 Comp. 5th Bn. 60th F. 47   |     |                                        |
|                                            |   |                   |   | 7th Foot, 2d Bn. . . .       | 336 |                                        |
|                                            |   |                   |   | 11th 1st do. . . .           | 896 |                                        |
| Light Div.<br>Brig. Gen. R. Crawford.      | { | Br. Gen. Drummond | { | 53d 2d do. . . .             | 353 | Musk. 1686<br>Rifles 813<br><hr/> 2499 |
|                                            |   |                   |   | 1 Comp. 5th Bn. 60th F. 47   |     |                                        |
|                                            |   |                   |   | 3d Portuguese Regt.          |     |                                        |
|                                            |   |                   |   | 15th do. do.                 |     |                                        |
|                                            |   |                   |   | 43d Foot, 1st Bn. . . .      | 791 |                                        |
|                                            |   |                   |   | 52d 1st do. . . .            | 895 |                                        |
|                                            | { |                   | { | 95th 1st do. . . .           | 813 |                                        |
|                                            |   |                   |   | 1st Bn. Portuguese Chass.    |     |                                        |
|                                            |   |                   |   | 2d do. do.                   |     |                                        |
|                                            |   |                   |   |                              |     |                                        |
|                                            |   |                   |   | Royal Staff Corps . . .      | 39  |                                        |
|                                            |   |                   |   | 63d Foot, 2d Bn. . . .       | 451 |                                        |
|                                            |   |                   |   | Indep. Gar. Comp. K.G.L.     | 21  |                                        |

INFANTRY EFFECTIVE, MUSKETS AND RIFLES . . . 18,607  
 CAVALRY, CARBINES . . . . . 2,755

## APPENDIX 12. -

THE following Letter from Sir Thomas Picton is inserted, as giving a most interesting account of the part borne by his Division in the Action.

10th November, 1810.

MY LORD,

IN consequence of an extraordinary report which has been circulated with a good deal of assiduity, it becomes necessary that I should make a written detailed report to your lordship of the circumstances which preceded and attended the action which took place upon the height of Busaco, on the morning of the 27th of September, in as much as they relate to myself and the troops I had the honour of commanding on that occasion.

Major-General Lightburne, with the 5th and 83d Regiments, was detached to the left, and did not act under my orders.

On the evening of the 25th, by orders from your Lordship, I occupied that part of the Sierra de Busaco, which is immediately connected with the Pass of St. Antonio de Cantarza, with Colonel Mackinnon's brigade, consisting of the 45th, 74th, and 88th Regiments, amounting to about 1300 rank and file; and with the 9th and 21st Portuguese Regiments, under Colonel de Champalain, and upon the whole about 3000 men.

All the movements of the enemy during the 26th, indicating a determination of attacking the position early

on the following morning; I made what dispositions I judged necessary for the defence of the post that evening, and there being an unoccupied space of considerably above a mile between my left and Sir Brent Spencer's division, immediately after sunset (when it could not be observed by the enemy) I detached Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace, with the 88th Regiment, to take up an intermediate position and communicate with the hill of Busaco, and the main body of my division, at the Pass of St. Antonio. The troops in the immediate neighbourhood of the Pass were visited by me on their respective posts before day-break; and immediately after Colonel Mackinnon returned from visiting the 88th Regiment, and reported that the enemy was collecting in the ravine opposite to the position occupied by that Regiment; in consequence of which I immediately detached Major Gwynne, of the 45th Regiment, with four companies, to reinforce that post.

A few minutes after, when the day began to clear up, a smart firing of musketry was heard on the left, apparently proceeding from the point where the 88th Regiment had been stationed; and after a short suspense, a violent cannonade opened upon the Pass of St. Antonio, and, at the same time, a heavy column compelled the advanced piquet of the division to fall back, and, pressing forward with great impetuosity, endeavoured to push up the road and force the pass. The light corps of the division, unable to resist such a superiority of numbers in front, were most judiciously thrown in upon the flank of the advancing column by Lieutenant-Colonel Williams; and it was received with so steady and well directed a fire by the 21st Portuguese Regiment of the Line, and three companies of the 74th Regiment

that moved up to their support, on the left, that after a long struggle, and repeated desperate attempts to effect their object, during which they suffered much from the well directed fire of the Portuguese artillery, under Major Arentschildt, they were ultimately under the necessity of desisting, though a severe firing of cannon and musketry still continued.

About this period the fire of musketry on the left appearing to increase and draw nearer, I directed Colonel Mackinnon to take the immediate command of the troops at the pass of St. Antonio, and rode towards the left with the Assistant Adjutant General, Major Packenham, leaving my aide-de-camp, Captain Cuthbert, and the Assistant Quarter Master General, Captain Anderson, to bring up, as fast as possible, one battalion of the 8th Portuguese Regiment, and the five remaining companies of the 45th Regiment.

On reaching the high rocky point about half way between the Pass of St. Antonio and the Hill of Busaco, I found the light companies of the 74th and 88th Regiments retiring in disorder, and the head of the enemy's column, already in possession of the strong rocky point, deliberately firing down upon us, and the remainder of a large column pushing up the hill with great rapidity. Whilst endeavouring to rally the light infantry companies, with the assistance of Major Packenham, I was joined by Major Smith, of the 45th Regiment, and we succeeded in forming them under the immediate fire of the enemy, not more than sixty yards distant. Major Smith most gallantly led them to the charge, and gained possession of the rock, driving the enemy before him; but, I am concerned to say, fell in the moment of victory, for which we were chiefly indebted to his anima-



ting example. The Assistant Quarter Master General having fortunately brought up a battalion of the 8th Portuguese Regiment, commanded by Major Birmingham, at this critical period, I personally led and directed their attack on the flank of the enemy's column, and we completely succeeded in driving them in great confusion and disorder down the hill and across the ravine.

Not being able to discover any enemy upon the ridge to my left, I immediately returned to the Pass of St. Antonio where the firing of musketry and cannon still continued with little abatement. On my arrival, I learned from Colonel Mackinnon that the enemy had not been able to make any impression during my absence. At this moment Major-General Leith's aide-de-camp came to report the arrival of that General and his division; upon which I rode from the post of St. Antonio to the road of communication, and directed the leading regiment of the brigade to proceed without loss of time to the left, as I had no occasion for assistance. General Leith's brigade, in consequence, marched on, and arrived in time to join the five companies of the 45th Regiment, under the Honourable Lieutenant-Colonel Meade, and the 8th Portuguese Regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas, in repulsing the last attempts of the enemy.

Your Lordship was pleased to mention me, as directing the gallant charge of the 45th and 88th Regiments; but I can claim no merit whatever in the executive part of that brilliant exploit, which your Lordship has so highly and so justly extolled. Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace, of the 88th Regiment, and Major Gwynne, who commanded the four companies of the 45th Regiment engaged on that occasion, are entitled to the whole of the merit; and I am not disposed to deprive

them of any part. I was actively engaged at the time in repelling the attack upon the post, with which I was principally charged; though I provided, as far as the means I had at my disposal would allow, for the safety of every part of the position within my reach; and the moment I could, with propriety and safety to the service, quit the principal point of my command, I immediately proceeded to the part where my services were most necessary, and was at all times to be found where His Majesty's service, and my own honour, required that I should be.

I shall not say any thing of the conduct of the troops under my command during the whole of the trying service of the day. It was beyond eulogy, and can receive no additional splendour from my feeble praise.

With many apologies for troubling your Lordship with such long details in which I am so necessarily and so much concerned,

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) THOMAS PICTON.

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## APPENDIX 13.

THIS number is calculated upon a belief that the infantry of Massena's army, when it left Ciudad Rodrigo, was 62,000.

At the moment of the invasion of Portugal, the French magnified the number of troops under Marshal Massena to 110,000: the successive writers of the present day, each emboldened by the diminution of his predecessor, have at length ventured to reduce his numbers to 46,000. For the sake of future historical writers, the following letters are inserted as the authority for the strength assigned to Massena's army in this publication, and a summary is attempted of the total of the French force which took part in his campaign.

(TRANSLATION.)

*Havre, May 28, 1810.*

*To the Field Marshal Prince of Essling.*

IT appears from the statement of the force of the English army, as taken from the English newspapers, that it consists of 23,000 men, English and Germans, and 22,000 Portuguese.

The Emperor orders me to acquaint you, therefore, that you must have more troops than are sufficient to beat the English army, in case they should endeavour to raise the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo. It is his Majesty's

desire that you should proceed with the 6th and 8th corps, leaving 2000 Dragoons of the 8th, with General Kellermann, and likewise a corps of about 10,000 men, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, sufficient to keep open the communication, and you, Prince, with the 6th corps, and the rest of the 8th, forming together about 50,000 men, must take possession of Ciudad Rodrigo, and defeat the English, if they advance.

I have just written to the King of Spain, and to Field Marshal the Duke of Dalmatia, to place General Reynier under your orders, with the 2d corps d'armée which he commands.

I have dispatched orders to General Reynier to approach Alcantara with his corps, in order to manoeuvre with you on the right of the Tagus.

(Signed)

The PRINCE OF WAGRAM and  
NEUFCHATEL.

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(COPY.)

“ Addressée à son Excellence le Duc de Feltre, Ministre  
de la Guerre, à Paris.

“ Armée de Portugal.

*Ciudad Rodrigo, le 19e Juillet, 1810.*

*Le Général de Division, Commandant en Chef l'Artillerie  
de l'Armée de Portugal, Eblé.*

MONSEIGNEUR,

“ J'AI reçu la lettre que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire, le 4 Juin dernier,

et sur laquelle je la prie de me permettre de lui faire quelques réflexions.

“ Comme elle, je pense que le pays où doit agir l’armée de Portugal, s’oppose à ce que l’on traîne à sa suite une grande quantité d’artillerie, et suis loin de demander que celle qui existe soit augmentée : mais je pense aussi, qu’elle doit toujours avoir sous la main, au moins, un double approvisionnement, dont un marchant avec les troupes, un demi en réserve à la suite de chaque corps, et l’autre moitié au parc général.

“ J’appuie mon opinion sur la difficulté de former des dépôts surs et assez rapprochés pour que l’on puisse, avec la célérité que les opérations peuvent commander, faire remplacer les munitions consommées ; parceque les moyens de transport du pays, qui ne consistent qu’en bœufs, ont disparu partout où l’armée a séjourné ou passé ; et que partout les villages sont restés déserts ; et il seroit impossible, avec le peu de chevaux existant, de renvoyer des voitures d’artillerie sur les derrières pour rapprocher les dépôts. J’ai néanmoins l’honneur d’observer à votre excellence, que le double approvisionnement que je demande, ne dispensera pas d’avoir une ligne de dépôts pour alimenter le parc général et fournir aux troupes, qui circulent dans le pays, &c. Ces dépôts demanderont un officier d’artillerie, des cannoniers, une garde non seulement pour servir l’artillerie, qui sert à défendre ces dépôts, mais encore pour confectionner des munitions, escorter des convois, &c. et déjà le nombre existant des uns et des autres est au-dessous de l’indispensable nécessaire.

“ La demande que je fais d’un double approvisionnement peut, au premier instant, paroître outrée à votre Excellence ; mais j’aime à croire que les raisons que je lui

donné la convaincront du contraire, et la disposeront à ne pas trouver étrange que je demande un nombre de caissons, ou de chariots à munitions suffisant pour porter quatre millions de cartouches ; et l'armée étant de plus de 62,000 hommes, le 2<sup>me</sup> corps compris, il n'y aura à sa suite qu'environ 60 cartouches par homme.

“ La consommation de ces munitions est vraiment incroyable : elle est occasionnée par l'inexpérience et la négligence du soldat, par l'insouciance des officiers, et par les nombreux détachemens qui marchent continuellement avec les convois de vivres et de munitions.

“ Le siège de Rodrigo a occasionné une consommation de plus de neuf cent mille cartouches d'infanterie, par le seul fait des tirailleurs ; attendu que les assiégés n'ont point fait de sortie.”

The first is an official statement that Ney's and Junot's corps d'armée alone, before the junction of Reynier's corps, mustered 50,000 men, having at the time a corps of 10,000 infantry, cavalry, and artillery detached from them : the second leaves no doubt that the infantry of the three corps, on leaving Rodrigo, amounted to 62,000. Assuming, therefore, that number as a basis of calculation, the summary of the force employed against Portugal would be,

|                                                                   |   |   |   |   |        |   |              |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---|---|---|---|--------|---|--------------|
| Infantry                                                          | - | - | - | - | 62,000 | } |              |
| Cavalry                                                           | - | - | - | - | 6,000  |   |              |
| Artillery, sappers, and other auxiliaries                         | - | - | - | - | 4,000  |   |              |
| Makes Massena's army to have been originally, on leaving Rodrigo, |   |   |   |   |        | } | 72,000       |
| 9th corps d'armée, two divisions joined in front of the lines     | - | - | - | - |        | } | 10,000       |
|                                                                   |   |   |   |   |        |   | <hr/> 82,000 |

|                                                                                                                                     |   |               |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---|---------------|
| Brought forward                                                                                                                     | - | 82,000        |
| Remaining infantry of that corps joined on<br>the frontier, where it had been stationed to<br>cover the communication with Portugal | } | 8,000         |
| Cavalry and artillery of the Imperial Guard in<br>the battle of Fuentes de Honor                                                    | } | 1,000         |
| Soult's force directed against the Alemtejo                                                                                         | - | 14,000        |
|                                                                                                                                     |   | <hr/> 105,000 |

The above are stated as the lowest probable numbers; otherwise, paying strict attention to veracity, the number of the French forces which acted against Portugal in the winter of 1810 and 1811, might be reckoned at 110,000 men. During the campaign under consideration, the French were stronger in Spain than at any other period of the war, mustering nearly 250,000 men, including 35,000 cavalry.

## APPENDIX 14.

(Referring to page 395, Vol. I.)

*Return of the Strength of the Army in Portugal, 24th June, 1811.*

| Division.                                      | Brigade.                               | Regiments.                       | Effective<br>Rk. & File. | REMARKS.                 |
|------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| <i>Cavalry.</i>                                |                                        | 3d Dragoon Guards . . . . .      | 332                      | 3127                     |
|                                                |                                        | 4th do. . . . .                  | 229                      |                          |
|                                                |                                        | 1st Royal Dragoons . . . . .     | 424                      |                          |
|                                                |                                        | 13th Light Dragoons . . . . .    | 287                      |                          |
|                                                |                                        | 14th . . . . .                   | 340                      |                          |
|                                                |                                        | 16th . . . . .                   | 333                      |                          |
|                                                |                                        | 1st Light Drag. K. G. L. . . . . | 429                      |                          |
|                                                |                                        | 11th Light Dragoons . . . . .    | 550                      |                          |
|                                                |                                        | 2d Light Drag. K. G. L. . . . .  | 203                      |                          |
| <i>1st Division.</i><br>Lieut. General Graham. | Major Gen. Harry<br>Campbell . . . . . | Coldstream Gds. 1st Bn. . . . .  | 761                      | Rifles.                  |
|                                                |                                        | 3d Guards, 1st Bn. . . . .       | 766                      |                          |
|                                                |                                        | 1 Comp. 5th Bn. 60th Ft. . . . . | 33                       |                          |
|                                                |                                        | 24th Foot, 2d Bn. . . . .        | 277                      |                          |
|                                                | Maj. Gen. Stopford                     | 42d . . . . . 2d Bn. . . . .     | 350                      | Rifles.                  |
|                                                |                                        | 79th . . . . . 1st Bn. . . . .   | 566                      |                          |
|                                                |                                        | 1 Comp. 5th Bn. 60th F. . . . .  | 25                       |                          |
|                                                |                                        | 1st Line Bn. K. G. L. . . . .    | 440                      |                          |
|                                                | M. Gen. Baron Low                      | 2d . . . . .                     | 390                      | Musk. 4233<br>Rifles 58  |
|                                                |                                        | 5th . . . . .                    | 344                      |                          |
|                                                |                                        | 7th . . . . .                    | 339                      |                          |
|                                                |                                        |                                  |                          |                          |
| <i>2d Division.</i><br>Lieut. General Hill.    |                                        | 50th Foot, 1st Bn. . . . .       | 452                      | Musk. 3285<br>Rifles 163 |
|                                                |                                        | 71st . . . . . 1st Bn. . . . .   | 414                      |                          |
|                                                |                                        | 92d . . . . . 1st Bn. . . . .    | 602                      |                          |
|                                                |                                        | 1 Comp. 95th, 3d Bn. . . . .     | 56                       |                          |
|                                                |                                        | 3d Foot, 1st Bn. . . . .         | 79                       |                          |
|                                                |                                        | 29th . . . . . 1st Bn. . . . .   | 135                      |                          |
|                                                |                                        | 31st . . . . . 2d Bn. . . . .    | 202                      |                          |
|                                                |                                        | 57th . . . . . 1st Bn. . . . .   | 242                      |                          |
|                                                |                                        | 66th . . . . . 2d Bn. . . . .    | 155                      |                          |
|                                                |                                        | 28th . . . . . 2d Bn. . . . .    | 313                      |                          |
|                                                |                                        | 34th . . . . . 2d Bn. . . . .    | 383                      |                          |
|                                                |                                        | 39th . . . . . 2d Bn. . . . .    | 308                      |                          |
|                                                |                                        | 3 Comps. 60th F. 5th Bn. . . . . | 107                      |                          |



| Division.                                | Brigade.          | Regiments.                | Effective<br>Rk. & File. | REMARKS.<br>State, 24th<br>June, 1811.    |
|------------------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------------------|
| 3d Division.<br>Major Gen. Picton.       |                   | 45th Foot, 1st Bn. .      | 391                      | Musk. 2844<br>Rifles 163<br><br>3007<br>— |
|                                          |                   | 74th 1st Bn. .            | 464                      |                                           |
|                                          |                   | 88th 1st Bn. .            | 585                      |                                           |
|                                          |                   | 3 Comp. 60th F. 5th Bn.   | 163                      |                                           |
|                                          |                   | 5th Foot, 2d Bn. .        | 392                      |                                           |
|                                          |                   | 83d 2d Bn. .              | 345                      |                                           |
|                                          |                   | 88th 2d Bn. .             | 258                      |                                           |
|                                          |                   | 94th 2d Bn. .             | 409                      |                                           |
| 4th Division.<br>Major General Cole.     | Major Gen. Kemmis | 27th Foot, 3d Bn. .       | 576                      | Musk. 2710<br>Rifles 28<br><br>2738<br>—  |
|                                          |                   | 40th 1st Bn. .            | 585                      |                                           |
|                                          |                   | 97th 1st Bn. .            | 289                      |                                           |
|                                          |                   | 1 Comp. 60th F. 5th Bn.   | 28                       |                                           |
|                                          | BrigGen Packenham | 7th Foot, 1st Bn. .       | 346                      |                                           |
|                                          |                   | Do. 2d Bn. .              | 179                      |                                           |
|                                          |                   | 23d 1st Bn. .             | 358                      |                                           |
|                                          |                   | 48th 1st Bn. .            | 316                      |                                           |
| 5th Division.<br>Maj. Gen. Dunlop.       | Major Gen. Hay.   | 1st Foot, 3d Bn. .        | 550                      | Musk. 2856                                |
|                                          |                   | 9th 1st Bn. .             | 570                      |                                           |
|                                          |                   | 38th 2d Bn. .             | 332                      |                                           |
|                                          |                   | 1 Co. Brunswick Lt. Inf.  | 56                       |                                           |
|                                          | Major Gen. Dunlop | 4th Foot, 1st Bn. .       | 543                      |                                           |
|                                          |                   | 30th 2d Bn. .             | 399                      |                                           |
|                                          |                   | 44th 2d Bn. .             | 350                      |                                           |
|                                          |                   | 1 Co. Brunswick Lt. Inf.  | 56                       |                                           |
| 6th Division.<br>Major General Campbell. | Brig. Gen. Hulse  | 11th Foot, 1st Bn. .      | 738                      | Musk. 2652<br>Rifles 40<br><br>2692       |
|                                          |                   | 53d 2d Bn. .              | 404                      |                                           |
|                                          |                   | 61st 1st Bn. .            | 608                      |                                           |
|                                          | Major Gen. Burne  | 1 Comp. 60th F. 5th Bn.   | 40                       |                                           |
|                                          |                   | 2d Foot . . . . .         | 487                      |                                           |
|                                          |                   | 36th 1st Bn. . . .        | 415                      |                                           |
| 7th Division.<br>Major General Sontag.   | Major Gen. Alten  | 1st Light Bn. K. G. L.    | 537                      | Musk. 2158<br>Rifles 520<br><br>2678      |
|                                          |                   | 2d do. do.                | 520                      |                                           |
|                                          |                   | 9 Cos. Brunswick Lt. Inf. | 473                      |                                           |
|                                          | Major Gen. Sontag | 51st Foot . . . . .       | 360                      |                                           |
|                                          |                   | 5 Comps. 85th Foot .      | 200                      |                                           |
|                                          |                   | Chasseurs Britanniques    | 588                      |                                           |

| Division.                                               | Brigade.          | Regiments.               | Effective<br>Rk & File. | REMARKS.<br>State, 24th<br>June, 1811.   |
|---------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------------------------|
| <i>Light Division.</i><br>Major General<br>R. Crawford. | Colonel Beckwith  | 43d Foot, 1st Bn. . .    | 651                     | Musk. 1809<br>Rifles 737<br>————<br>2546 |
|                                                         |                   | 4 Comps. 95th F. 1st Bn. | 327                     |                                          |
|                                                         | Br. Gen. Drummond | 1 Comp. 95th F. 2d Bn.   | 78                      |                                          |
|                                                         |                   | 52d Foot, 1st Bn. . .    | 723                     |                                          |
|                                                         |                   | Do. 2d Bn. . .           | 435                     |                                          |
|                                                         |                   | 4 Comps. 95th F. 1st Bn. | 332                     |                                          |
|                                                         |                   | 58th Foot, 2d Bn. . .    | 313                     | Lisbon,                                  |
|                                                         |                   | Royal Staff Corps . .    | 31                      |                                          |
|                                                         |                   | Inv. Gar. Comp. K. G. L. | 20                      |                                          |
|                                                         |                   | 48th Foot, 2d Bn. . .    | 20                      |                                          |

INFANTRY, EFFECTIVE MUSKETS . . . . 24,256  
 CAVALRY CARBINES . . . . 3,127

## APPENDIX 14.

[Referring to Page 6, Volume II.]

THE following Regulations, which were established for the protection of the French couriers, are inserted to show the annoyance caused by the Guerrillas in 1811.

### No. I.

*Regulation, fixing the departure of Estafettes, Couriers, and Convoys, in the arrondissement of the Army, upon the line of communication between Valladolid and Bayonne.*

HIS Excellency Marshal Duke of Ragusa, Commander in Chief, orders the execution of the order of the day, issued on the 19th October, 1811, by General Count Dorsenne, Commander in Chief of the Army of the North, of which the following are the dispositions:

Art. 1. From the 1st of November next, the correspondence from Valladolid to Bayonne will only be transmitted twice each week.

Art. 2. The estafettes and mails shall travel day and night. The Directors of the Posts will take care that the carriers of the mails never separate from the estafettes.

Art. 3. Reckoning from the time fixed by Art. 1., a particular escort shall only be furnished twice a month

to General Officers, those employed in the administration, men isolated, and conveys of all descriptions; consequently, persons above described shall be obliged to set out at these times only.

Art. 4. The commandants of places, whoever they may be, that send, except on the days determined for the escorts, shall be suspended from their employments.

Art. 5. The escort of estafettes and couriers shall not consist of less than 250 men, and be composed, as much as possible, of cavalry and infantry. The governors and commandants of places will augment the number of the escort when they judge it necessary, by uniting, in case of need, the troops from two or three garrisons.

Art. 6. Extraordinary escorts shall be only furnished to officers, bearers of dispatches to His Serene Highness the Prince Major-General, and only in consequence of an order from the General in Chief; or to officers of the Staff, dispatched by Generals employed in the army upon urgent occasions.

Art. 7. The commandants of places are authorised to protect, by strong detachments, the arrival of grain and provisions to the army magazines, and other fixed places.

Art. 8. The commandant of the escort of the estafettes and couriers will take care that the estafette's horse has a cord attached to his bridle, which shall always be held by a serjeant in the centre of the said escort.

Art. 9. The commanders of the escorts shall always keep their troops ready for battle. The commandants of places will take care, that, previous to their departure, every soldier is provided with fifty cartridges.

Art. 10. Every officer or commandant of an escort, who shall be convicted of not having taken all proper

measures for the safety and protection of the estafettes and convoys, shall be arrested and brought to a court-martial, to be dealt with according to the rigour of the laws.

Art. 11. Generals, Governors, Commandants of places, and escorts, are charged respectively with the entire execution of the present.

(Signed) **BARON DE LAMARTINIERE,**  
General, and Chief of the General Staff.

*Head Quarters,*  
*Valladolid, 8th Feb. 1812.*

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## APPENDIX 15.

*Strength of the British Army under Lord Wellington,  
24th March, 1813.*

| Division.                                                 | Brigade.                            | Regiments.              | Effective<br>Rk. & File. | REMARKS.                 |
|-----------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1st Division.<br>Cavalry.                                 | Major Gen. Anson                    | 1st Life Guards . . .   | 206                      | 6599                     |
|                                                           |                                     | 2d do. . . . .          | 225                      |                          |
|                                                           |                                     | Royal Horse Gds. Blue   | 250                      |                          |
|                                                           |                                     | 5th Dragoon Guards .    | 252                      |                          |
|                                                           |                                     | 3d Dragoons . . .       | 337                      |                          |
|                                                           |                                     | 4th . . . . .           | 327                      |                          |
|                                                           |                                     | 11th Lt. Drag. . . .    | 324                      |                          |
|                                                           |                                     | 12th . . . . .          | 303                      |                          |
|                                                           |                                     | 16th . . . . .          | 330                      |                          |
|                                                           |                                     | 14th Lt. Drag. . . .    | 319                      |                          |
|                                                           | Major Gen. V. Alten                 | 1st Huss. K. G. L. . .  | 396                      |                          |
|                                                           |                                     | 2d . . . . .            | 230                      |                          |
|                                                           | Major Gen. Bock .                   | 1st Drag. K. G. L. . .  | 215                      |                          |
|                                                           |                                     | 2nd . . . . .           | 241                      |                          |
| 2d Division.<br>Cavalry.                                  | Major Gen. Slade .                  | 3d Drag. Gds. . . .     | 260                      |                          |
|                                                           |                                     | 4th . . . . .           | 234                      |                          |
|                                                           |                                     | 1st Royal Drag. . . .   | 228                      |                          |
|                                                           | Major Gen. Long .                   | 9th Lt. Drag. . . .     | 191                      |                          |
|                                                           |                                     | 13th . . . . .          | 217                      |                          |
|                                                           |                                     | 10th Hussars . . . .    | 505                      |                          |
|                                                           |                                     | 15th . . . . .          | 505                      |                          |
|                                                           |                                     | 18th . . . . .          | 504                      |                          |
| 1st Division.<br>Lieut. General Honourable<br>W. Stewart. | Major Gen. Howard                   | 1st Foot Gds. 1st Bn.   | 413                      | Musk. 4281<br>Rifles 699 |
|                                                           |                                     | do. 3d Bn.              | 493                      |                          |
|                                                           | Maj. Gen. Honourable<br>E. Stopford | 1 Comp. 60th R. 5th Bn. | 46                       |                          |
|                                                           |                                     | Coldstream Gds. 1st Bn. | 533                      |                          |
|                                                           |                                     | 3d Foot Guards, 1st Bn. | 696                      |                          |
|                                                           |                                     | 1 Comp. 60th R. 5th Bn. | 44                       |                          |
|                                                           |                                     | 1st Line Bn. K. G. L.   | 541                      |                          |
|                                                           | Major Gen. Lowe .                   | 2d . . . . .            | 512                      |                          |
|                                                           |                                     | 5th . . . . .           | 484                      |                          |
|                                                           | Colonel Halket .                    | 1st Light Bn. K. G. L.  | 568                      |                          |
|                                                           |                                     | 2d . . . . .            | 650                      |                          |

| Division.                                                  | Brigade.                              | Regiments.                 | Effective<br>Rk. & File. | REMARKS.                               |
|------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------------------|
| 2d Division.<br>Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K. B.             | Brig. Gen. Byng .                     | 50th Foot, 1st Bn. .       | 656                      | Musk. 6460<br>Rifles 169<br><hr/> 6629 |
|                                                            |                                       | 71st 1st Bn. .             | 853                      |                                        |
|                                                            |                                       | 92d 1st Bn. .              | 761                      |                                        |
|                                                            |                                       | 1 Comp. 60th R. 5th Bn.    | 68                       |                                        |
|                                                            |                                       | 3d Foot, 1st Bn. .         | 737                      |                                        |
|                                                            |                                       | 57th 1st Bn. .             | 680                      |                                        |
|                                                            |                                       | 31st } 1st P. Bn. { 2d Bn. | 351                      |                                        |
|                                                            |                                       | 66th } 2d Bn.              | 431                      |                                        |
|                                                            |                                       | 1 Comp. 60th R. 5th Bn.    | 58                       |                                        |
|                                                            |                                       | 28th Foot, 1st Bn. .       | 799                      |                                        |
|                                                            |                                       | 34th 2d Bn. .              | 559                      |                                        |
|                                                            |                                       | 39th 1st Bn. .             | 633                      |                                        |
|                                                            |                                       | 1 Comp. 60th R. 5th Bn.    | 43                       |                                        |
| 3d Division.<br>Sir T. Picton, K. B.                       | Maj. Gen. Honour-<br>able C. Colville | 45th Foot, 1st Bn. .       | 405                      | Musk. 2900<br>Rifles 193<br><hr/> 3093 |
|                                                            |                                       | 74th . . . . .             | 376                      |                                        |
|                                                            |                                       | 88th 1st Bn. .             | 665                      |                                        |
|                                                            |                                       | 3 Comps. 60th R. 5th Bn.   | 193                      |                                        |
|                                                            |                                       | 5th Foot, 1st Bn. .        | 429                      |                                        |
|                                                            |                                       | 83d 2d Bn. .               | 328                      |                                        |
|                                                            |                                       | 87th 2d Bn. .              | 373                      |                                        |
|                                                            |                                       | 94th . . . . .             | 324                      |                                        |
| 4th Division.<br>Lieut. Gen. Hon. Sir G.<br>L. Cole, K. B. | Maj. Gen. W. Anson                    | 27th Foot, 3d Bn. .        | 588                      | Musk. 3495<br>Rifles 34<br><hr/> 3529  |
|                                                            |                                       | 40th 1st Bn. .             | 497                      |                                        |
|                                                            |                                       | 48th 1st Bn. .             | 363                      |                                        |
|                                                            |                                       | 2d } 2d P. Bn. { 2d Bn.    | 287                      |                                        |
|                                                            |                                       | 53d } 2d Bn.               | 234                      |                                        |
|                                                            | Colonel Skerrett                      | 1 Comp. 60th R. 5th Bn.    | 34                       |                                        |
|                                                            |                                       | 7th Foot, 1st Bn. .        | 612                      |                                        |
|                                                            |                                       | 20th . . . . .             | 585                      |                                        |
|                                                            |                                       | 23d 1st Bn. .              | 292                      |                                        |
|                                                            |                                       | 1 Comp. Brunswick Oels'    | 37                       |                                        |
| 5th Division.                                              | Major Gen. Hay                        | 1st Foot, 3d Bn. .         | 498                      | Musk. 2517                             |
|                                                            |                                       | 9th 1st Bn. .              | 578                      |                                        |
|                                                            |                                       | 38th 1st Bn. .             | 297                      |                                        |
|                                                            |                                       | 1 Comp. Brunswick Oels'    | 29                       |                                        |
|                                                            | Brig. Gen. Robinson                   | 4th Foot, 1st Bn. .        | 431                      |                                        |
|                                                            |                                       | 47th 2d Bn. .              | 311                      |                                        |
|                                                            |                                       | 30th } 4th P. Bn. { 2d Bn. | 201                      |                                        |
|                                                            |                                       | 44th } 2d Bn.              | 142                      |                                        |
|                                                            |                                       | 1 Comp. Brunswick Oels'    | 30                       |                                        |

| Division.                                                 | Brigade.            | Regiments.               | Effective<br>Rk. & File. | REMARKS.                                       |
|-----------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------------------------|
| <i>6th Division.</i><br>M. Gen. Hon. E.<br>Packenham.     | Colonel Sterling    | 11th Foot, 1st Bn. . .   | 484                      | Musk. 3484<br>Rifles 45<br><hr/> 3529<br><hr/> |
|                                                           |                     | 42d 1st Bn. . .          | 446                      |                                                |
|                                                           |                     | 61st 1st Bn. . .         | 451                      |                                                |
|                                                           |                     | 79th 1st Bn. . .         | 571                      |                                                |
|                                                           |                     | 91st 1st Bn. . .         | 729                      |                                                |
|                                                           | Colonel Hinde       | 1 Comp. 60th R. 5th Bn.  | 45                       |                                                |
|                                                           |                     | 32d Foot, 1st Bn. . .    | 450                      |                                                |
|                                                           |                     | 36th 1st Bn. . .         | 353                      |                                                |
| <i>7th Division.</i><br>Lieut. Gen. Earl of<br>Dalhousie. | Brig. Gen. Barnes   | 6th Foot, 1st Bn. . .    | 928                      | Musks. 3571                                    |
|                                                           |                     | 24th } 3d P. Bn. { 2d Bn | 269                      |                                                |
|                                                           |                     | 58th } 2d Bn             | 228                      |                                                |
|                                                           |                     | 9 Comps. Brunswick Oels  | 350                      |                                                |
|                                                           |                     | 51st Foot . . . . .      | 336                      |                                                |
|                                                           |                     | 68th . . . . .           | 365                      |                                                |
|                                                           |                     | 82d 1st Bn. . . . .      | 386                      |                                                |
|                                                           |                     | Chasseurs Britanniques   | 689                      |                                                |
| <i>Lt. Division.</i><br>Major Gen.<br>C. Alten.           | Maj. Gen. Vandeleur | 43d Foot, 1st Bn. . .    | 704                      | Musk. 1388<br>Rifles 1194<br><hr/> 2582        |
|                                                           |                     | 95th 1st Bn. . . . .     | 533                      |                                                |
|                                                           |                     | Do. 3d Bn. . . . .       | 337                      |                                                |
|                                                           |                     | 52d 1st Bn. . . . .      | 684                      |                                                |
|                                                           |                     | 95th 2d Bn. . . . .      | 324                      |                                                |
|                                                           | Lieut. Col. Dundas  | Royal Staff Corps . .    | 58                       |                                                |
|                                                           |                     | Lieut. Col. Bromehead    | 77th Regt. . . . .       | 442                                            |
|                                                           |                     | Captain Bothe . . .      | Ind. Gar. Comp. K. G. L. | 16                                             |

INFANTRY, EFFECTIVE MUSKETS . . . . . 30,430

CAVALRY CARBINES . . . . . 6,590

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37,029

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## APPENDIX 16.

*Military Considerations on the issue of the Contest in the Peninsula of Spain and Portugal.*

By reference to dates, it will be seen, that the French were driven beyond the boundaries of Spain whilst Buonaparte was in strength to make face against the united armies of the remainder of Europe; and consequently the triumph of the Spaniards was not the effect of extraneous circumstances, though, without doubt, much accelerated by them.

It is much to be desired that some competent person would delineate the causes which produced the salvation of Spain, and assign to each its due share of importance, that the world might profit by the extraordinary occurrence of a nation, with scarcely any regular army, having preserved its independence against the most formidable legions ever employed to subvert a state; and that it may be generally understood how far popular spirit is equal to protect itself, as also whether any new ideas on war ought to be entertained from the issue of this peculiar struggle. In the mean while the following cursory observations on the subject are submitted.

The most prominent features of the contest appear to have been, 1st. The exertions and unbending firmness of the population. 2d. The Guerrilla warfare. 3d. The faults of the enemy. 4th. The allied British and Portuguese army. 5th. The shape and size of the country, its difficult communications, and thin population. 6th.

The great expense supported by England.—Each of these shall be separately considered.

The unbending firmness manifested on all occasions by the Spaniards, added to occasional great exertion, contributed much to their independence; but however desirable to support the trite adage, that a nation determined to be free must become so, and of all similarly received opinions which tend to promote a spirit of patriotism and of freedom in the commonality, it cannot be denied that they appear falsified by every event of the struggle; these freemen having been invariably beaten by the organized bondsmen opposed to them; and the patriotic population, wherever the English army or peculiar circumstances did not operate in their favour, (as in Catalonia and Aragon,) having been held by them in a state of subjection. The unbending spirit and firmness of the people alone would not, therefore, have expelled the intruders in any limited period. Time, it is probable, might have rendered their perseverance triumphant; but unless aided by some extraneous cause, several generations would have first passed away, and the event is more a subject of speculation than of useful inquiry.

The second feature of the contest, the Guerrilla warfare, also contributed something to its successful result: the part it bore has, however, been much overrated, which a reference to the registers of their deeds, the Cadiz and Lisbon Gazettes of the period, will prove—the number of French therein claimed to have been killed or captured by the Guerrillas, falling little short of the total number which crossed the Pyrenees. Their own numbers were also in general magnified in a most extraordinary degree: from accurate returns of the bands roving between the Tagus and the Douro, in which district they

were the most numerous, it has been ascertained that they did not amount to three thousand,\* being on a surface nearly equal to the fourth part of the country occupied by the French, which, taken as an average, would give for their numbers south of the Ebro about 10 or 12,000 instead of 40 or 50,000, as usually represented. This small force reconciles with their daring and enterprise, that General Foy should twice have safely traversed the whole country with a small escort, though the Guerrillas were apprized of his passage, and prepared to intercept his return; and that Marshal Massena, under similar circumstances, should have arrived in France with the spoils of Portugal; and that out of the numerous convoys which left the country under trifling escorts, so few should have been captured. It is also evident that they could not exceed a limited number without exchanging their nature and becoming armies, under which head they cease to be the object of this inquiry; and an appeal is confidently made to all parties whether they were ever able in that shape to face the French in open combat.

Without wishing to detract from those highly patriotic, meritorious and useful bodies, it may be stated that their reputation owed much to the pen as well as to the sword. When acting with the British in France, they showed less firmness than the regular corps of Spaniards, and the astonishment of the English officers was not a little excited at frequently witnessing the vaunted bands of Mina and Longa turn before inferior numbers of French troops. From this fact, and from there being in the in-

\* The band of the Empecinado, which wandered chiefly in the mountains near Segovia, is not included in this calculation.

terior of Spain no places of refuge of such strength as the Alpujarras and the mountains of Andalusia, from which the small moveable corps Marshal Soult had it in his power to employ, nearly, if not entirely, dislodged them, it is not too much to presume, that, so far from being of themselves able to save their country, had the intrusive government driven the British and Portuguese armies out of the Peninsula, and found itself strong enough to act against the Guerrillas, and to treat them as banditti, they would, in a few months, have dwindled into such,

3d. The faults of the enemy. Of these the two most usually cited are, having penetrated to the south, and spread over the distant provinces, before the north was pacified, or even fully subdued; and secondly, having divided their forces into distinct armies. The former of these alleged errors contributed much, during the protraction of the war, to shake their dominion; but the French also gained considerably by it in the first instance: had they filled up two or three campaigns in tranquillizing the north, would not regular armies have been trained to oppose their invasion of the south? and is it altogether certain that they would, even in that time, have established their dominion against the inflexible firmness of the Spaniards? On the second point it may be asked, whether the entrusting each grand army to the care of its own chief was not a consequence of the attempt to subdue a nation of the size of Spain rather than a fault, and whether such system must not invariably be pursued on every similar occasion? How can it ever be practicable for a central authority to controul the various movements of armies spread over 150,000 square miles, and frequently with their communications interrupted for days together? An

order of detail requires to be modified every moment, and can only be given by those on the spot. No authority, however little removed from the scene of action, would be competent thereto. A general plan of operations must necessarily emanate from a single source, and if (as ought to be the case) confined to ensure unity of object and action to the various parts of the machine, it could be better regulated at Paris than at Madrid. The principal error of the French seems rather to have been having no decided line of subordination between the different commanders when circumstances required the junction of their armies, and having a puppet king who could not, on any unforeseen emergency, enforce obedience to his commands; and it will be found most in temporary and unforeseen combined movements, that the separation of command was injurious to the French. None of those auxiliary causes, nor all of them united, would therefore have produced a decisive effect had there been no English nor Portuguese army present, and it follows to consider them *à-priori*, as having been the principal agents in effecting the deliverance of the Peninsula; but making every allowance for the peculiar talents of the British chief, there is room for inquiry how 60,000 men, with few reinforcements, should, for years together, have been able successfully to oppose very superior numbers constantly reinforced at pleasure. What were the causes which enabled them to do so?

The good will of the population is admitted to have been of great assistance;\* but that would not have been

\* It is extremely difficult to describe the nature of the assistance given by the Spaniards, as their hostility towards the intruders was carried on with policy, and under great deception: wherever the French arrived in force, the inhabitants tranquilly received them, obeyed their orders with

long available without a large tract of country to manœuvre over, as, had the army been obliged to fight whenever pressed, the most splendid success would in a few repetitions have been annihilation. To feel assured that extent of country had great influence beyond the weakness it caused to the French armies by separation, we need only look at the consequences produced by the allies acting in one part of Spain on another. Sir John Moore, by drawing the war into the north, saved the south from immediate conquest; and Lord Wellington subsequently liberated the southern provinces by a similar movement: the victory of Vitoria freed Valencia, and the invasion of France Catalonia. We likewise find the advantage of an extensive country confirmed by the conduct of many of the provinces: thus, Galicia, stigmatised as the least warlike province in Spain, overpowered a considerable army by its extent and shape, which did not admit of one portion of the inhabitants being separated from

seeming alacrity, and at the same moment communicated them to the commanders of their own forces. The day prior to the battle of Salamanca, the same letter, in triplicate, from King Joseph to Marmont, was brought to Lord Wellington by three separate couriers—one of whom had a written order to be paid four hundred dollars by Marmont, on receipt of the dispatch; (these letters being in a character which could not be decyphered, their contents proved of no advantage to the allies). The day of the action at Vitoria, the Alcade of Logroño, thirty-six miles distant, arrived on the field, his mule dropping under him with fatigue as he dismounted, to say that he had early that morning received Clausel's corps, and that whilst he had left his deputy to serve out the rations he had brought the return of their numbers. A thousand similar actions might be quoted to show the passive, though not less effectual nature of the assistance given by the population. The strongest proof, however, of general and disinterested good will is, that although no army ever had better intelligence, the whole amount of money paid on that head fell short of the sum given for intelligence at the capture of one single sugar island in the first years of the war.

the remainder: whereas the Asturias, bearing the reputation of the most warlike province, literally composed of one huge mountain, and from whence issued some of the most celebrated Guerrilla hands, never made any protracted resistance. The French always beat the organized troops on the first rencontre, and there being no extent of country to disperse over, the Spaniards could never recover: a chain of posts of forty miles drew a line from the frontier to the sea, and impeded all communication from east to west.

Spain, considered as a whole, is very nearly the shape of Galicia, and Portugal that of the Asturias; the British were, however, driven from the one into the other, and by parity of reasoning, as well as by a consideration of the circumstances which occurred, it is fair to presume they would never have recovered the ascendancy, had not the lines in front of Lisbon afforded a field of battle too decidedly advantageous to leave the enemy any hope of wearing out the defenders by a succession of sanguinary combats.

Shutting up the army in the lines would, in most countries and under other circumstances, have been equivalent to its destruction; the space they covered geographically considered, being a mere point, and affording no supplies; regarded, however, in a military view, with its rear open to the sea, it was of more value in the defence of Portugal than the occupation of the whole kingdom. The war was equally alive, the army was entire, secure, and daily increasing in strength and experience, the blockaders were, at the same time, from a variety of causes, wasting away, and the scantiness of the supplies which could be drawn from the stores of the thin population around them ensured their ultimate retreat. The

lines, therefore, drew much of their value from the peculiar character of the country, and still more from the cause of success last enumerated, as without daily supplies of a magnitude only to have been furnished by the prodigious wealth of England, famine would more rapidly have acted upon the defenders than the blockaders, and would have dislodged them first—an event which would, in all probability, have concluded the efforts of the British forces in the cause; at any rate it must be admitted, that nothing but an expenditure unheard of before in the annals of war, could have enabled the British and Portuguese to follow up and continue their triumphs in such a poor and exhausted country. From twelve to fifteen hundred officers, or subaltern agents, were employed in the commissariat arrangements, and provisions were purchased at any price, however exorbitant, till the utmost exertions of Britain failed in obtaining a sufficiency of specie.\* Then the expedient of maintaining a line of supply from the sea was carried to such extent, that in some cases, articles of food to be procured on the spot were brought from England at six times their local price.

\* The expenses of the war never having exceeded a tithe of the revenue raised in Great Britain, the difficulty did not arise from want of money, but from the impossibility of converting the currency of the state into bullion. That commodity, like any other, rose in price from the demand exceeding the supply, and the exchange between England and Portugal became so unfavourable to the former, that at one period seventy-two pence were paid for each dollar, the current and standard value of which is only fifty-four pence. This had the effect of materially increasing the cost of every article paid for in the Peninsula, and consequently operated indirectly as a premium on supplies sent from England.

In 1812 there were 9,000 hired mules employed in the transport of provisions and forage, besides 2,000 cars with their cattle, the property of government.



Even under this system the current year failed to clear its own expenses in the Peninsula : credit and confidence supplied the deficiency—promises of payment were accepted in lieu of money, and three millions sterling of debt were contracted, which it required two years of peace to liquidate.

If the reasoning above offered to show that no other sufficient means than the regular Portuguese and British army existed in Spain, to avert the dominion of France, be correct, the contest unhappily tends to confirm most of the received opinions respecting war—that regular armies alone are fit to contend with regular armies ; that the most numerous legions will generally prevail ; that the largest countries are those best adapted for defensive war ; but, above all, that money is the main support of hostilities ; holding out no fresh hopes to the patriot, or to the minor state. It, however, leaves a forcible appeal to all citizens to submit to discipline in the hour of invasion, and a warning to all governments exposed to the aggression of a more powerful neighbour, to pay watchful attention to preserve the foundation of its military establishment.

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The contest in Spain, however, considered under a more enlarged view, offers additional proof of what the history of mankind seems to inculcate—that dominion founded on mere military exertion can never stand still ; that it must on every effort advance, or it instantly retrogrades ; such being apparently a law of the universe, intended to prevent one man tyrannizing over the whole globe, and counteracting, by the arrangements of his

limited understanding, the infinite variety of institutions and governments required for general prosperity. To take an extreme case,—suppose the subjugation of only one people remain to complete universal dominion; if they successfully resist, the conquerors of the remainder of the earth are stripped of their invincibility, and the greater the efforts made against them, and the longer persisted in, so much more apparent does it become. The hopes of the conquered, and the power of the oppressor, naturally rise and fall in inverse ratio, the former become less submissive, and greater exertions are required to maintain the ascendancy. Opportunity or accident raises some other people into open resistance; the means of re-conquering them are diminished; each successful revolt generates another; in a succession of years the struggle becomes general; and, ultimately, nations resume the natural boundaries of independence marked out by climate, mountains, seas, rivers, and other localities. Such, at least, may be clearly traced in the dissolution of one, if not of two, of the greatest military empires which ever flourished; and such threatens, ere long, to be further exemplified in the extinction of a tottering state not long since the terror of Christendom, as spreading both by fanaticism and the sword.

It must have been a confident reliance on the effects of re-action, when advance should cease, which caused six months perseverance during the winter of 1810-1811, in employing all the disposable military strength of England, and spending millions of money to preserve a few square miles of territory free from the dominion of France, when, by means of the fleet, so much more advantageous a field of action could have been found.

The maintenance of that small spot deprived the

French armies of their invincibility; and it was fair to reason thus—if the destruction of the most renowned military empires, even of those consolidated by a duration of successive centuries, has been by re-action from the point where advance ceased, what chance will the comparatively infantine exertions of France have of rising into maturity, if checked almost at their birth, and proved to be of no overpowering force?

England has acquired from the events of the late war, the important knowledge of her great military strength and resources, which, if duly applied on future occasions, will amply repay the sacrifices made to obtain it.

Should a conquering people again threaten to subvert the balance of the European world, we know how to thwart them—not by naval enterprises which may impede, but can never prevent their success, not by any deceptive policy of balancing integral acquisitions by colonial or other distant aggrandizement, nor by any selfish prudence of husbanding our resources to protect our own firesides, nor by prodigally lavishing our money on other people for twenty successive years to fight our battles—but by immediately putting forth our native strength to the utmost, and endeavouring to terminate the contest in one or two campaigns. A corps of fifty thousand auxiliary troops will always give more real strength to our allies than the treasury of Britain, and will generally prove sufficient to turn the scale on any nearly balanced contest. This is the only line of conduct that will give England due rank and consideration in European warfare.

Permanently large military establishments, however, being incompatible with our constitution as a free, and ruinous to our prosperity as a manufacturing and commercial people, no patriot can desire to see them main-

tained beyond what necessity strictly demands. Naval supremacy is a firm security from sudden aggression, and will frequently prevent the necessity of continental interference; it is consequently the Ægis of England, and should have a decidedly national preference; it might even be politic if possible to revive the illusion, however little flattering to the national character, that maritime warfare is more congenial to our nature, and more adapted to our talents than the wasting and complicated operations of the military service.

Secondary to this our right arm, sound policy demands the most unremitting attention that the military establishments of the empire do not relax into the chaos of the last peace, that however limited the number of soldiers retained, they be kept an army in all its component parts, that the knowledge we have acquired be preserved, that organization and discipline be maintained; so that when again driven to make a powerful effort, the foundations may be found perfect and a grand superstructure be quickly reared at a moderate expense. No brilliant success is likely to attend the first efforts of such inexperienced troops; but as the victors at Talavera showed themselves the worthy descendants of the conquerors of Blenheim, so will the new levies in any future war prove themselves undegenerated in spirit and firmness from those who so splendidly triumphed at Waterloo, and a few campaigns will endow them with all other military qualities. Ordinary occasions do not call for extraordinary men, but in any protracted or difficult contest, another Marlborough or Wellington will not fail to appear.



## APPENDIX 17.

THE constitution promulgated by the Cortes having been annulled, it is thought better not to clog the military narrative with any particulars respecting it ; and only to throw together in this Appendix a few observations pointing out the slight basis on which it reposed, to account for the facility with which it was destroyed.

When the Extraordinary General Cortes was elected in 1810, the greater number of the provinces, being occupied by the French, could return no deputies, and a variety of unprecedented expedients were adopted to complete the regular number, besides a direct violation of ancient usage in admitting representatives from the American provinces. These irregularities ought to have made the Cortes entertain doubts of their own legality, and be exceedingly cautious how they introduced the required ameliorations in the government ; instead of which, they commenced by the most violent changes in every institution of the state and church. This want of judgment may be traced to the composition of the assembly. The nomination as deputy being attended with no pecuniary advantage, and appearing to hold out no prospect of future benefit, was little courted by prudent or worldly men ; whereas every aspiring or visionary patriot, fraught with the hope of regenerating his country, sought with avidity to be elected : and, unluckily, too great a proportion of members were returned whose ideas of perfection

were drawn from the writings of the Greeks and early Romans, and whose highest ambition was to refine on the theoretic doctrines of their favourite authors. These members being the best educated, and some of them eloquent speakers, soon obtained an ascendancy : they fairly enough arrogated to themselves the title of *Liberales*, though they certainly little maintained it in branding with that of *Serviles* all who refused to support their views of giving unbounded freedom to the nation. In the sittings of the Cortes, whoever spoke contrary to their opinions, whether he uttered the sentiments of prejudice firmly rooted by long duration, the simple effusions of an honest heart, or the logic of a less cultivated understanding than their own, was branded as a *Servile*; and not unfrequently, when argument failed, was silenced by the clamours of the populace in the galleries, who, flattered with the expectation of some unknown advantage, listened with impatience to all who opposed the meditated changes. Thus, only, arguments favourable to the views of the *Liberales* being admitted, every objection to their schemes was overlooked; and with nine-tenths of the nation totally unprepared for any change, they drew up a body of laws striking at almost every institution regarded with respect, and chalked out for the Spaniards, unconscious of its value, a higher degree of liberty than the most enlightened nation has hitherto been able to attain. From ignorance of human nature, or from too strong democratic notions, they absolutely courted the opposition of the upper classes by wanton changes, and a total disregard of their feelings and prejudices ; so that the constitution, the fruits of their labour, whilst it abased the kingly power, degraded the nobles, robbed the church,

and limited the authority of the military, promised only a distant benefit to the people contingent on the success of the war, and consequently from its announcement was opposed by a host of powerful enemies, without a single class of society feeling warmly interested in its preservation.

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## APPENDIX 18.

*Return of the number of British Troops in Spain and Portugal (exclusive of Cadiz, Gibraltar, and the Eastern coast of Spain,) at the undermentioned periods:*

*Adjutant-General's Office, London.*

|                        | RANK AND FILE. |                          |           |
|------------------------|----------------|--------------------------|-----------|
|                        | Cavalry.       | Artillery and Engineers. | Infantry. |
| 1st December, 1808 .   | 3923           | 3099                     | 41,106    |
| 1st May, 1809 . . .    | 3304           | 1413                     | 19,510    |
| 25th May, 1810 . . .   | 4386           | 2048                     | 26,678    |
| 25th February, 1811 .  | 4431           | 2394                     | 37,103    |
| 25th July, 1811 . . .  | 5553           | 2970                     | 43,985    |
| 25th March, 1812 . . . | 7558           | 3322                     | 42,289    |
| 25th December, 1812 .  | 7808           | 4612                     | 48,186    |
| 25th May, 1813 . . .   | 8743           | 5411                     | 47,672    |
| 25th November, 1813 .  | 9105           | 6147                     | 48,167    |
| 25th April, 1814 . . . | 10168          | 6230                     | 45,120    |

The above Return bears honourable testimony to the great exertions made to send out troops to the Peninsula, and, contrasted with the actual number of musquets and carbines effective in the field, as given in the Appendix, for three periods, shows the extraordinary difference between the strength of Armies, as reckoned on paper, and the numbers actually engaged.



## APPENDIX 19.

**FIELD** Marshal the Marquis of Wellington, and the Marshals the Duke of Dalmatia, and the Duke of Albufera, being desirous of concluding a suspension of hostilities between the armies under their respective orders, and of agreeing upon a line of demarcation, have named the undermentioned officers for that purpose, viz. on the part of the Marquis of Wellington, Major General Sir George Murray, and Major General Don Luis Wimpffen; and on the part of the Duke of Dalmatia, and of the Duke of Albufera, the General of Division Count Gazan.

These officers, having exchanged their full powers, have agreed upon the following Articles :

**ART. 1.**—From the date of the present Convention there shall be a suspension of hostilities between the allied armies under the orders of Field Marshal the Marquis of Wellington, and the armies of France under the orders of Marshal the Duke of Dalmatia, and of Marshal the Duke of Albufera.

**ART. 2.**—Hostilities shall not be recommenced on either part without a previous notice being given of five days.

**ART. 3.**—The limits of the department of the Haute Garonne, with the departments of Arriege, Aude and Tarn, shall be the line of demarcation between the armies as far as the town of Buzet on the river Tarn. The line will then follow the course of the Tarn to its junction with the Garonne, making a circuit, however, on the left bank of the Tarn, opposite Montauban, to the distance of three quarters of a league from the bridge of Montau-

ban. From the mouth of the river Tarn, the line of demarcation will follow the right bank of the Garonne as far as the limits of the department of the Lot and Garonne, with the department of La Gironde. It will then pass by La Reole, Sauveterre, and Rauzan, to the Dordogne, and will follow the right bank of that river, and of the Gironde, to the sea. In the event, however, of a different line of demarcation having been already determined by Lieutenant General the Earl of Dalhousie, and General Decaen, the line fixed upon by those officers shall be adhered to.

ART. 4.—Hostilities shall cease also on both sides in regard to the places of Bayonne, St. Jean Pied de Port, Navarreins, Blaye, and the Castle of Lourdes.

The governors of these places shall be allowed to provide for the daily subsistence of the garrisons in the adjacent country: the garrison of Bayonne, with a circuit of eight leagues from Bayonne, and the garrisons of the other places named, within a circuit of three leagues round each place.

Officers shall be sent to the garrisons of the above places to communicate to them the terms of the present convention.

ART. 5.—The town and forts of Santona shall be evacuated by the French troops, and made over to the Spanish forces. The French garrison will remove with it all that properly belongs to it, together with such arms, artillery, and other military effects, as have not been the property originally of the Spanish government.

The Marquis of Wellington will determine whether the French garrison of Santona shall return to France by land, or by sea; and in either case the passage of the

garrison shall be secured, and it will be directed upon one of the places, or ports, most contiguous to the army of the Duke of Dalmatia.

The ships of war, or other vessels now in the harbour of Santona, belonging to France, shall be allowed to proceed to Rochfort with passports for that purpose.

The Duke of Dalmatia will send an officer to communicate to the French general commanding in Santona, the terms of the present convention, and cause them to be complied with.

ART. 6.—The fort of Venasque shall be made over as soon as possible to the Spanish troops, and the French garrison shall proceed, by the most direct route, to the head quarters of the French army. The garrison will remove with it the arms and ammunition which are originally French.

ART. 7.—The line of demarcation between the allied armies, and the army of Marshal Suchet, shall be the line of the frontier of Spain and France from the Mediterranean to the limits of the department of the Haute Garonne.

ART. 8.—The garrisons of all the places which are occupied by the troops of the army of the Duke of Albufera, shall be allowed to return without delay into France. These garrisons shall remove with them all that properly belongs to them, as also all the arms and artillery which are originally French.

The garrisons of Murviedro, and of Peniscola, shall join the garrison of Tortosa, and these troops will then proceed together by the great road, and enter France by Perpignan. The day of the arrival of these garrisons at Gerona, the fortresses of Figueiras, and of Rosas, shall be

made over to the Spanish troops, and the French garrisons of these places shall proceed to Perpignan.

As soon as information is received of the French garrisons of Murviedro, Peniscola, and Tortosa, having passed the French frontier, the place and forts of Barcelona shall be made over to the Spanish troops, and the French garrisons shall march immediately for Perpignan. The Spanish authorities will provide for the necessary means of transport being supplied to the French garrisons on their march to the frontier.

The sick or wounded of any of the French garrisons, who are not in a state to move with the troops, shall remain and be cured in the hospitals where they are, and will be sent into France as soon as they have recovered.

ART. 9.—From the date of the ratification of the present convention, there shall not be removed from Peniscola, Murviedro, Tortosa, Barcelona, or any of the other places, any artillery, arms, ammunition, or any other military effects belonging to the Spanish government. And the provisions remaining at the evacuation of these places shall be made over to the Spanish authorities.

ART. 10.—The roads shall be free for the passage of couriers through the cantonments of both armies, provided they are furnished with regular passports.

ART. 11.—During the continuance of the present convention, deserters from either army shall be arrested, and shall be delivered up if demanded.

ART. 12.—The navigation of the Garonne shall be free from Toulouse to the sea, and all boats in the service of either army, employed on the river, shall be allowed to pass unmolested.

ART. 13.—The cantonments of the troops shall be ar-

ranged so as to leave a space of two leagues, at least, between the quarters of the different armies.

**ART. 14.**—The movements of the troops, for the establishment of their cantonments, shall commence immediately after the ratification of the present convention.

The ratification is to take place within twenty-four hours for the army of the Duke of Dalmatia, and within forty-eight hours for the army of the Duke of Albufera.

Done in triplicate at Toulouse, on the 18th of April, 1814.

(Signed)

G. MURRAY,  
M. G. & Q. M. G.

(Signed)

LUIS WIMPFEN,  
Gefe de E. M. G. de Cam-  
paña de los Ejercitos  
Españoles.

(Signed)

Le Lieut. Général DE GAZAN.

Approuvé,  
LE M. DUC D'ALBUFERA.

Confirmed,  
WELLINGTON.

Approuvé,  
M. DUC DE DALMATIA.

## *Population of Spain at 1*

| <i>Captain-Generalships.</i> | <i>Province</i>     |
|------------------------------|---------------------|
|                              | Madrid . . .        |
| NEW CASTILE . . . . .        | { Cuenca . . .      |
|                              | Guadalaxara . . .   |
|                              | Mancha . . .        |
|                              | Toledo . . .        |
|                              | Avila . . .         |
|                              | Burgos . . .        |
|                              | Leon . . .          |
|                              | Palencia . . .      |
|                              | Salamanca . . .     |
| OLD CASTILE . . . . .        | { Segovia . . .     |
|                              | Soria . . .         |
|                              | Toro . . .          |
|                              | Valladolid . . .    |
|                              | Zamora . . .        |
|                              | Asturias . . .      |
| ARAGON . . . . .             |                     |
| CATALONIA . . . . .          |                     |
| VALENCIA . . . . .           | { Valencia . . .    |
|                              | Murcia . . .        |
|                              | Majorca . . .       |
| BELEARIC ISLANDS . . . . .   | { Minorca . . .     |
|                              | Ivica and Formen    |
| NAVARRRE . . . . .           |                     |
| GUIPUZCOA . . . . .          | { Alava . . .       |
|                              | Guipúzcoa . . .     |
|                              | Biscay . . .        |
|                              | Cordova . . .       |
|                              | Jaen . . .          |
| ANDALUSIA . . . . .          | { Seville . . .     |
|                              | Nuevas Poblacion    |
|                              | Ceuta . . .         |
|                              | Granada . . .       |
| GRANADA . . . . .            | { Presidios menores |
| GALICIA . . . . .            |                     |
| ESTREMADURA . . . . .        |                     |
| CANARY ISLANDS . . . . .     |                     |



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A WRITER in No. LXX. of the Edinburgh Review, whilst canvassing "Jomini's *Traité des Grandes Opérations Militaires*," having digressed from his subject for the purpose of disparaging Colonel Jones's "Account of the War in Spain and Portugal," taxing the author with extreme inaccuracy, and even venturing to bring forward one instance of his incorrectness, so extremely gross and prominent as to induce the writer to "apprehend that it will cause the reader to turn away with disgust, and desire to hear no more;" it becomes an imperious duty, as much for the cause of truth, as for the credit of the publication, to analyse the reproaches of the critic, and show that they are founded on the most reprehensible mis-statements, or the most childish ignorance of military movements.

For the sake of those who may not have the Review in their possession, the whole diatribe is here copied:—

‘ We have somewhat deviated from the strict line of our Review, by entering at such length into the transactions of this campaign,—partly tempted by its connexion with our subject, and partly from a desire to defend this great man from the most ungenerous aspersions,—to rescue his fair scroll of fame and honour from the harpy claws that would tear and deface it. Eleven years have passed since Sir John Moore found a bloody and honourable grave, in defence of his country ; and, to this day, slight and uncandid authors continue to pass off their slender remarks upon his character and proceedings. Some of these are beneath criticism, such as Mr. Rocca,—and might have been safely left to the correction of their own frivolous absurdity, were it not that they have been kept in countenance by the observations of Colonel Jones of the Engineers, in a recent work of his, entitled, “ An Account of the War in Spain and Portugal, and the South of France ; ” which account, he informs the world, is intended to serve as an authority upon which the future historian may safely rely, when handing down to posterity the events of that war. Such a work would indeed be desirable ; but posterity will be woefully deceived, if it trusts to a history founded upon the authority of this work, which, to say nothing of its deficiency in style, is curiously devoid of profound views, and, in many places, extremely inaccurate as to facts. It is, however, only with this last fault, as far as it affects the character of Sir John Moore, that we have any present business ; and we shall select, in proof of our assertion, one instance of this incorrectness, so extremely gross and prominent, that we apprehend our readers will turn away with disgust and desire to hear no more.

‘ In his 49th page, Colonel Jones has written thus :—

"It was found, even at this early period of the retreat, that rapidity of movement, and the want of regular supplies, had shaken the discipline of the troops; stragglers had become numerous; and disgraceful scenes of plunder and drunkenness were exhibited at Villa Franca, the town being literally sacked in the search after food. These excesses, however, might readily have been restrained, if a previous arrangement for the supply had been made; as the army yet preserved a considerable degree of discipline." Again, at page 50, he says—"To make this exertion, a quantity of treasure and many valuable stores, which could not advance at the same rate, were abandoned." This vast quantity of treasure amounted to £25,000, which was always kept near the head-quarters, to answer sudden emergencies. The bullocks that drew it were tired; and to prevent an engagement with the rear guard, the money was rolled down a precipice, where it was found afterwards by the Spanish peasantry. But we will not quarrel with this high-sounding phrase of Colonel Jones, who probably considered it as vast,\* from a comparison with the scanty sum in the military chest of that army.

'The first cause of the "frightful excesses," to use

\* The ridicule which is cast on the expression "vast," attaches altogether to the reviewer himself, as it is not to be found in Colonel Jones's publication—nor is it altogether consistent with candid or equitable criticism to have overlooked the fact that in a second edition, which has been in circulation for some months, the author, in order to avoid the possibility of any misconception as to the amount of the money thrown away, has inserted the precise sum of £35,000, after the word quantity.

By a return presented to the House of Commons, it appears that the total sum lost during the retreat amounted to £77,950.

another expression of Colonel Jones,\* was, it seems, "the rapidity of movement." The distance from the town of Benavente to Astorga is less than 40 miles;—from thence to Villa Franca about 50 miles, making together less than 90 miles English. The army marched from Benavente upon the 28th of December; upon the 3d of January, they entered Villa Franca. Thus in seven days and seven nights, or 168 hours, they had marched nearly 90 English miles. We will allow twelve hours out of every twenty-four for food and sleep;—surely enough for a retreating army! Does Colonel Jones require more? There will remain 84 hours to 90 miles, or little more than one mile per hour. Wonderful rapidity!

How stands the fact?

Sir John Moore, in a letter to Lord Castle-reagh, dated Astorga, December 31, 1808, says:

"I have no option now but to fall down to the coast as fast as I am able. I found no provisions here; the little which had been collected has been consumed by Sir David's corps in their passage, and there is not two days' bread to carry the army to Villa Franca. I have been forced to push on the troops by divisions without stopping. General Frazer, with his division, will be at Villa Franca this day, and will proceed on to Lugo."

Mr. James Moore, in his Narrative, page 184, in allusion to these marches, states:

"Although the enemy had hitherto been completely frustrated, yet a multitude of severe distresses were now accumulating upon the British, which the prudence of their leader could not avert. Deluges of cold rain fell,

\* The expression "frightful excesses," does not occur in Colonel Jones's publication.

chilling and drenching the soldiers, who were wading in bad roads deep with mud. It was often difficult to procure shelter when they halted; or fuel to dry their clothes or to dress their food. The provisions were often scanty, and irregularly procured.'

The following extract, from the journal of an Officer of Major-General Leith's brigade, further explains the nature of the march on these days.

'Monday, 2d of January. At day-light, the brigade quitted Villa Franca, and marched into the pass (24 miles) to Pedro Fitto, a village composed of a few huts, situated on the top of a high mountain. In the afternoon the snow was driven with such force, that the troops could hardly face it, and not finishing their march till after dark, with difficulty found cover in the huts from the inclemency of the weather: one man during the night frozen to death on the snow.'

'Tuesday, 3d of January. The Brigade marched at day-light, fine clear piercing weather, and the ground covered with deep snow till the troops had half descended the mountain—rain then set in, and continued to pour without intermission till evening, when the Brigade halted at Bercerea, having accomplished twenty miles.'

The same day, Tuesday, 3d of January, the preceding division, under General Frazer, marching in the same deluge of rain, entered Lugo, 24 miles farther on.

Thus we find that a considerable portion of the army marched 68 miles, from Villa Franca to Lugo, between the 28th of December and 3d of January, in addition to the 90 to Villa Franca, which the Reviewer assumes as the

total distance marched during that period, giving an average of  $22\frac{1}{2}$  miles a day for seven successive days through such a country and in such weather as above described, and on the shortest days of the year, being certainly a rapidity of movement, or probably better expressed as an excess of exertion, attended with sufferings and privations sufficient to shake the discipline of any troops.

It was by the divisions thus pressed forward, and not by the reserve or rear division, which alone marched at the rate calculated by the critic, that the numerous stragglers were left, who committed the irregularities complained of.\* It is undisputed (even Mr. James Moore's Narrative states it) that the reserve, thus leisurely moving, preserved far better discipline than the other divisions, which is surely the strongest presumptive proof that with less haste there would have been more order throughout the army, and that the deductions drawn by Colonel Jones on this point are as just as his facts are accurately stated.

Here we might, in just retribution, retort on the critic his own judgment, that "we apprehend

\* The scene of drunkenness that presented itself here, (*Bembibre, 1st January,*) was disgusting. The stragglers from the preceding divisions so crowded the houses, that there was hardly accommodation for the reserve.—*Mr. James Moore's Narrative*, p. 184.

our readers will turn away with disgust" from misrepresentation and deception so gross as to suppress nearly half the distance marched for the purpose of holding up an author to ridicule:— but rather let us in charity presume that this sapient decider on military merit conceived that the divisions of an army marched arm in arm like well-dressed beaux on a mall, and never suspected that on the same day the rear entered the defile of Villa Franca, the leading column reached Lugo, 68 miles beyond it: this, however, betrays an ignorance of military tactics which no Ensign, who had made a single campaign, could possibly have fallen into. The criticism on Colonel Jones's work must therefore, if candid, have been penned by one who had never heard the "angry cannon's roar:" indeed, general report attributes it to a respectable follower of the Æsculapian art, and if so, we can only exclaim with the painter of antiquity, *Ne sutor ultra crepidam*.

The Reviewer next proceeds to quote from the Account of the War.

"But the excesses of the troops might have been readily restrained, if a previous arrangement for the supply had been made.—We beg our readers to bear in mind this assertion, and compare it with the following statement.

'Upon the 12th of December, Sir John Moore wrote as follows to Sir David Baird, then commanding the Corunna division. "I consider Benavente as a place to



have certain stores advanced to; the rest you should divide between Astorga and Villa Franca." Upon the 14th of December, in a letter to the same officer, he wrote thus—"The arrangement with respect to your stores, which I communicated in my letter of the 12th, may go on, by which we shall have a certain portion at Benavente, and the rest at Astorga and the rear;" and, a little farther on, in the same letter—"Every arrangement which I before directed, with a view to enable us to live in the Galicias, should be strictly attended to."

As Sir David Baird is still living, we suppose that Colonel Jones was not aware of the serious charge of disobedience of orders which the passages quoted from his work contain against that brave and distinguished officer; but although, like Sir John Moore, he had been in his grave, his high character might still have been preserved, because the whole army knew that there were magazines at Astorga and Benavente, and a large one at the town of Villa Franca, so miserably "sacked in the search after food." The whole army saw them—the whole army knew that it was the last-mentioned magazine which was partly plundered, and not the inhabitants' houses. Colonel Jones, we believe, belonged to that army; and if he could not see what every body besides himself saw, he might, and, before he presumed to censure, he ought to have informed himself of the true state of the case. In Mr. James Moore's Narrative of his brother's campaign, a work which it is evident Colonel Jones has read, the following passage is to be found.—"Upon the General's arrival at Villa Franca, the Commissaries reported that the magazines had been plundered—stores of wine had been broke open, and a great quantity of provisions and forage spoiled. One man,

who was detected in committing these atrocities, was made an example of." And yet, in the face of all these facts, Colonel Jones talks of "the want of regular supplies" shaking the discipline of the troops—of his own impartiality—and the value his work will be of to the future historian!"

This divides itself into two heads—the conduct of the troops at Villa Franca, and the previous arrangement for the supply of the army. Here we will take Mr. James Moore's Narrative for authority as far as it goes.

'It has been mentioned that, on the 1st of January, the General found the little town of Bembydre filled with stragglers of the preceding divisions.—And when he marched with the reserve and the cavalry to Villa Franca on the morning of the 2d, he left Colonel Ross with the 20th regiment, and a small detachment of cavalry to cover the town, while parties were sent to warn the stragglers, amounting to near a thousand men, of their danger, and to drive them, if possible, out of the houses. Some few were prevailed upon to move on; but neither threats nor the approach of the enemy could induce the greater number to quit the houses. At length the rear-guard was compelled to march and leave these senseless people to their fate; yet a small detachment of cavalry covered the whole, and only quitted the town on the approach of the enemy; then, from the immediate danger, the road was filled with Spanish and British stragglers, (armed and unarmed,) mules, carts, women, and children, all mingled in strange confusion."

"The reserve halted at Cacabelos, and the greatest part of the cavalry at Villa Franca. On arriving at this town the General heard with vexation, that *great irre-*

*gularities had also been committed there by the preceding divisions.* The Commissaries reported that the magazines had been plundered; stores of wine had been broke open, and a great quantity of forage and provisions spoiled. One man, who was detected in committing these atrocities, was made an example of, in the hope of preventing such crimes in future: and to convince the soldiers of the miserable consequences of their drunkenness, and of quitting their corps, some of those stragglers who had been shockingly mangled by the cavalry, were shown through the ranks. Thus every measure was adopted that prudence could devise, to put a stop to this bad conduct."

Colonel Jones saw all this, and even more: for he saw the stragglers, who entered Villa Franca after the above-described excesses, finding the magazines plundered, plunder the inhabitants, breaking into the houses, and consuming or wasting all the liquor and provisions they could discover, and producing a scene of terror and confusion never exceeded.

We have the written testimony of several distinguished officers to these robberies, but the notoriety of the fact renders it unnecessary to publish them;\* and we shall proceed to examine

\* We cannot, however, refrain from quoting one line from a manuscript memoir of Col. Pasley, the author of an inestimable Essay on the Military Policy of Great Britain, who was, at the period alluded to, on the general staff of the army, it being so particularly a confirmation of the text,—“Villa Franca presented the frightful image of a place taken by storm.”

whether the want of previous arrangement for the supply did not incessantly tend to prevent that leisurely movement which would have enabled Sir John Moore, when within the defile, to have preserved the discipline of his army, and restrain the excesses of the soldiery. We will not, however, be guilty of the indelicacy towards Sir David Baird which the critic invites, of entering into the discussion how far that officer stands responsible for the deficiency of magazines in Galicia, but only establish the fact from Sir John Moore's official correspondence with Lord Castlereagh, that want of provisions constantly hurried his movements.

*Benavente, 28th Dec. 1808.*

‘ I shall be guided by circumstances, and shall not, you may rest assured, retreat an inch beyond what I am compelled to do. But I fear, if once I am forced into the mountains, that the want of the means of subsistence will make it necessary to proceed down to the coast, to be provisioned from the ships.’

*Astorga, Dec. 31st, 1808.*

‘ I have no option now but to fall down to the coast as fast as I am able. I found no provisions here; the little which had been collected has been consumed by Sir David's corps in their passage, and there is not two days' bread to carry the army to Villa Franca. I have been forced to push on the troops by divisions, without stopping.’ ‘ There are no means of carriage: the people run away, the villages are deserted, and I have been obliged to destroy great part of the ammunition and mi-

litary stores. For the same reason I am obliged to leave the sick. In short, my sole object is to save the army. We must all make forced marches to the coast, from the scarcity of provisions, and to be before the enemy, who, by roads upon our flanks, may otherwise intercept us; but, after a time, the same difficulty which affects us must affect him; therefore, the rear once passed Villa Franca, I do not expect to be molested.'

Speaking of remaining in front of Lugo—  
letter from Corunna, dated 13th January, 1809:

'The country was intersected, and his position too strong for me to attack with an inferior force. The want of provisions would not enable me to wait longer. I marched that night, and, in two forced marches, bivouacking for six or eight hours in the rain, I reached Bentanços on the 10th instant.'

Again, Mr. Moore's Narrative—pages 196 and 197.

'But, even if these dangers could have been hazarded, it was impossible to remain two days, from the want of provisions. The country could furnish nothing more, and adequate means for conveying supplies from Corunna were wanting. The Commissariat was by no means on a scale for such measures, and the British army was too weak to guard the convoys.'

The above-quoted passages are positive declarations by Sir John and Mr. James Moore that no sufficient previous arrangement for the supply had been made to enable the troops to occupy the successive strong positions the Galician mountains presented, and that the deficiency of

magazines was a leading cause of their hurried retreat, and consequent disorder.

The want of previous arrangement for the supply is therefore an historical fact which, in justice to Sir John Moore, ought to be particularly brought forward, as alone accounting in a satisfactory manner for some of his rapid movements, particularly that from Lugo, performed under the following order.

‘ The army has still eleven leagues (forty-five miles) to march; the soldiers must make an exertion to accomplish them; the rear-guard cannot stop, and those who fall behind must take their fate.’

By which excess of exertion several marches were gained on the enemy.\*

Having, we conceive, fully established the correctness of the text of Colonel Jones’s work on this second point, and also of his deductions, it only remains to repel the insinuation thrown out in the Review of a wish on the part of that officer to cast ‘ungenerous aspersions’ upon, and ‘tear and deface with harpy claws’ Sir John Moore’s ‘fair scroll of fame and honour.’ This

\* ‘ I gave notice to the admiral of my intention, and begged that the transports might be brought to Corunna. Had I found them here on my arrival on the 11th instant, the embarkation would easily have been effected; for I had gained several marches on the French.’—*Extract of a Letter from Sir John Moore to Lord Castlereagh, dated Corunna, 13th January, 1809.*

will be best done by quoting the concluding passage of Colonel Jones's work respecting that commander.

**Speaking of the battle of Corunna—**

'All feeling of triumph, however, amongst the victors was at the moment damped, and all mutual congratulation checked, by deep concern for the loss of their chief, General Sir John Moore, whose personal intrepidity always placing him foremost at the moment of danger, had commanded their respect, and whose manly character and humane disposition had won their esteem. He languished several hours after receiving his wound, expressing, under most acute pain, the elevated feelings of a soldier and a Christian. His remains were deposited the same evening in one of the bastions of the citadel.

'Here let us for a moment pause, and in justice to the memory of a gallant and accomplished soldier remark, that Sir John Moore's march on Sahagun, from which all his subsequent misfortunes arose, was stated by himself at the time to be a sacrifice of his own judgment to public opinion. His first retrograde movement from Saldanha, on discovering the danger which menaced his communications, fully justified the high opinion previously entertained of his talents:—his decision, his firmness, and the manœuvres he executed on that occasion, extricated the army from a most perilous situation. His subsequent retreat from Villa Franca is now known to have been most unnecessarily precipitated; but lest we too harshly censure an error of judgment, it should be recollected that the halt of Buonaparte with the main body of his forces, was at the time unknown; that the retreat through Galicia being little expected, few ar-

rangements had been made for the supply of the troops, and that with the great strength of the country Sir John was personally unacquainted: further, that the British army was not then the veteran body we have since been accustomed to regard it, and that the star of Napoleon still shone in its greatest lustre.'

This surely savours more of friendly feeling to support, than of 'ungenerous aspersion to tear and deface' the fame of Sir John Moore, and renders the insinuations of the Reviewer as destitute of sting, as his reproaches are 'curiously' devoid of foundation.

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